Secure Block Ciphers - Cryptanalysis and Design

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Abstract

The rapid evolution of computational devices and the widespread adoption of digital communication have deeply transformed the way we conduct both business and everyday life and they continue to do so. The ability to ensure confidentiality and integrity of information sent over digital channels is fundamental to this development and is absolutely essential for all private and corporate communication, ranging from bank transactions, digital citizen services, and remote computer access, to cell phone calls and instant messaging. The vast majority of secured data sent over all types of networks is encrypted using so-called symmetric ciphers. The security of our digital infrastructure thus rests at its very base on their security.

The central topic of this thesis is the security of block ciphers – the most prominent form of symmetric ciphers. This thesis is separated in two parts. The first part is an introduction to block ciphers and their cryptanalysis, the second part contains publications written and published during the PhD studies. The first publication evaluates the security of a modification of the AES in which the choice of S-box is unknown to the attacker. We find that some of the attacks that can be applied to the AES can be transferred to this block cipher, albeit with a higher attack complexity. The second publication introduces a new block cipher family which is targeted for new applications in fully homomorphic encryption and multi-party computation. We demonstrate the soundness of the design and its superior performance in these applications. The third publication treats the cryptanalysis of SIMON, a cipher proposed by the NSA. In particular we discuss how the methods of differential and linear cryptanalysis can correctly be applied to ciphers of this type. The fourth publication introduces a cryptanalytic framework which generalizes differential cryptanalysis. We demonstrate that attacks based on impossible transitions in this framework can competitively break round-reduced block ciphers in the low-data setting.
Resumé

Den hurtige og fortsatte udvikling af beregningsenheder og den udbredte overgang til digital kommunikation har fundamentalt ændret den måde, hvorpå vi gør forretning og begår os i hverdagen. Evnen til at sikre fortrolighed og integritet af den information, vi sender via digitale kommunikationskanaler, er fundamentalt for denne udvikling og er absolut essentiel for al privat og forretningsmæssig kommunikation, spændende over alt fra bankoverførsler, digitale offentlige tjenester og fjernadgang til computere, til mobiltelefonsamtaler og chatbeskeder. Langt størstedelen af sikret data, der bliver sendt over alle typer netværk, er krypteret med såkaldte symmetriske ciphers. Vores digitale infrastrukturs sikkerhed hviler således grundlæggende på sikkerheden af disse.

Zusammenfassung


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I truly enjoyed my time as a Ph.D. student. I am aware that this is to the smallest part my own accomplishment and I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to those who made this such a pleasant experience.

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0 Introduction

The development and rapid evolution of digital computers is without doubt the technological advancement that most deeply changed modern life. The exponential growth in computing power together with the reduction of size and power consumption of computational devices has led us from room filling machines to computers that easily fit in our pocket while providing computing power unparalleled by the former machines. While this could certainly have been a major source of change by itself, it was the pervasion of communication networks and advances in communication technology that allowed computers to have the impact that we see today – most importantly the creation of the Internet and mobile telephone networks.

It is no coincidence that this development was accompanied by the foundation and growth of modern cryptology. The central goal of cryptology is to provide methods that enable secure communication over insecure channels. Incidentally, the channels of modern communication are often inherently insecure both due to the nature of the transportation medium, such as radio waves, and the disparate ownership structure of these networks. It is thus that cryptology came to be a cornerstone of today’s communication infrastructure making services such as electronic bank transactions, remote access, and private messaging possible.

Classically there are three characteristics of secure communication: confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. Confidentiality refers to the inability of an eavesdropper to infer any information contained in the communication. Integrity describes the assurance that the information has not been modified during transmission. Authenticity is the ability to prove the source of a certain information.

A method or algorithm that provides confidentiality of information is called a cipher. Using a cipher, a sender can encrypt information and send the encrypted information to a recipient. The recipient can then again use the cipher to decrypt and receive the original information. To avoid an eavesdropper decrypting the message, the exact method used to encrypt the information must be secret. This is commonly achieved by initializing the cipher with a secret key. A cipher thus more accurately corresponds to a family of encryption and decryption methods.

Generally speaking, there are two types of ciphers. The first and older kind are the symmetric ciphers. With these, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption. The second type are the asymmetric ciphers — also called public-key ciphers. With these, decryption requires a different key than encryption. Importantly, they are constructed such that knowledge of one key does not grant knowledge of the other key. While asymmetric ciphers generally have more powerful applications and enable solutions in situations where symmetric ciphers fail, symmetric ciphers tend to have considerably faster implementations. In practice, one often combines both
types to benefit as well from the speed of symmetric ciphers as from the versatility of asymmetric ones.

Both symmetric and asymmetric ciphers can be used to achieve the two other characteristics of secure communication: integrity and authenticity. Symmetric ciphers are used here in a construction called message authentication code (MAC). The corresponding construction for asymmetric ciphers is called a digital signature scheme.

In recent decades, the scope of cryptology has been broadened to encompass more diverse applications that center generally around the problem of retaining control over some information while at the same time allowing other parties limited access to this information. A good example for this is Yao’s millionaires’ problem: a group of millionaires wants to determine the richest among them without revealing their exact wealth to each other. This and related problems can be solved with a cryptographic techniques called secure multi-party computation (MPC). Other examples of such techniques include fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) which allows an external party to do meaningful computation on encrypted data without gaining knowledge of either the data or the unencrypted result of the computation, and verifiable computation where a party can prove to another party that it indeed accurately performed some desired computation.

We will concentrate here on the oldest branch of cryptology: symmetric ciphers. There are two types of symmetric ciphers: stream ciphers and block ciphers. While stream ciphers encrypt messages as a whole, block ciphers only encrypt one fixed-size piece of information at a time. Block ciphers hence require a message to be separated into pieces of this size. To avoid security problems which can arise when every piece of information is encrypted independently of the others — in particular when the same piece of information is always encrypted to the same encrypted piece — block ciphers should always be executed in a so-called mode of operation. This is an embedding structure which connects the encryptions of the single message pieces to create dependencies between these. These modes also allow block ciphers to act like stream ciphers. Here we will only concern ourselves with block ciphers.

0.1 Overview of the thesis

This is a thesis by publication which consists of two parts. In the first part, we give a concise introduction to block ciphers and their cryptanalysis. Topics covered include different notions of block cipher security, some general design strategies, and important cryptanalytic techniques such as differential and linear cryptanalysis. For more details and background references, [21] is a good source.

The second part of the thesis contains a collection of publications which treat various aspects of block cipher security. In the first publication, a variant of the Advanced Encryption Standard is considered in which an integral building block — the S-box — is considered to be unknown to the attacker. It is demonstrated that integral cryptanalysis can still be used to attack up to six rounds of this cipher,
0.1 Overview of the thesis

recovering both the key and the secret S-box.

In the second publication, a new family of ciphers is introduced which is optimized for deployment in fully homomorphic encryption or multi-party computation schemes. In such schemes, the non-linear operations of a cipher pose the largest bottleneck. This new cipher family is thus designed from ground up with the goal of minimizing its non-linearity. The publication includes a cryptanalytic evaluation of the scheme as well as an implementation comparison with existing schemes. It should be mentioned that there exist attacks which can break some members of the cipher family with less time complexity than exhaustive search \cite{12}. An updated version of this publication will soon be publicly available.

The third publication analyzes the type of round functions used in the block cipher \textsc{Simon}, published by the NSA. In particular, exact and efficient methods to determine the linear and differential round transition probabilities are derived. Those are then used to find optimal differential and linear trails using a computer-aided approach. Further building up on this, the parameter space of \textsc{Simon} is explored with regard to security against these attack vectors.

The fourth publication introduces a framework which generalizes the methods of differential cryptanalysis. It is shown that impossible transitions in this framework can be used to successfully attack round-reduced versions of the Advanced Encryption Standard and the Data Encryption Standard with low data complexity. Furthermore it is shown that higher-order differentials correspond to the generalized form of truncated differentials in this framework.
Part I

Introduction to block ciphers and their security
1 Block Ciphers

In this chapter, we will introduce the concept of a block cipher, discuss the different notions of block cipher security, and take a look at some basic design strategies.

1.1 Notations and conventions

We will denote the finite field with $n$ elements as $\mathbb{F}_n$ or as $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$ where $p$ is a prime number and the characteristic of the field. We will denote the logarithm to the base 2 as $\log$. Random variables will be written with bold capital letters, e.g., $X$. When a probability distribution is not explicitly mentioned, a uniform distribution is assumed. The size (or cardinality) of a set $A$ is denoted as $|A|$. Let $A \subseteq X$. When the superset $X$ is clear from the context we will denote the complement $X \setminus A$ of $A$ in $B$ as $\overline{A}$.

1.2 Basic definitions

Conceptually a block cipher is some method that allows us to encode a fixed-size piece of information — such as a word of fixed length in some alphabet — using a secret piece of information, a key. The hope for any well-designed block cipher is that it should not be possible to extract the original information from the encoded word without knowledge of the secret key. We start by defining the basic concepts of block ciphers.

A block cipher is a family of bijective functions $\text{Enc}_k$ parametrized by a key $k \in \mathcal{K}$, $|\mathcal{K}| < \infty$ that map a finite set of messages $\mathcal{M}$ to a finite set of encrypted messages $\mathcal{C}$:

$$\text{Enc}_k : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}.$$ 

The input to a block cipher is called the plaintext, the output is called the ciphertext. These are usually denoted as $m$ and $c$. Accordingly $\mathcal{M}$ and $\mathcal{C}$ are called the plaintext space (or message space) and the ciphertext space. $\mathcal{K}$ is called the key space. The function $\text{Enc}_k$ is called the encryption function, its inverse $\text{Dec}_k := \text{Enc}_k^{-1}$ is called the decryption function.

Usually $\mathcal{M}$, $\mathcal{C}$, and $\mathcal{K}$ will have a group structure e.g., $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ or $\mathbb{F}_{p^n}$. The most common choices are the binary representations $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ and $\mathbb{F}_{2^q}$. The elements of these can nicely be associated with bit-strings of length $n$ or $qm$ respectively and are thus very amenable for implementation in computers. Due to this, we define the block size $n$ of a cipher as $n := \lceil \log |\mathcal{M}| \rceil$ and likewise the key size $l$ as $l := \lceil \log |\mathcal{K}| \rceil$. In this thesis we will only be concerned with bit-based ciphers.
1.3 Notions of security

We expect from a secure cipher that it is not possible for an adversary to infer the plaintext from the ciphertext without knowledge of the secret key. Let us assume an attacker has collected some amount of ciphertext. Usually the attack will have some a priori knowledge about the plaintext. This could for example be the language or some format that the plaintext will be in. The attacker could then always try out all possible keys until one of the keys returns a plausible message.

Such an attack, in which the adversary simply tries out all keys, is called an exhaustive search or a brute-force attack. Unless the adversary has absolutely no knowledge about the plaintext or is given only a very limited amount of ciphertext, such an attack is always possible. Brute-force attacks thus pose a natural reference for the quality of any attack.

Of course to apply an exhaustive search, the attacker must know the cipher and the possible keys. To thwart this type of attack one could simply try to keep the block cipher itself a secret. While this has been done in the past, and sometimes continues to be done, Auguste Kerckhoffs famously formulated in 1883 [17] what is nowadays a generally accepted principle:

**Kerckhoffs’ principle.** *The security of a cipher should solely rely on the secrecy of the key and never on the secrecy of the encryption method.*

Adhering to this principle will ensure that even an adversary with full knowledge of the encryption method, will not be able to break the cipher. Today this principle is often even taken a step further: it is considered best practice to make the design of a block cipher public. While this removes any secrecy of the method, it enables the large community of academic, industrial, governmental, and leisure cryptanalysts to scrutinize the design. This either leads to broken designs, which should not be used in the first place, or to an increased level of trust in the security of the cipher.

We will now start to take a closer look at the components that together define the different notions of block ciphers security.

1.3.1 The adversary

When we want to define what a secure block cipher is, the first question that we have to answer is “Secure against whom?” What are the abilities that we need to assume an adversary can potentially have and use to break an encryption scheme?

For being able to attack the cipher, the adversary needs access to some data. The extent to which the adversary is granted access defines four different main types of attack scenarios.

**Definition 1.1** (Ciphertext-only attacks). The adversary is only given access to a number of ciphertexts.

**Definition 1.2** (Known-plaintext attacks). The adversary is given access to a number of corresponding plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
Definition 1.3 (Chosen-plaintext attacks). The adversary can choose one set of plaintexts for which she will be given the corresponding ciphertexts.

Definition 1.4 (Adaptively chosen-plaintext attacks). The adversary has access to the encryption of any plaintext of her choice during the whole attack.

Clearly each attack type gives the adversary more power than the previous attack types. While especially the chosen-plaintexts attacks might seem to be giving the adversary unrealistically much access, there are practical scenarios in which attacks of this type are possible. Furthermore, as security against chosen-plaintext attacks is a stronger security notion, we might want our ciphers to be secure against even such an adversary.

For the last two types of attacks, there exist the corresponding ciphertext versions: chosen-ciphertext and adaptively chosen-ciphertext attacks. These types of attacks can also be combined to give the strongest types of access: chosen-plaintext chosen-ciphertext attacks and the corresponding adaptive versions.

Block ciphers are finite objects and as such they can always be attacked just given enough time and data. As mentioned above, it is for example always possible to find the key by exhaustive search. To make meaningful statements about the security of a block cipher, it is hence necessary to state what the maximally allowed time and the maximally allowed amount of data are. The natural upper bound for the allowed time — the so-called time complexity — is the time needed to exhaustively try out the whole key space. The natural upper bound for the maximally allowed knowledge of data — the so-called data complexity — is the whole codebook, i.e., all possible plaintext-ciphertext pairs.

The data complexity can directly be measured in allowed plaintext-ciphertext pairs. For the time complexity it is not so straightforward. The usually taken and arguably most objective method of determining the time complexity of some attack is stating it in relation to the time that the encryption of one plaintext would take. Unfortunately this relation depends on the concrete computing machine (computing model) and the complexity of an attack in relation to the complexity of an encryption can vary depending on this\footnote{A good example are modern CPUs that have dedicated processor instructions for encryptions with the block cipher AES, making encryptions relatively cheaper in comparison to older CPUs where AES encryptions could not utilize these instructions.} One can argue though that while the concrete machine used for an attack can make a difference of a small factor the general order of magnitude of an attack’s time complexity should not deviate too much.

A third resource that an attacker needs and whose amount is often not stated in concrete attacks is the allowed memory capacity. Whereas a high time complexity can often be handled by parallelizing the attack and distributing it to a large number of computers, a high memory complexity cannot so easily be dealt with and can pose the bottleneck in practical attack scenarios. High memory complexity can also have a large effect on the time complexity as the access time increases considerably when moving from cache to RAM to disk storage.
1.3.2 Attack goals

To define the security of a cipher, we need to both define the power and limitations and the goal that the attacker tries to achieve. We will now introduce a number of different possible attack goals in decreasing order of difficulty for the attacker.

**Definition 1.5** (Key-recovery attack). In a key-recovery attack, the attacker’s goal is to retrieve the key.

As said before it is (almost) ² always possible to find the key by exhaustive search. A key-recovery attack would thus only be considered a break of the cipher’s security if it has a time complexity below that of a brute-force attack. Of course it is principally possible for the designers of a cipher to explicitly state lower security claims.

**Definition 1.6** (Global deduction attack). In a global deduction attack, the goal of the attacker is to find an efficient method for decrypting arbitrary ciphertexts.

While this is a weaker attack goal, as we do not require the attacker to recover the key itself, a method that can decrypt arbitrary ciphertexts is usually equally devastating for the security of a cipher. For a well-designed cipher we would hope that this should not be possible for any ciphertexts which gives rise to the third possible attack goal.

**Definition 1.7** (Local deduction attack). In a local deduction attack, the goal of the attacker is to find a correct plaintext-ciphertext pair different from those that she has been given directly.

While it is intuitively clear that we would want a good cipher to be resistant against the above mentioned attack goals, for the next goal it is not initially clear why susceptibility to it can pose a security risk.

**Definition 1.8** (Distinguishing attack). In a distinguishing attack, the attacker is given access to both the cipher with a uniformly randomly chosen key and to a function that has been chosen uniformly at random from all invertible mappings from the plaintext space to the ciphertext space. The goal of the attacker is then to determine which of the two is the cipher and which is the random function.

Intuitively it is a desirable property of a cipher to look like a random function. After all this is what we would expect from the ciphertexts: they should look random. Although this type of attack looks like it is mostly of theoretical interest, we will later see that ciphers which fail to be indistinguishable from random permutations are often also vulnerable to the other attack goals (see Section 2.1).

The counterpart to the last type of attack goal, the distinguishing attack, is an idealized block cipher:

²Exceptions are scenarios in which the attacker simply lacks enough information to deduce the key, for example due to a lack of data, a lack of knowledge about the plaintext distribution in a ciphertext-only attack, or the existence of equivalent keys.
1.3 Notions of security

**Definition 1.9 (Ideal cipher).** An ideal cipher for a message space \( \mathcal{M} \), a ciphertext space \( \mathcal{C} \) and a key space \( \mathcal{K} \) is a family of functions indexed by \( k \in \mathcal{K} \) where each function is chosen independently and uniformly at random from all bijective \( \mathcal{M} \) to \( \mathcal{C} \).

An ideal cipher tries to capture the intuitive notion of what we would like a cipher to behave like. It is important to note that the ideal cipher is not a block cipher according to our definition. It corresponds rather to the set of all possible block ciphers (for given \( \mathcal{M} \), \( \mathcal{C} \), and \( \mathcal{K} \)) endowed with the uniform probability distribution. It thus inherently lives in a probability space — no concrete instantiation can ever be an ideal cipher. The best we can hope for is thus that a good concrete design is indistinguishable from an ideal cipher, i.e., an adversary trying to achieve a distinguishing attack will only succeed with a probability very close to one half.

We now have a range of different types of adversaries and attack goals that together create different security notions. Combining the strongest type of adversary, the adversary with adaptive chosen-ciphertext chosen-plaintext access, with the weakest type of attack, the distinguishing attack, creates the strongest notion of security for a block cipher (among the notions discussed here). Today we expect a good cipher to be secure in any of the notions that one can construct with the adversaries and goals described here.

We should also mention that there exists a range of other types of adversaries and attack goals that give rise to other interesting security notions. It is for example possible to give the adversary different computational restrictions for the offline phase, the phase where she does not yet have access to the cipher, than for the online phase. This distinction is essential for example in the classical time-memory trade-off (see Hellman [15]). It is also possible to give the adversary access to two versions of the cipher with different keys where the adversary can choose the difference between the keys, allowing for so-called related-key attacks (see for example Biham [2] or Knudsen [18]). An attacker that can restrict the cipher to only choosing its key from a subset of all keys, creates the notion of weak-key attacks (see for example [26]). An interesting variation of the attack goal are multi-target attacks where the adversary has access to a collection of block ciphers and the goal is to break one of them.

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**Shannon’s confusion and diffusion**

Shannon described in his fundamental work [32] two properties that ciphers should have to help frustrate attacks: confusion and diffusion. By diffusion, Shannon referred to the ability of the cipher to make any statistic which is simple to detect in the plaintexts difficult to detect in the ciphertexts and vice versa. Today we might rephrase this as that a good cipher should behave like a

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\[ As \text{ it is often the case in symmetric cryptography, it is not possible to define “very close to one half” precisely without making an arbitrary choice of constant. In theoretical cryptography, idealized constructs usually have a size parameter that can tend to infinity allowing limit definitions as common in complexity theory. As concrete block ciphers are always finite, this is unfortunately not possible here. \]
random permutation. By *confusion*, Shannon referred to the feature of a cipher that key recovery remains difficult, even when the adversary is given a large number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Today we might say that a cipher should be secure against key recovery attacks under known-plaintext attacks. While this is an integral requirement for ciphers nowadays, before Shannon the security of many encryption schemes would break down under known-plaintext attacks.

### 1.4 General block cipher design considerations

From the general notions of block cipher security, let us now move to considerations for practical block cipher constructions. Let us start the discussion with a quote from Claude Shannon from the article that is often credited with founding modern cryptography in which he describes what a good cipher design should ideally achieve:

> It is not enough merely to be sure none of the standard methods of cryptanalysis work — we must be sure that no method whatever will break the system easily. This, in fact, has been the weakness of many systems; designed to resist all the known methods of solution, they later gave rise to new cryptanalytic techniques which rendered them vulnerable to analysis. (Claude E. Shannon, 1949 [32, p. 704])

Despite the fact that almost 70 years have passed since Shannon’s work and despite the many considerable advances that have been made in symmetric cryptology, the described situation has not changed: in lack of any method to ensure that an efficient cipher design is secure against all possible attacks our best option of determining a cipher’s security is still to ensure that the cipher is secure against all known attack vectors.

Before we discuss such attack techniques on block ciphers just yet, let us review some general design decisions that have proven themselves as good starting points for cipher design. A first property that is certainly desirable is that a cipher should make any simple relationship between plaintexts too complicated to be detected in the ciphertexts. Intuitively we would like the cipher to thoroughly mix the possible messages to conceal such relations.

Without discussing the role of the keys yet, how can we build a function that achieves such a mixing property? Certainly if we randomly picked a permutation, it would be a good mixing function. But any such function would be impossible to describe, let alone to implement. We thus need some method to build such mixing function that is viable. Shannon [32] suggested to take the composition (product) of many simple functions to create a complex one. Intuitively this makes sense: just

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4While we seem to have some intuitive idea of what such a well-mixing (pseudo-random) function is, it seems extremely difficult to give a sensible, formal definition. As not uncommon in cryptology we will let our intuition guide us.
as with shuffling cards, repeating a large number of mildly random operations, we expect to get quite thoroughly random results.

How then do we get the key into play? To achieve security against known- or chosen-plaintext attacks, we would like the relationship between the key, plaintext and ciphertext to be as complex as possible while maintaining an efficient construction. We can utilize the same approach that we already use to achieve a good mixing: By blending the key with the message during or between application of the simple functions, the key will be intermingled with the message in a complex way. The repeated application of these simple functions can thus not only be used to hide the relationship between the plaintext and the ciphertext but also to hide the relationship between the plaintext, the ciphertext, and the key.

All modern block ciphers follow this concept which gives rise to the following definition: a product cipher is a block cipher that consists of the repeated composition of functions:

\[ \text{Enc}_k = f_k^r \circ \cdots \circ f_k^1, \quad r > 1, \]

where the keys for the smaller functions are derived from the general key $k$ via a mapping called key schedule, $k_i = \text{KeySchedule}_k(i), 1 \leq i \leq r$. The functions $f_k^i, 1 \leq i \leq r$ are called round functions and the respective keys $k_i$ are called round keys. If the functions $f^i$ are identical (or almost identical), such a cipher is also referred to as an iterated block cipher. The intermediate results between rounds are either called intermediate messages or states. As we will only be concerned with product ciphers, we will implicitly assume for the rest of this thesis that block ciphers are of this kind.

The difficulty of designing good product ciphers lies then in determining suitable round functions, a good method of blending the key into the message, and the number of rounds needed to achieve a sufficiently complex relationship between plaintext, ciphertext, and key. In the following, we will introduce the two most prominent design classes.

1.5 Substitution-permutation networks

One possibility of constructing good round functions is this: to avoid the expensive implementation cost of good mixing operations on the whole message, we chop the message into smaller parts, apply good mixing operations on each part, and then use a cheap mixing operation to mingle all parts again. This corresponds to two different mixing layers called substitution layer and permutation layer. A cipher which is constructed as a sequence of substitution and permutation layers is called a substitution-permutation network (abbreviated as SPN).

In the substitution layer, the state is separated into smaller segments — usually all of the same size. Each of the segments is then substituted independently of the other segments according to some rule. Usually this is done via a so-called S-box (“S” as in substitution) which is simply a look-up table. Depending on the design, the same S-box might be used for all segments, or different S-boxes can be employed. Choosing
Figure 1.1: A schematic of a substitution-permutation network. S-boxes are denoted by S, the permutation layers are denoted by P.

good S-boxes is a large field of research in itself but as they are often the only source of non-linearity in the cipher, good non-linear properties are usually desirable.

The permutation layer operates on the entire state. As such it is desirable to keep the complexity of this layer low to achieve an efficient implementation. In hardware the cheapest implementation for the permutation layer would be a mere reordering of the state bits which corresponds to a rewiring — hence the name permutation layer. In modern ciphers, especially those designed for software implementation, the permutation layer is often more generally a linear or affine transformation.

To mix a round key into the state, many options such as key-dependent S-boxes are available. The most common technique is though to add a key of the same length as the state to the state using either modular or exclusive-or addition. This can be done either before both layers, between them, or after them. See Fig. 1.1 for a schematic of a substitution-permutation network.

By far the most important block cipher based on a substitution-permutation network is the Advanced Encryption Standard (abbreviated AES). Originally named Rijndael, it was standardized by the U.S. National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) in 2001 after being selected as finalist among fifteen submissions in a two-round standardization process. Due to the importance of the AES and its influence on many other cipher designs we will shortly describe its general structure. For more details on the specification as well as a good background cipher design decision, on the AES by its designers Daemen and Rijmen is a good source.

The AES encrypts messages of sixteen bytes, or 128 bits. It has either ten, twelve, or fourteen rounds, depending on whether the key size 128, 192, or 256 was chosen. Each round consists of a substitution layer and a permutation layer followed by the exclusive-or addition of a round key to the state. In the substitution layer, each byte is substituted according to an S-box — the same S-box for all bytes and rounds.
1.6 Feistel ciphers

The basic idea underlying Feistel ciphers, also called Feistel networks, is similar to that of substitution-permutation networks. Namely the idea is to split the state into segments, apply the complex and hence expensive transformations only to segments and use a linear and cheap transformation to mix the segments. In contrast to substitution-permutation networks, Feistel ciphers do not apply the complex transformations to all segments in parallel but apply the transformation only to a subset of segments each round. Furthermore, Feistel ciphers allow non-invertible transformations for the segments.

In the classical Feistel construction, the state is split into two equally sized segments. The first segment is sent through some transformation, usually confusingly also called the (Feistel) round function, and the mixed with the second segment via an exclusive-or addition. Both the result of this addition and the original value of the first segment are kept and used as the two input segments to the next round — only with reversed roles. The key is usually introduced by being added to either the input or the output of the transformation. See Fig. 1.2 for a schematic of a Feistel network.
Some advantages of a Feistel network with respect to a substitution-permutation network are the following: the possibility to use non-invertible round functions giving the designer more freedom of choice, the potentially smaller implementations in hardware both due to the fact that an expensive non-linear function is only applied to a part of the state, and the fact that the same network can be used for decryption, only with an inverted sequence of round keys. But then, as only a part of the state undergoes a non-linear transformation each round, generally more rounds are needed to achieve security than in comparable SPN constructions.

There exist many generalizations of the classical Feistel constructions and Feistel networks can differ in a number of ways. Instead of using same-sized segments, segments of different size may be used. Instead of splitting the state into two segments, more segments can be used. In constructions where more than two segments are used, the number of Feistel round functions used per round of the cipher can differ as well as how these are used to mingle the segments.

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The original Feistel cipher

The most influential Feistel cipher is the Data Encryption Standard (abbreviated DES). It is the predecessor of the AES and was standardized in 1977 [10]. The underlying original design was developed by Horst Feistel at IBM [14] from whom the name stems. This first version of the Feistel cipher differed in two ways from the DES and most of todays schemes. Firstly, the switching of segments at the end of each round functions was key-dependent in each bit. So each bit was switched or not switched independently of the other bits depending on the round key. Secondly, the round function, which was build as one round of an SPN, contained a key-dependent choice of S-boxes.
2 Cryptanalysis

In this chapter, we will first give an overview of different types of attack elements and how they can be combined to form more complex attacks. We will then move on to discuss some of the cryptanalytic techniques used in the publications of this thesis.

2.1 Overview of attack types and attack constructions

The simplest and most straight-forward attack which is always available given one or a few pairs of known plaintext and ciphertext is the exhaustive key search or brute-force attack. To determine the correct key the available ciphertexts are decrypted under all possible keys and any key for which this does not result in the correct plaintexts is discarded. To identify the correct key with high probability, at least around the order of $2^k$ trial decryptions are needed where $k$ is the size of the key. Because this attack is (almost) always possible, it is used as the reference frame for most other attacks.

To construct an attack which can be executed faster than a brute-force attack, some weakness in the cipher design needs to be used. Central for such cryptanalytic attempts is the fact that block ciphers are round-based. As elaborated in Section 1.4, the whole idea behind using round-based designs is to reach security through the repeated application of round functions that by themselves are not cryptographically secure. Any cryptanalytic attempt will thus start by analyzing the round function and its weaknesses. The difficult part is to determine those weaknesses that create persisting vulnerabilities also in the repeated composition of the round functions.

2.1.1 Attack elements

Successful attacks are often a combination of different attack elements that together can be used to recover the key or distinguish the cipher. We will now briefly describe the major types of such attack elements.

Partial key guessing The importance of a thorough mixing of the whole key with the state is manifested in the partial key guessing technique. Suppose that after some number of rounds there is some part of the output state that, when written as a function of the input bits and the key bits, does not depend on all key bits. We can then determine the value of these key bits by using exhaustive search only on them.

If this technique can successfully be applied, it lends itself to a divide-and-conquer approach to key recovery, strongly reducing the time complexity to determine the full
key. This technique is rarely though applicable to all rounds of a decently designed cipher. Its importance lies much rather in how it can be combined with many other attack elements to construct key recovery attacks.

**Deterministic distinguisher** A *deterministic distinguisher* is a property of the cipher that holds for any key and would be highly improbable to hold for a random permutation. It is important that such property can be evaluated efficiently to be useful as a distinguisher. Typically such distinguisher could take the form of a linear equation in the ciphertext and plaintext bits. Examples of such distinguishers which we will discuss later are integral properties and truncated differentials.

To every property that always holds, there is the complementary property that never holds. Clearly both are equally good at distinguishing the cipher from a random permutation. It can at times be conceptually easier to work with the impossible property. This is notable for example in impossible differential attacks.

**Statistical distinguishers** A *statistical distinguisher* is a property that is key-dependent but will for most keys be improbable to hold for a random permutation. A statistical distinguisher can usually be regarded as a random variable over the probability space that results from picking the cipher key uniformly at random. Again it is important that whether or not this property holds must be efficiently determinable.

The important characteristic of a statistical distinguisher is the probability with which it holds. As an exact determination is often infeasible, it is common to make some independence assumptions that allow an easier deduction of this probability. Important examples of statistical distinguishers are differentials, linear approximations, and boomerangs.

### 2.1.2 Combining attack elements

Powerful attacks are almost always the result of a combination of different attack elements to construct attacks that can cover more rounds or to turn a distinguishing attack into a key recovery attack. We will discuss now some typical combinations of attack elements.

**Partial key guessing + a distinguisher** To turn a distinguishing attack into a key recovery attack, we can combine a distinguisher with partial key recovery. Let us assume that the distinguishing property is determined from some of the input bits to round 1 and some of the output bits of round \( r \) of the cipher. Let us further assume that those output bits of round \( r \) can be calculated from the output bits of round \( r + s \) and some but not all of the key bits.

An attacker given access to the output bits of round \( r + s \) and the corresponding input bits but not the intermediate bits, can now try all key bit combinations needed to determine the intermediate state bits. By discarding all those key bit combinations
that do not give intermediate state bits for which the distinguishing property holds, the attacker can reduce the possible key space, potentially to the point of determining the key exactly.

There are two potential pitfalls in this combination. The first one is, it needs to be made sure that the property is unlikely to hold if the output of round \( r + s \) is partially decrypted with a wrong key bit guess. This is commonly known as the \textit{wrong-key randomization hypothesis}. It usually requires that the quality of the distinguishing property does not hold equally well over all rounds but is specific to round \( r \).

The second pitfall is that the constructed attack might not be actually better than an exhaustive key search. Two factors need to be taken into account when determining the time complexity of this combined attack: the time needed to determine the validity of the distinguishing property and the quality of the distinguishing property. The latter determines the probability with which wrong key guesses can be weeded out.

To improve the quality of the attack, the distinguisher can at times be combined with partial key guessing both at the beginning and at the end of the distinguisher, not only at the end.

\textbf{Partial key guessing} + \textbf{partial key guessing} Assume that some part of the state after \( r \) rounds only depends on the input bits and some, but not all key bits. Let us furthermore assume that the same partial intermediate state when written as a function of the output bits of round \( r + s \) and the key bits, also does not depend on all key bits.

An attacker can now, given access to a number of input texts to round 1 and the corresponding output texts of round \( r + s \), mount the following attack. First she creates a list of all possible intermediate states and the corresponding key bit values, determined from the input texts of round 1. Then she creates the corresponding list of intermediate states and key bit values, now determined from the output bits of round \( r + s \). To determine potential key candidates, she can look for intermediate states that appear in both lists. To further reduce the number of key candidates, she can test whether the key bits from the first list and the second list are compatible for states that appear in both lists.

This type of attack is called a \textit{meet-in-the-middle attack} and was first applied to 2DES, a concatenation of two DES ciphers using different keys [11]. The time complexity of such an attack is essentially determined by the more expensive one of the two partial key guesses. The downside is that it requires memory to store at least one of the two lists (the other one can be generated and discarded entry by entry). It is often possible though to drastically reduce the memory requirements with a slightly higher time complexity using Floyd’s cycle finding method (see for example Morita, Ohta, and Miyaguchi [28]).

\textbf{Distinguisher} + \textbf{distinguisher} At times it is possible to combine two distinguishers to create a longer distinguishing property on a block cipher. For example, if we have two deterministic distinguishers, one on the first \( r \) rounds, and another on the
second \( s \) rounds, that are contradicting each other in the intermediate states, we can construct an impossible property. This is for example done to construct impossible differentials using two probability-one truncated differentials in the miss-in-the-middle technique.

It is also possible to combine statistical distinguishers. This is for example done in differential-linear attacks \cite{25} or in boomerang attacks \cite{36}. To be able to determine the success probability of these attacks, it is necessary to make additional assumption about independences which are not always satisfied (see for example \cite{29}).

\section*{2.2 Differential cryptanalysis}

One of the most important cryptanalytic techniques available today is differential cryptanalysis. Here we will give a concise introduction to the basic principles and some important extensions.

\subsection*{2.2.1 Basic differential cryptanalysis}

In differential cryptanalysis, the cryptanalyst tries to find a correlation between the difference of two plaintexts and the difference of two ciphertexts. If the correlation is sufficiently stronger than the expected correlation for a random permutation, it may be used in a cryptanalytic attack.

The core idea behind differential cryptanalysis is to choose the difference such that it is unaffected by the way the round keys are introduced into the state. Usually round keys are either added as vectors over \( \mathbb{F}_2 \) or as elements of \( \mathbb{Z}_n \) for some \( n \in \mathbb{N} \). More generally we can say that the round key is most often introduced via some group operation.

For the sake of simplicity, we restrict ourselves here to the case where the group operation is addition of vectors over \( \mathbb{F}_2 \). Most (if not all) definitions can equally be made for a general group addition. This restriction also implies that the texts or states, at which we are looking, lie in \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \) for some \( n \in \mathbb{N} \).

\begin{definition}[Differential] A difference \( \delta \) between two messages \( m_1 \) and \( m_2 \) is defined with respect to the addition over \( \mathbb{F}_2 \) as \( m_1 \oplus m_2 \). A differential is a pair of differences \((\alpha, \beta)\). These differences denote a difference in the input and a difference in the output for some function.

We write \( \alpha \xrightarrow{f} \beta \) to indicate a differential over a function \( f \) or just \( \alpha \rightarrow \beta \) when the function is clear from the context. To write the event that a specific pair of texts \((x, x \oplus \alpha)\) follows the differential, i.e. that \( f(x \oplus \alpha) \oplus f(x) = \beta \), we write \( \alpha \xrightarrow{x} \beta \).

\begin{definition}[Differential probability] Let \( X \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \) be a uniformly distributed random variable. Let \( f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^m \). The differential probability of \( \alpha \xrightarrow{f} \beta \) is defined as
\[
\Pr_X \left( \alpha \xrightarrow{f} \beta \right) \quad (2.1)
\]
\end{definition}
which can also be written as
\[
\Pr_X(f(X) \oplus f(X \oplus \alpha) = \beta).
\]
(2.2)

This probability is also denoted as \(\text{DP}_f(\alpha, \beta)\) or \(\text{DP}(\alpha, \beta)\) when the respective function is clear from the context.

For a random function (and similarly for a random permutation), the probability of any given differential with non-zero input difference is very low, on average \(2^{-n}\). If we have for a function \(f\) a differential of probability significantly higher than \(2^{-n}\), we can use this differential to distinguish the function \(f\) from a random function (or permutation).

There are two problems that we encounter when we are trying to find a differential suitable for a distinguisher:

1. How do we determine the differential probability when exhaustively trying all text pairs is computationally infeasible?

2. How do we determine the differential probability of functions with secret parameters (e.g. block ciphers with secret keys)?

Let us first discuss a partial solution to the first problem for composed functions. In a product cipher, it is natural to consider intermediate differences taken between the single rounds. Let now \(f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^n\) be a function generated through the concatenation of \(r\) round functions:
\[
f = f_r \circ \cdots \circ f_2 \circ f_1.
\]
(2.3)

**Definition 2.3** (Differential trail). An \(r+1\)-tuple of differences \((\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_r)\) with differences in \(\mathbb{F}_2^n\) is called a differential trail (or differential characteristic).

We will write \(\alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f_1} \alpha_1 \xrightarrow{f_2} \cdots \xrightarrow{f_r} \alpha_r\) to indicate the differential trail, or \(\alpha_0 \to \alpha_1 \to \cdots \to \alpha_r\) when the individual functions are clear from the context.

We are now interested in the probability that a pair of texts follows this trail, i.e., takes all the specified intermediate differences.

**Definition 2.4** (Differential trail probability). For a function \(f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^n\), \(f = f_r \circ \cdots \circ f_2 \circ f_1\) and an associated differential trail \((\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_r)\), the differential trail probability is defined as
\[
\Pr_X\left(\frac{\alpha_0}{X} \xrightarrow{f_1} \alpha_1 \text{ and } \frac{\alpha_1}{f_1(X)} \xrightarrow{f_2} \alpha_2 \text{ and } \cdots \text{ and } \frac{\alpha_{r-1}}{f_{r-1} \circ \cdots \circ f_1(X)} \xrightarrow{f_r} \alpha_r\right)
\]
(2.4)

where \(X\) is a random variable, uniformly distributed over \(\mathbb{F}_2^n\).

We will also write \(\text{DTP}_f(\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_r)\) or \(\text{DTP}(\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_r)\) to denote this probability.
In most attacks, we have no information about intermediate states of the cipher, so we have no possibility of determining which intermediate differences a pair of texts takes. Why then are we at all interested in differential trails? This is for two reasons. Firstly, it is much easier to determine the probability of a differential trail. Secondly, differential trails allow us to determine a lower bound on the probability of a differential.

When we multiply the probability of a differential with the size of the input space, we obtain the number of ordered text pairs that adhere to the differential. Likewise when we multiply the probability of a differential trail with the size of the input space, we obtain the number of ordered text pairs that adhere to the differential trail. But every pair of texts has to adhere to one and only one differential trail. All differential trails that share the same input and output difference with a differential hence create a partition of the text pairs that adhere to the differential. This allows us to formulate the following proposition:

**Proposition 2.5** (Differential composition). The probability of a differential \((\alpha_0, \alpha_r)\) over a function \(f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n\), \(f = f_r \circ \cdots \circ f_2 \circ f_1\) is the sum of the probabilities of all differential trails \((\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_r)\) that it contains:

\[
\Pr (\alpha_0 \rightarrow \alpha_r) = \sum_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{r-1} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} \Pr (\alpha_0 \rightarrow \alpha_1 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow \alpha_{r-1} \rightarrow \alpha_r). \tag{2.5}
\]

Summing over the probabilities of a subset of all differential trails for a given differential, we thus obtain a lower bound for the probability of this differential.

---

**A note on differentials, trails and characteristics**


In this text, we will mostly be using “differential trail” as the most descriptive term.

How do we determine the probability of a single differential trail now? To do this exactly is unfortunately infeasible in most cases. The common way of tackling the problem is to assume that the probability of a differential trail is the product of the single round transitions. Although the single rounds are still key dependent, the round transition probability usually is not as a key addition leaves the difference untouched. While the assumption of round independence is clearly not satisfied in general, experiments suggest that this approximation holds fairly well in many practical cases.

In block cipher cryptanalysis, the assumption of round independence is often deduced in a two-step process. Firstly we assume a model in which the round
independence holds, secondly we explicitly state the assumption that this model is close to the reality. The standard model uses a cipher where the round keys are independent, uniformly distributed random variables. In addition to this, it is required that the cipher has a structural property that ensures that the addition of the round keys is sufficient to make the round transition properties independent. Such ciphers are called Markov ciphers (see [24]).

The assumption that the actual differential probabilities of a given cipher with a secret key correspond to the probabilities derived in this model is called the stochastic equivalence hypothesis. This hypothesis states that differential probabilities behave under almost all keys as they behave under independent, uniformly random round keys.

In accordance with this, we will implicitly assume here that the probability of a differential trail corresponds to the product of the individual round transition probabilities:

$$\Pr\left(\alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f_1} \alpha_1 \xrightarrow{f_2} \cdots \xrightarrow{f_r} \alpha_r\right) = \prod_{i=1}^{r} \Pr\left(\alpha_{i-1} \xrightarrow{f_i} \alpha_i\right).$$

(2.6)

If there now exists a differential $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ over $r$ rounds of a cipher that has a probability $p$ which is much larger than $2^{-n}$, we can use this differential to distinguish these rounds from a random permutation in a chosen-plaintext attack. By requesting the encryption values of sufficiently many plaintext pairs, we can test whether the output difference corresponds to $\beta$ as often as predicted by the differential probability. This distinguisher can then be combined with partial key guessing to construct a key recovery attack.

### 2.2.2 Truncated differentials

Sometimes it can be useful to bundle many differentials together to achieve stronger distinguishers. For example, starting with an input difference $\alpha$ the most probable output difference might not be sufficiently probable to be used in an attack. But by testing for a larger number of the most likely output differences instead of just one, we may be able to find a strong enough distinguisher. The problem hereby is how to efficiently determine whether a difference belongs to this set of most probable output differences. Depending on the size of this set, it might be too difficult to determine membership (or write down this set).

Truncated differentials are such collections of differentials that have a structure that makes it easy to define them and determine membership: a truncated difference is defined as an affine subspace of all differences and a truncated differential is then defined as a pair of truncated differences. The probability of such a truncated differential is defined as the probability that a pair of texts chosen uniformly at random from all text pairs with a difference in the truncated input difference is mapped to a difference in the output truncated difference.
2.2.3 Impossible differentials

In standard differential cryptanalysis, we try to use differentials that have a sufficiently high probability to distinguish the cipher from a random permutation. Another possibility is to use differentials that have zero probability. Such differentials are termed impossible differentials. Clearly it is difficult to use only one impossible differential for distinguishing. But given a slightly larger number, we are already able to distinguish a cipher from a random permutation.

To this end, impossible truncated differentials — truncated differentials of probability zero — form an important class of collections of impossible differentials. This is particularly due to the fact that such impossible truncated differentials can often be constructed using two probability-one truncated differentials in the earlier mentioned miss-in-the-middle technique.

The development of differential cryptanalysis

Differential cryptanalysis was originally introduced at the CRYPTO ’90 conference by Biham and Shamir \[4\]. Lai and Massey \[24\] introduced the concept of a differential as a collection of differential trails with the same input and output difference. Truncated differentials were devised by Knudsen \[20\]. Impossible differentials were independently developed by Biham, Biryukov, and Shamir \[3\] and Knudsen \[19\].

2.3 Linear cryptanalysis

To introduce the concepts of linear cryptanalysis, we will use an inductive approach which differs somewhat from standard introductions.

Let \( f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n \) be a bijective mapping on \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \). Let \( \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{A}^\prime \) and \( \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{B}^\prime \) be two partitions of \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \) such that \( |\mathcal{A}| = |\mathcal{A}^\prime| \) and \( |\mathcal{B}| = |\mathcal{B}^\prime| \), i.e., the partitions each split \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \) in two parts of equal size. When we choose a random element \( X \) from \( \mathcal{A} \), the probability that \( f(X) \) is in \( \mathcal{B} \) clearly is \( \frac{1}{2} \) if \( f \) is a random permutation. Thus if we choose \( \mathcal{A} \) and \( \mathcal{B} \) such that this probability deviates from \( \frac{1}{2} \), we can use this to distinguish \( f \) from a random permutation by just determining for a sufficient number of random inputs from \( \mathcal{A} \) the number of their images that are in \( \mathcal{B} \). Note that if the probability that a random element from \( \mathcal{A} \) is mapped to \( \mathcal{B} \) is \( p \), then the probability that a random element from \( \mathcal{A}^\prime \) is mapped to \( \mathcal{B}^\prime \) is also \( p \) while the respective probabilities for \( \mathcal{A} \) to \( \mathcal{B} \) and \( \mathcal{A}^\prime \) to \( \mathcal{B}^\prime \) are both \( p - 1 \). Clearly if we know \( f \), it is always possible to find \( \mathcal{A} \) and \( \mathcal{B} \) such that this probability is 1.

But now consider the following simple cipher:

\[
\text{Enc}_{k_0,k_1}(x) = f(x \oplus k_0) \oplus k_1.
\]

For this simple cipher already, our approach fails due to the key additions of \( k_0 \) and \( k_1 \): we can neither tell when an input to \( f \) is in \( \mathcal{A} \) nor when an output of \( f \) is in \( \mathcal{B} \).
2.3 Linear cryptanalysis

This is unavoidable. Let us therefore try to do the next best thing: If we choose \( A \) and \( B \) such that \( A + k_0 \) is always either \( A \) or \( \overline{A} \) and \( B + k_1 \) is always either \( B \) or \( \overline{B} \), then we know that an element of \( A \) is mapped to an element of \( B \) always with probability either \( p \) or \( 1 - p \) for a fixed set of keys. If \( p \) deviates from \( \frac{1}{2} \), it is thus again easy to distinguish \( \text{Enc}_{k_0,k_1} \) from a random permutation.

As we see in the next lemma, the restriction that \( A + k_0 \) is always either \( A \) or \( \overline{A} \) determines the form of the set \( A \) to a large degree.

**Lemma 2.6.** Let \( A \) be a subset of \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \) of size \( 2^n - 1 \) with the property that for any \( k \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \) we have either \( A + k = A \) or \( A + k = \overline{A} \). Then \( A \) must be an affine subspace of dimension \( n - 1 \).

**Proof.** Let \( K \subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n \) be the set of keys \( k \) for which \( A + k = A \). Clearly 0 is in \( K \). Also for any \( k, k' \in K \), \( k + k' \) is also in \( K \) as \( A + k + k' = A + k' = A \). The set \( K \) thus forms a linear subspace of \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \). Assume without loss of generality that 0 is an element of \( A \) (if not we can switch the roles of \( A \) and \( \overline{A} \)). Then 0 + \( k \) is in \( A \) for any \( k \in K \) and thus \( K \subseteq A \). But also 0 + \( a \in A \) for any \( a \in A \) and hence \( A \subseteq K \). Thus \( A = K \) and \( A \) is a linear subspace of dimension \( n - 1 \). Then \( \overline{A} \) also has to be an affine subspace of dimension \( n - 1 \). \( \square \)

From this, we can conclude that the most sensible partition of the space into two equally sized parts is to choose affine subspaces. We can furthermore always set \( A \) and \( B \) to be the linear spaces (i.e., they include 0 as an element) and set \( \overline{A} \) and \( \overline{B} \) to the affine halves of the space.

How can we efficiently determine whether a value lies in the space \( A \) or \( \overline{A} \)? We can use the fact that hyperplanes are uniquely described as an orthogonal set with respect to some vector using the inner product. Let \( \langle a, b \rangle \) denote the canonical inner product of \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \) such that

\[
\langle a, b \rangle = \bigoplus_{i=1}^{n} a_ib_i.
\]

Then there exists a unique \( \alpha \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \) such that \( A = \{ a \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \mid \langle \alpha, a \rangle = 0 \} \). This \( \alpha \) is called the linear mask associated with \( A \). Knowing \( \alpha \), we can determine whether \( x \) is in \( A \) or in \( \overline{A} \) by evaluating whether \( \langle \alpha, x \rangle \) is equal to 0 or 1. A partition of \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \) into two affine subspaces of dimension \( n - 1 \) thus uniquely corresponds to a non-zero linear mask \( \alpha \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \) and vice versa.

Let \( \beta \) now be the corresponding vector for the set \( B \). To distinguish the cipher from a random permutation, we have to count how often we have either

\[
\langle \alpha, x \rangle = 0 \text{ and } \langle \beta, \text{Enc}(x) \rangle = 0,
\]

(2.7)

corresponding to an element from \( A \) being mapped to \( B \), or

\[
\langle \alpha, x \rangle = 1 \text{ and } \langle \beta, \text{Enc}(x) \rangle = 1,
\]

(2.8)

corresponding to an element from \( \overline{A} \) being mapped to \( \overline{B} \), when taking random elements \( x \) as input to the cipher. If the fraction of \( x \) for which this is true is close
to $p$ or $1 - p$, we are likely to have been using the cipher. If this fraction is close to $\frac{1}{2}$, we are likely using a random permutation instead. To ease the evaluation, we can combine Eqs. (2.7) and (2.8) to only one equivalent equation:

$$\langle \alpha, x \rangle + \langle \beta, \text{Enc}(x) \rangle = 0.$$ 

We call such an equation a linear approximation of the cipher $\text{Enc}$. The correlation of this approximation is defined as $2p - 1$. A correlation of 1 then corresponds to all values of $A$ being mapped to $B$ while a correlation of -1 indicates that all values of $A$ are mapped to the complement of $B$. Our distinguishing ability then only depends on the absolute value of this correlation.

Let us consider a slightly more complex cipher than the previous one:

$$\text{Enc}_{k_0, k_1, k_2}(x) = g(f(x \oplus k_0) \oplus k_1) \oplus k_2.$$ 

We ignore the key additions for now, i.e., let us assume the keys are equal to 0. Let us suppose that we have three partitions $A$, $B$, and $C$ such that the probability from $A$ to $B$ is $p$ over $f$ and the probability from $B$ to $C$ is $q$. We call such a trail of partitions a linear trail. The probability that an element of $A$ is mapped to an element of $C$ corresponds to the sum of the probability that an element of $A$ is mapped first to $B$ and then to $C$ and the probability that it is first mapped to $B$ and then to $C$. As a first guess, we might approximate this probability as $pq + (1 - p)(1 - q) = 1 - p - q + 2pq$. This yields a correlation of $2 - 2p - 2q + 4pq - 1 = (2p - 1)(2q - 1)$ equal to the product of the correlations of both transitions. Alternatively, if the middle key had switched the transition probabilities now, we would have gotten a probability estimate of $p(1 - q) + (1 - p)q = p + q - 2pq$ which corresponds to a correlation of $2p + 2q - 4pq - 1 = -(2p - 1)(2q - 1)$. The absolute value of the two-round correlation is thus not influenced by the key additions in this estimate.

Now what assumption did we implicitly make, when we approximated the probability of a particular path being taken as the product of the round transition probabilities? We assumed that those values in $B$ to which an element from $A$ can be mapped are mapped with probability $q$ to $C$, the same probability that any element from $B$ is mapped to $C$. So we implicitly assumed that those images from $A$ in $B$ are representative for the whole set, an assumption which seems fair if $f$ were a random function. But then the whole point of the distinguisher is that $f$ is not behaving like a random function.

Imagine we had been using a different middle partition $B'$ with different transition probabilities. Clearly this would have given us a different estimate. So which one is the correct one? As it turns out, when there are no key additions, the exact correlation of the transition $A$ to $C$ is the sum of the correlations of all trails from $A$ to $B$ to $C$ where the middle partitions $B$ can take any value. Taking now key additions into account, the values of the single trail correlations can flip from positive to negative and vice versa. So without knowing the keys, again we are left without knowledge of the two-round correlation.
Similarly to differential cryptanalysis, we have to make an assumption of independence that allows us to estimate the correlation of such a partition. The assumption is that the sign of the correlation of each linear trail is chosen independently of all other trails to be either positive or negative with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. While the expected value of the correlation is then 0, the variance of the correlation scales with the sum of the squares of the correlations of the single trails. It is also this variance that determines the quality of the distinguisher, i.e., the number of needed ciphertext-plaintext pairs needed to distinguish the cipher from a random permutation. As always, whether or not the assumption holds needs to be verified by experiment.

**2.4 Higher order-derivatives and integral cryptanalysis**

In this section, we will discuss some techniques based on derivatives over $\mathbb{F}_2$ that can be used to find deterministic distinguishers.

**2.4.1 Higher-order derivatives**

A function that takes a fixed number of input bits and outputs one bit is called a *Boolean function*. A function that takes a fixed number of bits as input and outputs another fixed number of bits can naturally be represented as a vector of Boolean functions and is hence called a *vectorial Boolean function*. As all relevant block ciphers are bit-based, they can naturally be thought of as vectorial Boolean functions.

One natural way to represent a Boolean function is to write it as a polynomial function in the input bits such as $f(x_1, x_2, x_3) = 1 + x_1 + x_2 + x_2 x_3 + x_1 x_2 x_3$. As the operations are over $\mathbb{F}_2$, we have that $x^2 = x$. So it is common to write the terms such that each variable appears at most once as a factor. The *degree* of a Boolean function is then the largest number of variables in a term that appears in the function.

The *derivative* $\Delta_\alpha$ of a Boolean function $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2$ in the direction of $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ is defined as

$$\Delta_\alpha f(x) := f(x + \alpha) + f(x)$$

where $x$ is the input bit vector. This derivative shares many properties with the standard derivative over the real numbers: it is linear, it satisfies (a variant of) the
product rule and importantly it reduces the degree of the function by at least 1. It is straightforward to extend this definition to vectorial Boolean functions.

A repeated application of the derivative in the direction $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_t$ is written as $\Delta_{\alpha_1,\alpha_2,\ldots,\alpha_t} f$. When the $\alpha_i$ are linearly dependent, the derivative always evaluates to 0. When all the $\alpha_i$ are linearly independent, it can be evaluated as

$$\Delta_{\alpha_1,\alpha_2,\ldots,\alpha_t} f = \sum_{\beta \in L(\alpha_1,\alpha_2,\ldots,\alpha_t)} f(x + \beta)$$

where $L(\alpha_1,\alpha_2,\ldots,\alpha_t)$ denotes the linear space spanned by the $\alpha_i$. To evaluate some derivative of order $n$ of some function at a point $x$, we thus need the value of the function $f$ at $2^n$ different points.

The fact that the degree of the function is reduced by 1 for each derivative can be used to construct a distinguisher: if we know that the degree of the cipher that we want to distinguish is $d$ while the degree for a random permutation is much likely higher than $d$, we can evaluate an order-$(d+1)$ derivative of the function in question and see whether it is equal to 0.

If we write the input bits of a Boolean function $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2$ explicitly out as $x_1, x_2, \text{and so forth}$, we can write the derivative taken in the direction of $x_i$ as $\Delta_{x_i}$ which corresponds to the derivative $\Delta_{\alpha}$ where $\alpha$ is all 0s except for one 1 at the $i$th position. Taking the derivative $\Delta_{x_i}$ of a Boolean polynomial, removes all terms from the polynomial that do not contain $x_i$ and removes the variable $x_i$ from all remaining terms. The derivative $\Delta_{x_1}$ of the polynomial $1 + x_1 + x_2 x_3 + x_1 x_2 x_3$ would thus be $1 + x_2 x_3$. We can then easily test whether a given term, say $x_2 x_5 x_{17}$ is present in a polynomial by taking the derivative for those variables $\Delta_{x_2, x_5, x_{17}}$ and seeing whether a constant 1 is present in the resulting Boolean polynomial. This can easily be done by evaluating the derivative at 0.

For an actual cipher the situation is slightly more complicated. As the cipher takes as input both a plaintext and a key, the value of an output bit is a Boolean function in the plaintext bits and the key bits. Alternatively we could say: whether a particular term in the plaintext bits is present is determined by the key. We could thus write the Boolean function representing an output bit as

$$\sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} c_x(k) \cdot x$$

where $x$ represents possible terms in the plaintext bits and $c_x(k)$ is the coefficient that determines whether this term is present or not. This coefficient generally depends on the key $k$ and is by itself again a Boolean function. As said above, we can determine the value of a coefficient function for a cipher with a fixed secret key by evaluating the respective derivative for this term at 0.

For a good cipher, these coefficient functions should be relatively complex in the key. An attack that makes use of coefficient functions that are linear in the key bits is the AIDA [35] or cube attack [13]. If we can find sufficiently many coefficient functions that are linear in the key bits, we can determine the values of these functions
for a cipher with a secret key using derivatives to create a linear system of equations which we can solve for the secret key bits.

**Higher-order differentials**

Higher-order derivatives were initially developed in 1994 by Lai [23] without a concrete application however. They were then used by Knudsen [20] in 1995 to describe higher-order differentials (which pretty much are higher-order derivatives plus a fixed output value that we are trying to detect) and he demonstrated that these can be used to break ciphers which are secure against standard differential cryptanalysis. Ironically Jakobsen and Knudsen [16] used higher-order differentials again in 1997 to break a cipher designed by Nyberg and Knudsen [31] in 1995.

### 2.4.2 Integral cryptanalysis

**Integral cryptanalysis** was initially developed as a dedicated attack against the block cipher Square [8] and later generalized by Knudsen and Wagner [22]. In an integral attack one tries to find a set of input bit positions such that the encrypted values of any set of input values for which the values are fixed in these bit positions and take all possible combinations of values in the other bit positions sums to 0 (at least in some bits).

For the usual case where the sum is taken to be an exclusive-or sum, we can formulate such integral property as follows: there exists a set of input bits and an output bit such that the Boolean function representing the output bit does not possess any term which contains all of these input bits simultaneously. This kind of property is particularly interesting because it will often still exist after a number of rounds for which the degree of the cipher will already be too high for a naive higher-order attack.

The elegance of the original Square attack and the generalized integral attack lies in how the structure of the cipher is utilized to find such property. This approach uses arguments about how certain properties of collections of states propagate through the cipher. Unfortunately this approach is usually only sufficient to attack a few rounds. Recently some progress has been made to find integral properties in cases where the usual toolset of integral cryptanalysis fails [34]. In this new method, a property of a collection of states termed *division property* is used to integrate more structural detail of the cipher into arguing how the property propagates (namely the degree of S-boxes or transitions in general is used).
Bibliography


Part II

Publications
Security of the AES with a Secret S-box

Publication Information


Contribution

• Main author.

Remarks

This publication has been slightly edited to fit the format.
Security of the AES with a Secret S-box

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Abstract. How does the security of the AES change when the S-box is replaced by a secret S-box, about which the adversary has no knowledge? Would it be safe to reduce the number of encryption rounds?

In this paper, we demonstrate attacks based on integral cryptanalysis which allow to recover both the secret key and the secret S-box for respectively four, five, and six rounds of the AES. Despite the significantly larger amount of secret information which an adversary needs to recover, the attacks are very efficient with time/data complexities of $2^{17}/2^{16}$, $2^{38}/2^{40}$ and $2^{90}/2^{64}$, respectively.

Another interesting aspect of our attack is that it works both as chosen plaintext and as chosen ciphertext attack. Surprisingly, the chosen ciphertext variant has a significantly lower time complexity in the attacks on four and five round, compared to the respective chosen plaintext attacks.

Keywords: AES, integral cryptanalysis, secret S-box

1 Introduction

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) \[10\] is an iterated block cipher using 10, 12, or 14 rounds depending on the key size of 128, 192, or 256 bits. These variants are named AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256.

In this paper we consider the cipher that is derived from the AES by replacing the S-box with a secret 8-bit S-box while keeping everything else unchanged. If the choice of S-box is made uniformly at random from all 8-bit S-boxes, the size of the secret information increases from 128 – 256 bits, the key size in the AES, to 1812 – 1940 bits. Clearly the security level of such a cipher could be very high, thus the question is: Could the number of rounds of this cipher be reduced to fewer than 10 rounds (as in AES-128)?

The AES was designed in order to achieve good resistance against differential and linear cryptanalysis, and this includes the choice of the S-box. Nonetheless a randomly chosen S-box is very likely to be highly resistant against these attacks as well.
The method that is most successful in attacking AES for up to 6 rounds is integral cryptanalysis. Somewhat surprisingly, a variant of this attack also applies to the AES variant with a secret S-box with up to 6 rounds, and although the complexity of the attack is larger than for the attack on the original AES, the time complexity is still less than exhaustive search of a 128-bit key.

**Related Work.**

The idea of integral cryptanalysis was conceived as a dedicated attack against the block cipher SQUARE [3]. This attack is able to break up to six rounds of AES-128. Biryukov and Shamir applied integral cryptanalysis to a generalised SPN structure denoted SASAS [1], which consists of three substitution layers separated by two affine layers. In their paper, the attacker is assumed not to have any knowledge about the linear layer or the S-boxes which are all allowed to be chosen independently at random. The SASAS attack recovers an equivalent representation of this SPN and thus allows decryption of any ciphertext. The attack allows to break the equivalent of three rounds of AES. It does not, however, recover neither the key nor the S-box.

The case of the AES with a secret S-box, which we consider in this paper, lies in between two cases: The original SQUARE attack on one hand can not be directly applied to the case with the secret S-box as it requires knowledge of the S-box to peel off the last layer after guessing some key bits. The SASAS attack, on the other hand, can be used to attack three rounds of this cipher. However, it is not very effective, as the extra knowledge of the linear layer and the equality of all S-boxes remains unused.

The security of PRESENT with a secret S-box was studied by Borghoff et al. in [2] and allows an attack on 28 out of 31 rounds using slightly less than $2^{64}$ plaintexts. This attack was further improved by Liu et al. in [8]. As the attack depends on the weakness of some randomly chosen 4-bit S-boxes, it seems hard to apply it to the 8-bit S-boxes used in the AES.

Furthermore there are various block cipher designs based on using a secret, key-dependent substitutions like Khufu [9], Blowfish [14], Twofish [15] or Maya [7]. The attack also bears some resemblance to so-called SCARE (Side-Channel Analysis for Reverse Engineering) attacks in which side-channel information is used to recover unknown parts of cipher implementations (see for example [13]).

**Our Contributions.**

We demonstrate that despite the increased size of the secret information in the cipher, we are able to recover both the secret key and the S-box for the 4-round, 5-round and 6-round versions of AES-128 by building up on techniques from integral cryptanalysis. Our attacks on four and five rounds are practical and achieve almost the same complexity as previous attacks which do not need to recover a secret S-box. The 6-round attack has a complexity of $2^{90}$ which is already much less than exhaustive search of the key, let alone of the S-box.
Table 1: Results of integral cryptanalysis on AES-128 with a secret S-box, AES-128 and SASAS with AES-like parameters. The time complexity is given in encryption equivalents, the data complexity is given in number of plaintexts/ciphertexts (16 bytes), the memory complexity is given in bytes. We assume that one round of encryption corresponds to $2^5$ table lookups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cipher</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Memory</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SASAS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$2^{21}$</td>
<td>$2^{16}$</td>
<td>$2^{20}$</td>
<td>[1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-128 (secret S-box)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$2^{17}$</td>
<td>$2^{16}$</td>
<td>$2^{16}$</td>
<td>This work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-128</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$2^{14}$</td>
<td>$2^9$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>[4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>$2^{38}$</td>
<td>$2^{40}$</td>
<td>$2^{40}$</td>
<td>This work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-128</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$2^{38}$</td>
<td>$2^{33}$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>[4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-128 (secret S-box)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$2^{90}$</td>
<td>$2^{64}$</td>
<td>$2^{69}$</td>
<td>This work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-128</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$2^{44}$</td>
<td>$2^{34}$</td>
<td>$2^{36}$</td>
<td>[6]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 compares the complexities for our attacks with those of previous integral attacks on AES-128 and the SASAS attack. Interestingly, the time complexities of the 4-round and 5-round attacks are lower by a factor of $2^{11}$ and $2^{16}$ respectively in the chosen ciphertext variant as compared to the chosen plaintext variant.

Organisation.

This paper is organised as follows. In §2 the notation and a specification of the AES is given. In §3 we analyse the security of the AES with a secret S-box with respect to statistical and integral attacks. §4 holds the concluding remarks.

2 AES Specification

The AES [10] is an iterated block cipher that operates on 128-bit blocks and comes in three variants: AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256, which have key sizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits, respectively. The number of rounds $T$ is 10, 12, and 14 respectively. The AES uses the four operations \texttt{SubBytes}, \texttt{ShiftRows}, \texttt{MixColumns}, and \texttt{AddRoundKey} which are detailed below. We use $R_i, 1 \leq i \leq T$, to denote the round function which takes a 128-bit block as input and provides a 128-bit block as output. The $i$th round is defined as

$$R_i = \begin{cases} \text{AddRoundKey}_i \circ \text{MixColumns} \circ \text{ShiftRows} \circ \text{SubBytes} & , i < T \\ \text{AddRoundKey}_i \circ \text{ShiftRows} \circ \text{SubBytes} & , i = T \end{cases}$$
Before the first round, a pre-whitening key is used in a step \( \text{AddRoundKey}_0 \), so the \( T \)-round encryption with master key \( K \) is denoted as

\[
E_K = R_T \circ \cdots \circ R_1 \circ \text{AddRoundKey}_0.
\]

Each of the four operations operate on a 128-bit block arranged in a \( 4 \times 4 \) byte matrix:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  s_0 & s_4 & s_8 & s_{12} \\
  s_1 & s_5 & s_9 & s_{13} \\
  s_2 & s_6 & s_{10} & s_{14} \\
  s_3 & s_7 & s_{11} & s_{15}
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

The bytes are regarded as elements of what is called the \textit{Rijndael finite field} \( \mathbb{F}_{256} = \mathbb{F}_2[x]/(x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1) \). In the Rijndael finite field, an element is represented by a single byte \( a = (a_7a_6 \cdots a_1a_0) \) with \( a_i \in \mathbb{F}_2 \), which in turn represents the field element

\[
a(x) = a_7x^7 + a_6x^6 + \cdots + a_1x + a_0.
\]

We use hexadecimal notation in typewriter font to write byte values. As such \( a = 01 \) represents \( a(x) = 1 \), \( a = 02 \) represents \( a(x) = x \), and so on. In the following, we briefly describe the four operations used in AES.

### 2.1 SubBytes

In the \textit{SubBytes} operation, each of the 16 bytes in the state matrix is replaced by another value according to an 8-bit S-box. In the standard AES, the AES S-box is used whose full description is available to the adversary. However, in our analysis we will assume that the S-box is secret and thus unknown to the adversary.

### 2.2 ShiftRows

In the \textit{ShiftRows} step, the \( i \)th row of the state, \( 0 \leq i \leq 3 \), is rotated to the left by \( i \) positions. As such,

\[
\text{ShiftRows} \left( \begin{pmatrix}
  s_0 & s_4 & s_8 & s_{12} \\
  s_1 & s_5 & s_9 & s_{13} \\
  s_2 & s_6 & s_{10} & s_{14} \\
  s_3 & s_7 & s_{11} & s_{15}
\end{pmatrix} \right) = \left( \begin{pmatrix}
  s_0 & s_4 & s_8 & s_{12} \\
  s_5 & s_9 & s_{13} & s_1 \\
  s_{10} & s_{14} & s_2 & s_6 \\
  s_{15} & s_3 & s_7 & s_{11}
\end{pmatrix} \right).
\]

### 2.3 MixColumns

In this step, each of the four columns of the state matrix are multiplied from the right onto an invertible matrix \( M \) over the Rijndael finite field. The matrix \( M \) and
its inverse are

\[
M = \begin{pmatrix}
02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\
01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\
01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\
03 & 01 & 01 & 02
\end{pmatrix}
\quad \text{and} \quad
M^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix}
0e & 0b & 0d & 09 \\
09 & 0e & 0b & 0d \\
0d & 09 & 0e & 0b \\
0b & 0d & 09 & 0e
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

2.4 AddRoundKey

In this step, a 128-bit round key is added to the state using the XOR operation. The
\(T+1\) round keys, denoted \(RK_0, \ldots, RK_T\) are generated using the AES key schedule.
A brief description of the AES key schedule can be found in Appendix A.

3 Cryptanalysis of the AES with a Secret S-box

3.1 Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis

First, we consider the security of the AES with a secret S-box which is chosen
uniformly at random against the two most commonly used attacks vectors for block
ciphers: differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. The original AES was
designed to resist these two attacks.

It has been shown that for mappings chosen uniformly at random from the set
of all \(m\)-bit bijective mappings, the expected value of the highest probability of a
(non-trivial) differential characteristic is at most \(2^m\) [11]. In our case where \(m=8\),
this means that for a randomly chosen 8-bit S-box the expected maximum probability
of a differential characteristic is \(\frac{16}{2^8} = 2^{-4}\).

Since the number of active S-boxes for four rounds of the AES is at least 25 [4],
one has an upper bound of the probability for any 4-round differential characteristic
of \(2^{-100}\), and thus an upper bound for any 8-round differential characteristic of \(2^{-200}\).
This is sufficient to conclude that differential cryptanalysis will not pose a threat to
variants of the AES where the S-box is replaced by a randomly chosen 8-bit S-box.

It is possible to prove a similar result for linear cryptanalysis using the bounds of
linear characteristics from [12].

3.2 Integral Cryptanalysis on Four Rounds

Summary.

Before we go into the details of the attack, let us summarize it shortly. The attack
splits the task of determining the secret S-box into consecutive steps that find
increasingly better.

First we use the fact that we can create balanced sets of intermediate texts right
after the first \texttt{SubBytes} step in round 1 by applying the SQUARE attack as a chosen
These balanced sets can be used to set up a system of linear equations which can be used to determine the secret S-box up to affine equivalence over \( F_8^2 \) as is similarly done in the SASAS attack \[1\]. A representative from this equivalence class is already sufficient to determine the whitening key up to 256 variants.

The knowledge about the whitening key and the representative of the S-box equivalence class allow us now to determine the intermediate texts right before the MixColumns step in round 1 up to affine equivalence over \( F_8^2 \). As a result of the SQUARE attack, the intermediate texts after the MixColumns step should take on each byte value in each byte position exactly once. This can be used to determine the secret S-box up to affine equivalence over \( F_{256} \). Finally, the secret S-box can be determined using knowledge of the key schedule.

Figure 1: Outline of the 4-round integral attack. The following notation is used: \( P \) takes each of the 256 values once, \( \cdot \) is constant, \( B \) is balanced and the values ? are unknown.

**Prerequisites.**

Before we start with the attack, let us clarify the notation. We assume that the last round, the fourth in this case, does not contain a MixColumns operation, as is the case for the last round of standard AES.

By a \( \Lambda \)-set, we mean a set of 256 messages that differ only in one byte but take for this byte all possible 256 values. Just as in the standard SQUARE \[3\] attack, when we decrypt a \( \Lambda \)-set with 4-round AES, we get intermediate texts right after the SubBytes step of round 1 that are balanced, i.e. the sum of all texts is equal to the text containing only zeroes. In particular, this set of messages is balanced in every byte.

\[1\] The reason for using a chosen ciphertext instead of a chosen plaintext attack will be explained later.
Finding an Affine Equivalent of the Secret S-box over $\mathbb{F}_2^8$.

Let $p_i, 0 \leq i < 256$, be the list of the first bytes of the 256 plaintexts, generated from the $\Lambda$-set of ciphertexts. Let $k_0$ be the first byte of the whitening key. We can now write the fact that the intermediate texts are balanced right after the first $\text{SubBytes}$ step as

$$\bigoplus_{i=0}^{255} S(p_i \oplus k_0) = 0$$

where $S$ is the secret S-box. Let $z_i := S(k_0 \oplus i)$. The above equation is then linear in the $z_{p_i}$ and can be written as

$$z_{p_0} \oplus z_{p_1} \oplus \cdots \oplus z_{p_{255}} = 0. \quad (1)$$

As duplicate values in the $p_i$ values will cancel out, only those $p_i$ need to be taken into account that appear an odd number of times in the list.

Taking different $\Lambda$-sets of ciphertexts, we can now try to generate enough linear equations to be able to determine $S$ uniquely. Unfortunately, we encounter two problems now. Firstly, we do not know the value of $k_0$. We can thus only hope to determine $S(k_0 \oplus \cdot)$. Secondly, the above equations are invariant under affine transformations: Let $A$ be an affine transformation from $\mathbb{F}_2^8$ to $\mathbb{F}_2^8$. Then

$$A(z_{p_0}) \oplus A(z_{p_1}) \oplus \cdots \oplus A(z_{p_{255}}) = 0$$

is also true for any set of $p_i$ that fulfills equation (1) and has an even number of summands. We can thus at best determine $S(k_0 \oplus \cdot)$ up to $2^{72}$ affine equivalent variants. Using the fact that the affine mapping needs to be invertible, we can thus at best determine the set

$$\{ A \circ S(k_0 \oplus \cdot) \mid A : \mathbb{F}_2^8 \to \mathbb{F}_2^8 \text{ is invertible} \}$$

which is of size $2^{70.2}$.

As each linear equation like equation (1) gives us one byte of information and as we can only determine the S-box up to $2^{72} = 2^{9 \cdot 8}$ variants, there can at most be $256 - 9 = 247$ linearly independent equations like equation (1). We found that using 256 different $\Lambda$-sets suffices in most cases to generate a set of equations with rank 247.

Given such a set of equations, it is now easy to determine one representative from the set of affine equivalents to $S(k_0 \oplus \cdot)$. Let this representative be denoted as $S'$, i.e. $S' = A \circ S(k_0 \oplus \cdot)$ for some invertible affine $A : \mathbb{F}_2^8 \to \mathbb{F}_2^8$ and unknown $k_0$. 

45
Determining the Whitening Key.

Let now \( p_{i,j} \) with \( 0 \leq i < 256 \) and \( 0 \leq j < 8 \) be byte \( j \) of the plaintext \( i \) in one of the \( \Lambda \)-sets and let \( k_j \) be byte \( j \) of the whitening key. We then have for \( a \in \mathbb{F}_2^8 \):

\[
a = k_j \quad \Rightarrow \quad 0 = \bigoplus_{i=0}^{255} S(a \oplus p_{i,j}),
\]

which is generally not true for \( a \neq k_j \), a fact the standard SQUARE attack is based on as well. For invertible affine \( A : \mathbb{F}_2^8 \to \mathbb{F}_2^8 \), we also have the equivalence

\[
0 = \bigoplus_{i=0}^{255} S(a \oplus p_{i,j}) \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad 0 = \bigoplus_{i=0}^{255} A \circ S(a \oplus p_{i,j}).
\]

We can thus for each byte \( j \) with \( 1 \leq j < 8 \) find \( k_j \oplus k_0 \) by trying out for which of the 256 possible values of \( a \) we have

\[
\bigoplus_{i=0}^{255} S'(a \oplus p_{i,j}) = 0
\]

for all \( \Lambda \)-sets. This allows us to determine the whitening key up to 256 variants, depending on the value of \( k_0 \). Let us set \( k' = (0, k_1 \oplus k_0, k_2 \oplus k_0, \ldots, k_{15} \oplus k_0) \). Then when using \( k' \) as the whitening key and \( S' \) as the S-box for encryption, the intermediate texts after the ShiftRows step in round 1 will correspond to the correct intermediate texts up to a fixed affine transformation on each byte.

Finding an Affine Equivalent of the Secret S-box over \( \mathbb{F}_{256} \).

When we decrypt a \( \Lambda \)-set, the set of intermediate texts that we get after the MixColumns step in round 1 will take all 256 possible values in each of the 16 state bytes (see Figure 1). The key idea here is to use this property to filter out wrong candidates for the secret S-box.

For a set of 256 bytes, we say that it has the \( \mathcal{P} \) property if it contains every possible value exactly once. Let \( V \) be a set of 256 byte vectors. We will likewise say that \( V \) has the \( \mathcal{P} \) property if \( V \) has this property in every byte position.

If \( V \) is now the set of intermediate texts after the MixColumns operation in round 1, that is the result of the decryption of a \( \Lambda \)-set, we know from the SQUARE attack that \( V \) has the \( \mathcal{P} \) property. Let now \( D \) be the corresponding set of intermediate texts directly before the MixColumns step. We can test our candidate \( S' \) for \( S \) by constructing the corresponding candidate set \( D' \) for the intermediate texts after the ShiftRows step in round 1 with our acquired knowledge of the whitening key, and applying the MixColumns operation on this set \( D' \) to see whether we obtain a set with the \( \mathcal{P} \) property.

For how many of the \( 2^{72} \) candidates for \( S' \) do we expect this to hold? Let \( A \) be the affine transformation by which \( S' \) deviates from \( S \). Then the byte vectors in \( D' \) also
deviate by this transformation from the true set $D$. Clearly, if $A$ consists only of an addition, the $P$ property of $MD'$ is preserved where $M$ is the MixColumns matrix. We can thus restrict $A$ to linear transformations.

In the case, that $A$ corresponds to an invertible linear mapping over $\mathbb{F}_{256}$, i.e. a multiplication with some element from $\mathbb{F}_{256}^*$, the set of intermediate texts after the MixColumns step will still have the $P$ property as well since the linear transformation commutes with the multiplication within the MixColumns matrix $M$ and the application of the invertible linear transformation $A$ on the set $MD$ leaves the $P$ property untouched:

$$MD' = MAD = AMD.$$ 

Opposed to this, when $A$ does not commute with the multiplication in $\mathbb{F}_{256}$, the $P$ property of $MD'$ is in general not preserved. As is shown in Appendix II if $A$ commutes with a primitive element of $\mathbb{F}_{256}$, $A$ corresponds to multiplication with an element of $\mathbb{F}_{256}$. As $03$ is a primitive element of the Rijndael field and is an entry in every row and column of $M$, the only class of affine transformations that preserve the $P$ property of $MD'$ is exactly the affine transformations over $\mathbb{F}_{256}$.

Checking whether the $P$ property holds for $MD'$ allows us thus to find the correct $S$ up to affine transformations over $\mathbb{F}_{256}$. Nevertheless, still $2^{72-16} = 2^{56}$ candidates need to be tested.

**Complexity Reduction: Finding the Affine Equivalent Over $\mathbb{F}_{256}$.**

The specific structure of the MixColumns matrix $M$ allows us to reduce the computational complexity of finding the correct affine representative amongst the $2^{56}$ possible candidates.

Let us define that a set of $2^l$ vectors over $\mathbb{F}^2_{256}$ has the $R$ property if both 1 and 0 appear in every bit position exactly $l$ times. Note that the $P$ property implies the $R$ property and that the $R$ property implies that the set of vectors is balanced but the opposite direction of implications is in generally false. As the $R$ property, like the $P$ property, is not preserved by the MixColumns layer, we still expect to find the correct representative by testing for the $R$ property instead of the $P$ property\footnote{This was indeed the case for all our test runs.}.

Let us take a closer look at the specific form of matrix $M$. When written as a linear function from $F^4_{256}$ to $F^4_{256}$, it has the form

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} 02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\ 03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \end{pmatrix}. \hspace{1cm} (2)$$

If we associate the multiplication with $01$, $02$, and $03$ with their respective linear
mappings from $\mathbb{F}_2^8$ to $\mathbb{F}_2^8$, we get the following representations:

$$01 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \quad 02 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \quad 03 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}. \quad (3)$$

If we now write $a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_7$ for the rows of $A$ we can write the first row of the $32 \times 32$ matrix $MA$ over $\mathbb{F}_2$ as

$$v := (a_1, \ a_0 \oplus a_1, \ a_0, \ a_0).$$

We see now that whether or not the first bit in the set $MD'$ satisfies the $R$ property relies solely on the rows $a_0$ and $a_1$ of the matrix $A$. As we only need to test matrices $A$ that are not linearly equivalent over $\mathbb{F}_{256}$, we can fix one row of $A$ to a non-zero constant. Let $a_0$ be fixed. Then we only need to try out all $2^8$ possible values for $a_2$ to see which one gives us the $R$ property in this bit.

After having determined $a_1$ (and fixed $a_0$), we can use the second row of $MA$ to determine $a_2$ and continue on to determine $A$ uniquely. In each step, we only need to test $2^8$ possible values. We can thus split the task of trying of out all $2^{56}$ candidates for $A$, to trying out row by row which reduces the complexity to $7 \cdot 2^8 \approx 2^{11}$ steps.

**Determining the Secret S-box.**

Without assuming anything about the key schedule, we can only determine the secret S-box up to an additive constant before and after the S-box, i.e. $S'(x) \sim a \oplus S(b \oplus x)$ since any additive constants can also be seen as part of the round keys. When not assuming anything about the key schedule, one can for example require that the first byte of the whitening key and the first round key is zero. It is straightforward then to find the correct representative for $S$ out of the $2^{16}$ options under these constraints. Using knowledge about the key schedule, one can also easily determine the correct variants for the round keys and adjust the representative for the S-box accordingly.

**The Complexity of the Attack.**

The needed data consists of the decryption of $256 \Lambda$-sets which corresponds to a data complexity of $2^{16}$ chosen ciphertexts. As most of these texts are only used to generate the linear system of equations in the first plaintext byte, most plaintext pairs can be discarded after the corresponding equation has been extracted. The memory complexity is thus $2^{8+8} = 2^{16}$ bytes.

Let us go through the steps to see what the time complexity is. Determining $S'$ up to affine equivalence over $\mathbb{F}_2^8$ requires solving a system of linear equations in $2^8$ variables. This requires $2^{3 \cdot 8} = 2^{24}$ steps where each step is comparable to a table lookup. Finding the whitening key requires trying out for each of the 16 key bytes all $2^8$ possible solutions with one $\Lambda$-set of $2^8$ values. It thus takes about $16 \cdot 2^8 \cdot 2^8 = 2^{20}$ table lookups.
To determining $S'$ up to affine equivalence over $\mathbb{F}_{256}$ using the $R$ property, for each of the seven rows of $A$ that have not been fixed we have to test $2^8$ values, each with a $\Lambda$ sets. Thus the total complexity of this step is $7 \cdot 2^8 \cdot 2^8 \approx 2^{19}$. A step here has about the same complexity as a table lookup.

The complexity of the attack is dominated by solving the linear system of equations, namely $2^{24}$ steps, which corresponds to $2^{17}$ encryptions when assuming a complexity of $2^5$ table lookups per encryption round. We ran the attack 1000 times on the single core of an Intel Core i7-4600M CPU at 2.90GHz. It found both the correct S-box and the correct key each time and always ran in less than a second (including reading the input data).

### 3.3 Integral Cryptanalysis on Five Rounds

The attack on four rounds can be extended to five rounds using a technique by Ferguson et al. [6] that allowed to improve the SQUARE attack on six rounds. The underlying idea is to create sets of ciphertexts that form a $\Lambda$-set right before the MixColumns step of round 4. Unfortunately, even with key guessing, it is not possible to determine such a set without knowledge of the secret S-box. However, by taking all $2^{32}$ possible values for four bytes that are in the same column during the MixColumns step of round 4 and keeping all other bytes constant, we can generate a set of ciphertexts that will take all $2^{32}$ values in that column. This set can now be viewed as the union of $2^{24}$ $\Lambda$-sets (see Figure 2).

![Figure 2: The $2^{32}$ ciphertexts take all possible combinations in the blue bytes but constant values in the rest. The state before the MixColumns step in the round before can be seen as the union of $2^{24}$ $\Lambda$-sets as depicted here. It is then possible to apply the 4-round attack again.](image)

A set of ciphertexts that gives us a $\Lambda$-set in the MixColumns step of round 4 will generate a balanced set right after the SubBytes step of round 1. As a sum of balanced sets remains balanced, decrypting our $2^{32}$ ciphertexts, we get a balanced set of size $2^{32}$ after the SubBytes step of round 1. This set can now be used to mount the four round attack on five rounds as well.

Just as in the four round version, we use the fact when such a set is balanced, we can, by using 256 of them, create a system of linear equations that can be solved to find an S-box $S'$ that is an affine equivalent to $S$ over $\mathbb{F}_2^8$. We can use the knowledge of $S'$ again to determine the whitening key up to 256 variants. We can then again generate the corresponding intermediate texts after the first SubBytes step that are
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affinely equivalent over $\mathbb{F}_2$ to the true texts. With these texts we can now determine $S$ up to affine equivalence over $\mathbb{F}_{256}$ by using the $R$ property. Note that when using the $R$ property here, we expect the correct set of texts to take in each bit the values 0 and 1 each exactly $2^{31}$ times as we are now working with the union of $2^{24}$ A-sets. Again to determine $S$ exactly and finding the correct master key is straightforward from this point.

How do the complexities of the attack change as compared to the 4-round variant? As we need 256 sets of ciphertexts, each of size $2^{32}$, this leaves us with a data complexity of $2^{40}$, an increase by a factor of $2^{24}$ in comparison to the four round attack. The time complexity of solving the linear system of equations does not change (it is still a system of 256 equations in 256 variables). The complexity of the whitening key recovery increases with the size of the balanced sets, i.e. again by a factor of $2^{24}$, leaving us with a complexity of $2^{44}$ table lookups. Likewise is the complexity of checking the $R$ property increased by a factor of $2^{24}$ to a total complexity of $2^{43}$ steps of the same complexity as a table lookup. This leaves the total time complexity at roughly $2^{45}$ steps which corresponds to $2^{38}$ encryptions when assuming a complexity of $2^5$ table lookups per encryption round.

The data complexity of $2^{40}$ chosen ciphertexts corresponds to 18 terabyte of data. But as most of the sets of $2^{32}$ plaintexts are each only used to generate one linear equation (in the 256 variables), apart from a few (16 suffice), most can be discarded during the generation of the linear system of equations, leaving us with at most $2^{40}$ bytes that need to be stored in memory at any point in time.

3.4 Integral Cryptanalysis on Six Rounds

The standard way of extending the SQUARE attack to six rounds (in the case of a chosen ciphertext attack) is by guessing four bytes of the whitening key and peeling of the first round of encryption for one byte of intermediate text, thereby increasing the time complexity of the attack by a factor of $2^{32}$. Unfortunately, this does not extend to the AES with a secret S-box as knowledge of the S-box is required to strip off the first round.

There is nonetheless a way to extend the five round attack to six rounds. Over one round of the AES, the four output bytes of one column only depend on four of the input bytes. Thus, it is possible to describe two rounds of AES with a secret S-box as the parallel application of four Super-boxes (see also [5]) with a linear transformation before and after. Such a Super-box consists of the parallel application of four S-boxes, a key addition a multiplication of the four bytes with the MixColumns matrix, again an application of four S-boxes in parallel and a final key addition.

Just as in the 5-round attack, we can generate sets of texts that are balanced right after the SubBytes step in round 2 and we can hence use these texts to generate a system of linear equations that lets us determine the Super-boxes, just as it allowed us to determine the usual S-boxes in the attacks before. Unfortunately, the system of linear equations for one Super-box involves now not $2^8$ variables but $2^{32}$ variables. This means that both the computational complexity as well as the data complexity...
increase. For the data complexity, when using the round extension as in the five round attack, we need now $2^{32}$ sets of each $2^{32}$ texts, leaving us with a data complexity of $2^{64}$ chosen ciphertexts. Just as with the attack on the normally sized S-box, the set of equations is not of full rank and lets us determine the Super-box only up to $2^{32-32+32} = 2^{1056}$ affine equivalents – only slightly less when taking the necessary bijectivity of the affine transform into account.

The Super-box that we obtain will thus be of the form

$$A \circ \text{SubBytes} \circ \text{KeyAddition} \circ \text{MixColumns} \circ \text{SubBytes} \circ \text{KeyAddition}$$

where $A$ is an unknown invertible affine mapping over $\mathbb{F}_2^{32}$ and where the other standard AES steps are truncated to operate on four bytes only. Despite our lack of knowledge of $A$, this form is already enough to extract from it the secret S-box and the involved key bytes up to $2^{16}$ variants, i.e. up to two additive constants applied before and after the S-box. After this, it is straightforward to uniquely determine the secret S-box and the key e.g. by guessing the two additive constants and applying standard 6-round SQUARE attack.

If we decrypt a $\Lambda$-set with our affinely transformed Super-box, we get a set that is balanced right after the first SubBytes step of the Super-box as described in the SASAS paper [1]. Note that it is necessary to assume that $A$ distributes the 8 bits that are being varied in the $\Lambda$-set to at least two S-Boxes, an assumption that is true for almost all possible $A$. At this point we can thus simply apply again the same techniques as we did for the four round attack to determine the secret S-box and the involved key bytes, only that we mount the attack on the affine equivalent of the Super-box now instead of the whole cipher.

What is the complexity of this attack? As already mentioned above, the data complexity is $2^{64}$ chosen ciphertexts. The time complexity is dominated by the first step of solving the system of $2^{32}$ linear equations over $2^{32}$ variables. Using Gaussian elimination, this step consists of $2^{96}$ operations, each comparable in complexity to a table lookup. Thus, the time complexity corresponds to $2^{90}$ encryptions when assuming a complexity of $2^5$ table lookups per encryption round. The memory complexity of $2^{32} \cdot 2^{32} \cdot 32 = 2^{69}$ bytes is also dominated by the size of the system of equations.

### 3.5 A Note on Chosen Ciphertext vs. Chosen Plaintext

Due to the symmetry of the AES regarding encryption and decryption, the attacks described here principally work in both directions. Interestingly though, for the attacks on four and five rounds, the chosen ciphertext variant is considerably more effective than the chosen plaintext attack. This is because the MixColumns matrix is sufficiently sparser than its inverse, creating a difference of $2^{16}$ in the number of steps when applying the $R$ property. This changes the time complexities of the 4-round and 5-round attacks to $2^{28}$ and $2^{54}$. As the complexity of the 6-round attack is dominated by the solving of the linear system of equations, it does not make a difference in that attack scenario.
4  Conclusion

In this work, we studied the impact of replacing the S-box in the AES by a secret S-box unknown to the adversary. Despite the expected increase in difficulty of recovering the secret information, we were able to mount efficient attacks based on integral cryptanalysis combined with dedicated techniques.

We were able to show that AES-128 with a secret S-box, reduced to 4 and 5 rounds, is susceptible to attacks with practical complexity that successfully recover both the secret S-box and the key. Furthermore, we have shown an attack on a variant with 6 rounds with a time complexity of $2^{90}$, which is much less effort than the time required to do exhaustive search of the key, let alone of the S-box.

Similarly to standard AES, it seems difficult to extend our attacks to more than 6 rounds. Also, the gap between the time complexities of integral attacks on standard AES and the AES with a secret S-box increases dramatically for the attack on 6 rounds. It is an open question whether this complexity can be further reduced.

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References


A The AES Key Schedule

In the AES, we think of the round keys as matrices over the Rijndael finite field, just as the state matrix. The first pre-whitening key $RK_0$ is the $n$-bit master key itself, so $RK_0 = K$. The key schedule varies slightly across the three AES variants. Here, we describe it for AES-128 and refer to [4] for the other two cases. We consider the 4 columns of the two round keys as $RK_i = (RK_0^0\|RK_1^1\|RK_2^2\|RK_3^3)$ and $RK_{i+1} = (RK_{i+1}^0\|RK_{i+1}^1\|RK_{i+1}^2\|RK_{i+1}^3)$. To derive $RK_{i+1}$ from $RK_i$, $0 \leq i < T$, we do the following

1. Let $RK_{i+1}^j = RK_i^j$ for $j = 0, 1, 2, 3$,
2. Rotate $RK_{i+1}^3$ such that the byte in the first row is moved to the bottom,

3. Substitute each byte in $RK_{i+1}^3$ by using the S-box from the SubBytes operation,

4. Update the byte in the first row of $RK_{i+1}^3$ by adding $02^{i-1}$ from the Rijndael finite field, and

5. Let $RK_{j_i+1}^j = RK_{j_i+1}^j \oplus RK_{j_i+1}^{j-1} \mod 4$ for $j = 0, 1, 2, 3$.

This procedure is repeated for $i = 1, \ldots, T$ to obtain the round keys $RK_0$ to $RK_T$.

**B Lemma**

Let $m \in \mathbb{N}^*$. As $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ is an $m$-dimensional $\mathbb{F}_2$-vector space, its elements can be represented as $m$-dimensional $\mathbb{F}_2$-vectors. But as the multiplication in $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ obeys the distributive law, the multiplication with an element of $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ corresponds to a linear mapping from $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ to $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$, that is an $m \times m$ matrix over $\mathbb{F}_2$. For an element $a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}$, let $L_a$ denote the corresponding $m \times m$ matrix. For $b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}$, we then have $a \cdot b = L_a b$.

**Lemma 1.** Let $a$ be a primitive element of $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$. Let $B$ be an $m \times m$ matrix over $\mathbb{F}_2$ which commutes with $L_a$. Then there exists $b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ such that $L_b = B$.

**Proof.** Let $c$ be any element from $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}^*$. As $a$ is primitive, there exists $k \in \mathbb{N}^*$ such that $c = a^k$ and likewise $L_c = L_a^k$. As $B$ commutes with $L_a$, by induction $B$ also commutes with $L_c$. Clearly, $B$ also commutes with $L_0$, so $B$ commutes with all elements of $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$.

Let now $b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ be the image of 1 under $B$, $b = B1$. We then have for any $c \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}^*$:

$$Bc = L_1 Bc = L_c L_{c^{-1}} Bc = L_c B L_{c^{-1}} c = L_c B 1 = L_c b = c \cdot b = b \cdot c = L_b c.$$ 

As this is true for any $c \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}^*$ and clearly also for 0, we have $B = L_b$. \qed
Ciphers for MPC and FHE

Publication Information


Contribution

- All authors contributed equally.
- Main contribution is the cryptanalysis of the cipher scheme.
- Further contributions were made in design decisions and writing the specification of the scheme.

Remarks

This publication has been slightly edited to fit the format.
Ciphers for MPC and FHE

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Abstract. Designing an efficient cipher was always a delicate balance between linear and non-linear operations. This goes back to the design of DES, and in fact all the way back to the seminal work of Shannon.

Here we focus, for the first time, on an extreme corner of the design space and initiate a study of symmetric-key primitives that minimize the multiplicative size and depth of their descriptions. This is motivated by recent progress in practical instantiations of secure multi-party computation (MPC), fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), and zero-knowledge proofs (ZK) where linear computations are, compared to non-linear operations, essentially “free”.

We focus on the case of a block cipher, and propose the family of block ciphers “LowMC”, beating all existing proposals with respect to these metrics by far. We sketch several applications for such ciphers and give implementation comparisons suggesting that when encrypting larger amounts of data the new design strategy translates into improvements in computation and communication complexity by up to a factor of 5 compared to AES-128, which incidentally is one of the most competitive classical designs. Furthermore, we identify cases where “free XORs” can no longer be regarded as such but represent a bottleneck, hence refuting this commonly held belief with a practical example.

Keywords: block cipher, multiplicative complexity, multiplicative depth, secure multiparty computation, fully homomorphic encryption

1 Introduction

Modern cryptography developed many techniques that go well beyond solving traditional confidentiality and authenticity problems in two-party communication. Secure
multi-party computation (MPC), zero-knowledge proofs (ZK) and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) are some of the most striking examples.

In recent years, especially the area of secure multi-party computation has moved from a science that largely concerned itself with the mere existence of solutions towards considerations of a more practical nature, such as costs of actual implementations for proposed protocols in terms of computational time, memory, and communication.

Despite important progress and existing proof-of-concept implementations, e.g. [30], [40], [47], [54], [58], [59], [63], there exists a huge cost gap between employing cryptographic primitives in a traditional way and using them in the more versatile MPC context. As an example, consider implementations of the AES block cipher, a global standard for the bulk encryption of data. Modern processors achieve a single execution of the block cipher within a few hundred clock cycles (or even less than 100 clock cycles using AES-NI). However, realizing the same cipher execution in the context of an MPC protocol takes many billions of clock cycles and high communication volumes between the participating parties, e.g. several hundreds of Megabytes for two-party AES with security against malicious adversaries [21], [22], [30], [47], [48], [58], [59], [63].

While our design approach is not specific to block ciphers but can be equally applied to e.g. hash functions, in this work, we propose block ciphers that are specifically designed for application in MPC and similar contexts. Traditionally, ciphers are built from linear and non-linear building blocks. These two have roughly similar costs in hardware and software implementations. In CMOS hardware, the smallest linear gate (XOR) is about 2-3 times larger than the smallest non-linear gate (typically, NAND). When implemented in an MPC protocol or a homomorphic encryption scheme, however, the situation is radically different: linear operations come almost for free, since they only incur local computation (resp. do not increase the noise much), whereas the bottleneck are non-linear operations that involve symmetric cryptographic operations and communication between parties (resp. increase the noise considerably). Our motivation hence comes from implementations of ciphers in the context of MPC, ZK, or FHE schemes where linear parts are much cheaper than non-linear parts.

This cost metric suggests a new way of designing a cipher where most of the cryptographically relevant work would be performed as linear operations and the use of non-linear operations is minimized. This design philosophy is related to the fundamental theoretical question of the minimal multiplicative complexity (MC) [13] of certain tasks. Such extreme trade-offs were not studied before, as all earlier designs – due to their target platforms – faired better with obtaining a balance between linear and non-linear operations.

In this work we propose to start studying symmetric cryptography primitives with low multiplicative complexity in earnest. Earlier tender steps in this direction [33], [35], [60] were aimed at good cost and performance when implemented with side-channel attack countermeasures, and are not extreme enough for our purpose. Our question hence is: what is the minimum number of multiplications for building a secure block cipher? We limit ourselves to multiplications in GF(2) and motivate
this as follows:

- By using Boolean circuits we decouple the underlying protocol / primitive (MPC protocol / ZK protocol / FHE scheme) from that of the cipher. Hence, the same cipher can be used for multiple applications.

- GF(2) is a natural choice for MPC protocols based on Yao or GMW (in the semi-honest setting, but also for their extensions to stronger adversaries), ZK protocols, as well as for fully or somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes (cf. Section 2 for details).

By nature of the problem, we are interested in two different metrics. One metric refers to what is commonly called multiplicative complexity (MC), which is simply the number of multiplications (AND gates) in a circuit, see e.g. [13]. The second metric refers to the multiplicative depth of the circuit, which we will subsequently call ANDdepth. We note that already in [26] it was observed that using ciphers with low ANDdepth is of central importance for efficient evaluations within homomorphic encryption schemes. Therefore, the authors of [26] suggest to study block cipher designs that are optimized for low ANDdepth, a task to which we provide a first answer. Our work is somehow orthogonal to Applebaum et. al [2], where the question of what can in principle be achieved in cryptography with shallow circuits was addressed.

This all motivates the following guiding hypothesis which we will test in this paper: “When implemented in practice, a block cipher design with lower MC and lower ANDdepth will result in lower executing times”. We note that the relatively low execution times often reported in the literature are amortized times, i.e. averaged over many calls of a cipher (in parallel). This, however, neglects the often important latency. Hence, another design goal in this work is to reduce this latency.

Outline and contribution.

In Section 2 we describe several schemes with “free XORs”. Then, in Section 3 we focus on an extreme corner of the design space of block ciphers and propose a new block-cipher design strategy that minimizes the multiplicative size and depth of the circuit describing it, beating all existing candidates by far with respect to these metrics. In terms of ANDdepth, the closest competitor is PRINCE. In terms of MC, the closest competitor turns out to be Simon. We give a high-level overview over a larger field of competing designs in Section 4. We analyse the security of our constructions in Section 5 and provide experimental evidence for the soundness of our approach in Section 6. In particular, our implementations outperform previously reported results in the literature, often by more than a factor 5 in MPC and FHE implementation settings. They also indicate that in the design space we consider, “free XORs” can no longer be regarded as free but significantly contribute to the overall cost, hence refuting this commonly held belief with a practical example. Finally, we describe our optimisation strategies for implementing our designs in the MPC and FHE case, which might be of independent interest.
Ciphers for MPC and FHE

Main features and advantages of LowMC.

- Low AND depth, and low MC, which positively impacts the latency and throughput of the FHE, MPC, or ZK evaluation of the cipher.
- Partial Sbox layer.
- Security arguments against large classes of statistical attacks like differential attacks, similar to other state-of-the-art designs are given in Section 5. Zorro [33] is the first SPN cipher in the literature that uses a non-full Sbox layer and is related to LowMC in this respect. However, recent attacks on Zorro that exploit this particular property [5], [36], [61], [67], highlight the need to be very careful with this design strategy. In our analysis of LowMC in Section 5 we are able to take these into account.
- In contrast to other constructions, it is easy to obtain tight bounds on the MC and AND depth.
- The design is very flexible and allows for a unified description regardless of the block size.
- We explicitly de-couple the security claim of a block cipher from the block size.

2 Schemes

In this section we list several schemes for MPC, FHE, and ZK that benefit from evaluating our cipher. We give a list of example applications for LowMC in the full version of the paper.

2.1 Multi-Party Computation (MPC)

There are two classes of practically efficient secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols for securely evaluating Boolean circuits where XOR gates are considerably cheaper (no communication and less computation) than AND gates.

The first class of MPC protocols has a constant number of rounds and their total amount of communication depends on the MC of the circuit (each AND gate requires communication). Examples are protocols based on Yao’s garbled circuits [68] with the free XOR technique [46]. To achieve security against stronger (i.e., malicious or covert) adversaries, garbled circuit-based protocols apply the cut-and-choose technique where multiple garbled circuits are evaluated, e.g., [4], [28], [30], [41], [42], [47], [49], [50], [51], [52], [53], [59], [63], [64]; also MiniLEGO [29] falls into this class.

The second class of MPC protocols has a round complexity that is linear in the AND depth of the evaluated circuit (each AND gate requires interaction) and hence the performance depends on both, the MC and AND depth of the circuit. Examples are the semi-honest secure version of the GMW protocol [34] implemented in [18], [62], and tiny-OT [58] with security against malicious adversaries.
2.2 Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)

In all somewhat and fully homomorphic encryption schemes known so far XOR (addition) gates are considerably cheaper than AND (multiplication) gates. Moreover, XOR gates do not increase the noise much, whereas AND gates increase the noise considerably (cf. [37]). Hence, as in somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes the parameters must be chosen such that the noise of the result is low enough to permit decryption, the overall complexity depends on the ANDdepth.

2.3 Zero-Knowledge proof of knowledge (ZK)

In several zero-knowledge proof protocols XOR relations can be proven for free and the complexity essentially depends on the number of AND gates of the relation to be proven. Examples for such protocols are [10], [15] and the recently proposed highly efficient protocol of [43] that requires only one evaluation of a garbled circuit [68] and can make use of the free XOR technique [46].

3 Description of LowMC

LowMC is a flexible block cipher based on an SPN structure where the block size $n$, the key size $k$, the number of Sboxes $m$ in the substitution layer and the allowed data complexity $d$ of attacks can independently be chosen. The number of rounds needed to reach the security claims is then derived from these parameters.

To reduce the MC, the number of Sboxes applied in parallel can be reduced, leaving part of the substitution layer as the identity mapping. Despite concerns raised regarding this strategy [67], we will show that security is viable. To reach security in spite of a low MC, pseudorandomly generated binary matrices are used in the linear layer to introduce a very high degree of diffusion. A method to accountably instantiate LowMC is given in Section 3.3.

Encryption with LowMC starts with a key whitening, followed by several rounds of encryption where the exact number of rounds depends on the chosen parameter set. A single round is composed as follows:

$$\text{LowMCRound}(i) = \text{KeyAddition}(i) \circ \text{ConstantAddition}(i) \circ \text{LinearLayer}(i) \circ \text{SboxLayer}$$

In the following we give a detailed description of the individual steps.

SboxLayer is an $m$-fold parallel application of the same 3-bit Sbox on the first $3m$ bits of the state. If $n > 3m$ then for the remaining $n - 3m$ bits, the SboxLayer is the identity. The selection criteria for the Sbox were as follows:

- Maximum differential probability: $2^{-2}$

4The number of Sboxes is limited though by the block size as the Sboxes need to fit into a block.
Figure 1: Depiction of one round of encryption with LowMC.

- Maximum linear probability: $2^{-2}$
- Simple circuit description involving MC = 3 AND gates, with AND depth = 1
- Each of the 8 non-zero component functions has algebraic degree 2

The Sbox is specified in [2] and coincides with the Sbox used for PRINTcipher [45]. Other representations of the Sbox can be found in the full version of this paper.

**LINEARLayer**(i) is the multiplication in GF(2) of the state with the binary $n \times n$ matrix **Lmatrix**[i]. The matrices are chosen independently and uniformly at random from all invertible binary $n \times n$ matrices.

**CONSTANTAddition**(i) is the addition in GF(2) of **roundconstant**[i] to the state. The constants are chosen independently and uniformly at random from all binary vectors of length $n$.

**KEYAddition**(i) is the addition in GF(2) of **roundkey**[i] to the state. To generate **roundkey**[i], the master key **key** is multiplied in GF(2) with the binary $n \times k$ matrix **Kmatrix**[i]. The matrices are chosen independently and uniformly at random from all binary $n \times k$ matrices of rank min($n, k$).

Decryption is done in the straightforward manner by an inversion of these steps.

$$S(a, b, c) = (a \oplus bc, a \oplus b \oplus ac, a \oplus b \oplus c \oplus ab)$$

Figure 2: Specification of the 3-bit Sbox.

### 3.1 Pseudocode

**plaintext** and **state** are $n$-bit quantities. **key** is a $k$-bit quantity, which can both be larger or smaller than $n$. $r$ is the number of rounds.
3 Description of LowMC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>blocksize</th>
<th>sboxes</th>
<th>keysize</th>
<th>data</th>
<th>rounds</th>
<th>ANDdepth</th>
<th>ANDs per bit</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>49</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Parameter sets of LowMC instantiations. One first set has PRESENT-like security parameters, the second set has AES-like security parameters.

ciphertext = encrypt (plaintext,key)

//initial whitening
state = plaintext + MultiplyWithGF2Matrix(KMatrix(0),key)

for (i = 1 to r)
    //m computations of 3-bit sbox,
    //remaining n-3m bits remain the same
    state = Sboxlayer (state)

    //affine layer
    state = MultiplyWithGF2Matrix(LMatrix(i),state)
    state = state + Constants(i)

    //generate round key and add to the state
    state = state + MultiplyWithGF2Matrix(KMatrix(i),state)
end

ciphertext = state

3.2 Parameters

Our security analysis against differential, linear, higher-order, meet-in-the-middle, algebraic, and slide attacks suggests that, except with negligible probability, any uniformly randomly chosen set of matrices leads to a secure construction for the parameters given in Table 1. For a larger selection of parameters bundled with security bounds, see the full version of this paper.

3.3 Instantiation of LowMC

To maximize the amount of diffusion done by the linear layer, we rely on randomly generated, invertible binary matrices. As there exist no binary matrices of size larger than $1 \times 1$ that are MDS, and as it is generally an NP-complete problem to determine the branching number of a binary matrix [7], there is no obviously better method to reach this goal. The problem in the instantiation of LowMC is to find an accountable way of constructing the random matrices and vectors that leaves no room for the designer to plant backdoors.
Our recommended instantiation is a compromise between randomness, accountability and ease of implementation. It uses the Grain LSFR as a self-shrinking generator (see [39] and [56]) as a source of random bits. The exact procedure can be found in the full version of this paper.

It must be mentioned though that it is principally possible to use any sufficiently random source to generate the matrices and constants. It is also not necessary that the source is cryptographically secure.

4 Comparison with other ciphers

In the following we survey a larger number of existing cipher designs and study their ANDdepth and MC per encrypted bit which we summarize in Table 2. We both choose representative candidates from various design strategies, as well as the designs that are most competitive in terms of our metrics. We do this in two distinct categories: AES-like security (with key sizes of 128-bits and more and data security and block size of 128-bits and more), and lightweight security (data security and block size of 96 bits or below). Note that data security refers to the $\log_2$ of the allowable data complexity up to which a cipher is expected to give the claimed security against shortcut attacks. For LowMC we explicitly de-couple the data security from the block size of the cipher as the proposed design strategy favour larger block sizes but we don’t see a new for larger data security than 128. For size-optimized variants we instantiate $\ell$-bit adders using a ripple-carry adder which has $\ell - 1$ ANDs and ANDdepth $\ell - 1$; for depth-optimized variants we instantiate them with a Ladner-Fischer adder that has $\ell + 1.25\ell \log_2 \ell$ ANDs and ANDdepth $1 + 2\log_2 \ell$, cf. [62].

We first survey AES versions and then ciphers with related security properties. The Sbox construction of [12] has 34 AND gates and ANDdepth 4 (the size optimized Sbox construction of [11] has only 32 AND gates, but higher ANDdepth 6). See also Canright [17]. To encrypt a 128-bit block, AES-128 has 10 rounds and uses 160 calls to the Sbox (40 for key schedule), hence 5 440 AND gates, or 42.5 AND gates per encrypted bit. To encrypt a 128-bit block, AES-192 has 12 rounds and uses 192 calls to the Sbox (32 for key schedule), hence 6 528 AND gates, or 51 AND gates per encrypted bit. To encrypt a 128-bit block, AES-256 has 14 rounds and uses 224 calls to the Sbox (56 for key schedule), hence 7 616 AND gates, or 59.5 AND gates per encrypted bit.

AES is actually comparatively efficient. Other ciphers with a different design strategy can have very different properties. Threefish [27] is a cipher with large block size. Threefish with its 512-bit block size has 72 rounds with 4 additions modulo $2^{64}$ each resulting in 35.438 AND gates per encrypted bit and ANDdepth=4 536 (63 per round). Threefish with its 1 024-bit block size has 80 rounds with 8 additions each resulting in 39.375 AND gates per bit and ANDdepth=5 040 (63 per round). The recently proposed NSA cipher Simon [6] is also a good candidate to be of low multiplicative complexity. If $b$ is the block size, it does $b/2$ AND gates per round, and
5 Resistance against cryptanalytic attacks

The number of rounds $r$ equals ANDdepth, and is hence a crucial factor to minimize. For this we evaluate the security of the construction against an array of known attack vectors. Below we especially discuss differential, linear and high-order attacks, as their analysis is a relevant technical contribution in itself. For a short discussion of other attack vectors, we refer to the full version of this paper.

We aim to prove the LowMC designs secure against classes of known attacks. However, due to the choice of random linear layers it is not immediately clear how to bound the probability of differential or linear characteristics. This is something we will investigate and resolve in Section 5.1. Due to the extremely simple description of the Sbox, higher order \[44\] and cube attacks \[24\] that exploit a relatively slow growth in the algebraic degree appear to be the most promising attack vector, and are studied in Section 5.4. The quality of these bounds is tested on small versions of LowMC. This all will allow us to formulate in Section 5.6 a relatively simple expression for deriving a lower bound for the number of rounds given other parameters like the

ANDdepth is equal to the number of rounds. For a key size of 128 bit (comparable to AES) and block size 128 bit, it needs 68 rounds. This means, 4352 AND gates, or 34 AND gates per bit.

In the lightweight category, we consider Present, but also Simon. The Present Sbox can be implemented with as little as 4 AND gates which is optimal \[19\] and has ANDdepth 3. With $16 \cdot 31 = 496$ Sbox applications per 64 bit block we arrive at 31 AND gates per bit. A depth-optimized version of the Present Sbox with ANDdepth 2 and 8 ANDs is given in the full version of this paper. The 128-bit secure version of Present differs only in the key schedule. Simon-64/96 has a 96 bit key, block size 64 bit and 42 rounds and Simon-32/64 has a 64 bit key, block size 32 bit and 32 rounds; see above for MC and ANDdepth. As another data point, the DES circuit of \[65\] has 18 175 AND gates and ANDdepth 261. KATAN \[16\] has 254 rounds. In KATAN32, the ANDdepth increases by two every 8 rounds resulting in an ANDdepth of 64; with 3 AND gates per round and a block size of 32 bit this results in 23.81 ANDs per bit, but similar to Simon-32/64 applications are limited due to the small block size. In KATAN48 and KATAN64 the ANDdepth increases by 2 every 7 rounds resulting in an ANDdepth of 74. KATAN48 has 6 ANDs per round and a block size of 48 bit resulting in 31.75 ANDs per bit. KATAN64 has 9 ANDs per round and a block size of 64 bit resulting in 35.72 ANDs per bit. Prince \[8\] has 12 rounds and each round can be implemented with 10 AND gates and ANDdepth 2, cf. \[26\]. NOEKEON \[20\] is a competitive block cipher with 16 rounds and each round applies 32 S-boxes consisting of 4 AND gates with ANDdepth 2 each.

LowMC is easily parameterizable to all these settings, see also Table 1 in Section 3. It has at most (if $3m = n$) one AND gate per bit per round which results, together with a moderate number of rounds to make it secure, in the lowest ANDdepth and lowest MC per encrypted bit, cf. Table 2.

5 Resistance against cryptanalytic attacks

The number of rounds $r$ equals ANDdepth, and is hence a crucial factor to minimize. For this we evaluate the security of the construction against an array of known attack vectors. Below we especially discuss differential, linear and high-order attacks, as their analysis is a relevant technical contribution in itself. For a short discussion of other attack vectors, we refer to the full version of this paper.

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Ciphers for MPC and FHE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cipher</th>
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<th>Block size</th>
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<th>ANDdepth</th>
<th>ANDs/bit</th>
<th>Sbox representation</th>
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<tr>
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<td>128</td>
<td>40 (60)</td>
<td>43 (40)</td>
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<td>48 (72)</td>
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<td>60 (56)</td>
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<td>128</td>
<td>68</td>
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<td>[12]</td>
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<tr>
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<td>64</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>full version</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Comparison of ciphers (excluding key schedule). We list the depth-optimized variants; size-optimized variants are given in () if available. Best in class are marked in bold.

desired security level in terms of time and data, and block size.

5.1 Differential characteristics

In differential attacks, the principal goal is to find a pair \((\alpha, \beta)\) of an input difference \(\alpha\) and an output difference \(\beta\) for the cipher such that pairs of input texts with difference \(\alpha\) have an unusual high probability to produce output texts with difference \(\beta\). Such a pair of differences is called a differential. A good differential can be used to mount distinguishing attacks as well as key recovery attacks on the cipher. For this it suffices if the differential does not cover the whole cipher but all except one or a few rounds.

As it is infeasible to calculate the probability of differentials for most ciphers, the cryptanalyst often has to be content with finding good differential characteristics i.e., paths of differences through the cipher for which the probability can directly be calculated. Note that a differential is made up of all differential characteristics that have the same input and output difference as the differential. The probability of a good differential characteristic is thus a lower bound for the related differential.

Allowing parts of the state to go unchanged through the Sbox layer clearly increases the chance of good differential characteristics. It is for example always possible to find \(\lceil \frac{l}{3m} \rceil\)-round characteristics of probability 1. In fact, it is even possible to find \(\lceil \frac{l}{3m} \rceil\)-round characteristics of probability 1 where \(l\) is the width of the identity part.
and $m$ the number of 3-bit Sboxes. Nonetheless, as we will prove in the following, this poses no threat. This is because of the randomness of the linear layer which maps a fixed subspace to a random subspace of the same dimension: Most "good" difference i.e., differences that activate none or only few Sboxes, are mapped to "bad" differences that activate most of the Sboxes per layer. This causes the number of characteristics that only use "good" differences to decay exponentially with the number of rounds. In the case of a $\lceil\frac{l}{3m}\rceil$-round characteristic of probability 1, this means that the output difference is fixed to very few options, which makes it then already in the next round extremely unlikely that any one of the options is mapped onto a "good" difference.

We will now prove that good differential characteristics exist only with negligible probability in LowMC. The basic idea behind the proof is the following. We calculate for each possible good differential characteristic the probability that it is realized in an instantiation of LowMC under the assumption that the binary matrices of the linear layer were chosen independently and uniformly at random. We then show that the sum of these probabilities, which is an upper bound for the probability that any good characteristic exists, is negligible.

Recall that $m$ is the number of Sboxes in one Sbox layer in LowMC and that $l$ is the bit-length of the identity part of the Sbox layer. We thus have $n = 3m + l$. Let $V(i)$ be the number of bit vectors of length $n$ that correspond to a difference that activates $i$ Sboxes. As we can choose $i$ out of the $m$ Sboxes, as for each active 3-bit Sbox there are 7 possible non-zero input differences and as the bits of the identity part can be chosen freely, we have

$$V(i) = \binom{m}{i} \cdot 7^i \cdot 2^{l} \cdot$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

Let $\alpha_0$ be an input difference and let $\alpha_1$ be an output difference for one round of LowMC. Let $a_0$ be the number of Sboxes activated by $\alpha_0$. As an active Sbox maps its non-zero input difference to four possible output differences each with probability $\frac{1}{4}$, and as a uniformly randomly chosen invertible binary $n \times n$ matrix maps a given non-zero $n$-bit vector with probability $\frac{1}{2^{n-1}}$ to another given non-zero output vector, the probability that the one-round characteristic $(\alpha_0, \alpha_1)$ has a probability larger than 0 is

$$\frac{4^{a_0}}{2^n - 1}.$$

Let $(\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_r)$ now be a given characteristic over $r$ rounds where the differences $\alpha_i$ are at the end of round $i$ and $\alpha_0$ is the starting difference. Let $(a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_{r-1})$ be the numbers of Sboxes activated by each $\alpha_0$, $\alpha_1$, $\ldots$, and $\alpha_{r-1}$. We can now calculate the probability that this characteristic has a probability larger than 0 in a random instantiation of LowMC as

$$\frac{4^{a_0}}{2^n - 1} \cdot \frac{4^{a_1}}{2^n - 1} \cdots \frac{4^{a_{r-1}}}{2^n - 1} = \frac{4^{a_0 + a_1 + \cdots + a_{r-1}}}{(2^n - 1)^r}.$$

\hspace{1cm} (2)
### 5.2 Linear characteristics

In linear cryptanalysis [55], the goal of the cryptanalyst is to find affine approximations of the cipher that hold sufficiently well. As with differential cryptanalysis, these can be used to mount distinguishing and key recovery attacks. The approximation is done by finding so-called **linear characteristics**, a concatenation of linear approximations for the consecutive rounds of the cipher. Similar to differential characteristics, linear characteristics activate Sboxes that are involved in the approximations.

The proof for the absence of good differential characteristics is directly transferable to linear characteristics because of two facts. Firstly, the maximal linear probability of the Sbox is $2^{-2}$, just the same as the maximal differential probability. Secondly, the transpose of a uniformly randomly chosen invertible binary matrix is still a uniformly randomly chosen invertible binary matrix. Thus we can use equation (4) to calculate the bounds for good linear characteristics as well.
5.3 Boomerang attacks

In boomerang attacks [66], good partial differential characteristics that cover only part of the cipher can be combined to attack ciphers that might be immune to standard differential cryptanalysis. In these attacks, two differential characteristics are combined, one that covers the first half of the cipher and another that covers the second half. If both have about the same probability, the complexity corresponds roughly to the inverse of the fourth power of this probability [66]. Thus to calculate the number of rounds sufficient to make sure that no boomerang exists, we calculate the number of rounds after which differential characteristics of probability $2^{-d/4}$ exist only with negligible probability and then double this number.

5.4 Higher order attacks

Due to its small size, the degree of the Sbox in its algebraic representation is only two. Since in one round the Sboxes are applied in parallel and since the affine layer does not change the algebraic degree, the algebraic degree of one round is two as well. As a low degree could be used as a lever for a high-order attack, let us take a look at how the algebraic degree of LowMC develops over several rounds.

Clearly the algebraic degree of the cipher after $r$ rounds is bounded from above by $2^r$. It is furthermore generally bounded from above by $n - 1$ since the cipher is a permutation. A second upper bound, that is better suited and certainly more realistic for the later rounds, was found by Boura et al. [9]. In our case it is stated as following: If the cipher has degree $d_r$ after $r$ rounds, the degree after round $r + 1$ is at most $\frac{n}{2} + \frac{d_r}{2}$. Differing from Boura et al. [9], in LowMC the Sbox layer only partially consists of Sboxes and partially of the identity mapping. This must be accounted for and requires a third bound: If the cipher has degree $d_r$ after $r$ rounds, the degree after round $r + 1$ is at most $m + d_r$. A proof of this can be found in the full version of this paper. This can be summarized as follows:

**Lemma 1.** If the algebraic degree of LowMC with $m$ Sboxes and length $l$ of the identity part in the Sbox layer is $d_r$ after $r$ rounds, the degree in round $r + 1$ is at most

$$\min \left( 2d_r, m + d_r, \frac{n}{2} + \frac{d_r}{2} \right)$$

where $n = 3m + l$ is the block width of LowMC.

Combining these three bounds, we can easily calculate lower bounds for the number of rounds $r$ needed for different parameter sets $l$ and $m$ of LowMC to reach a degree that is at least as large as the allowed data complexity $d$ minus 1. The results of this for LowMC’s parameters are displayed in Table 4.

5.5 Experimental Cryptanalysis

We proved that no good differential or linear characteristic can cover sufficiently many rounds to be usable as an attack vector in LowMC. This does not exclude
Table 4: For the different sets of LowMC parameters, bounds are given for the number of rounds for which no good differential or linear characteristics exist ($r_{\text{stat}}$), to avoid good boomerangs ($r_{\text{bmrg}}$), and the number of rounds needed to have a sufficiently high algebraic degree ($r_{\text{deg}}$). The bounds were calculated using equations 4 and 5.

though the possibility of good differentials or linear hulls for which a large number of characteristics combine. Given the highly diffusive, random linear layers, this seems very unlikely.

Likewise we were able to find lower bounds on the number of rounds needed for the algebraic degree of LowMC to be sufficiently high. Even though this is state-of-the-art also for traditional designs to date, this gives us no guarantee that it will indeed be high. Unfortunately it is not possible to directly calculate the algebraic degree for any large block size.

To nevertheless strengthen our confidence in the design, we numerically examined the properties of small-scale versions of LowMC. In table 5, we find the results for a 24-bit wide version with 4 Sboxes. For testing its resistance against differential cryptanalysis, we calculated the full codebook under 100 randomly chosen keys and used the distribution of differences to estimate the probabilities of the differentials. To reduce the computational complexity, we restricted the search space to differentials with one active bit in the input difference.

It can clearly be seen that the probability of differentials quickly saturates to values too low to allow an attack. Clearly, the bound calculated with equation 4 ($p_{\text{stat}}$ in the table) overestimates the probability of good characteristics. Even though we were not able to search the whole space of differentials there is little reason to assume that there are other differentials that fare considerably better. It is important to note that the number of impossible differentials goes to 0 after only few rounds. Thus impossible differentials cannot be used to attack any relevant number of rounds. At the same time this assures the absence of any truncated differentials of probability 1.

The minimal algebraic degree is tight for this version when compared with the theoretic upper bound as determined with equation 5. More experimental cryptanalysis can be found in the full version of this paper.

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5That is the minimum of the algebraic degrees of the 24 output bit when written as Boolean functions.
6 Comparison of Implementations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rounds</th>
<th>$p_{\text{best}}$</th>
<th>$p_{\text{worst}}$</th>
<th>$n_{\text{imposs}}$</th>
<th>$\deg_{\text{exp}}$</th>
<th>$\deg_{\text{theor}}$</th>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$2^{-101.5}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Experimental results of full codebook encryption over 100 random keys for a set of small parameters are given. $p_{\text{best}}$ and $p_{\text{worst}}$ are the best and the worst approximate differential probability of any differential with one active bit in the input difference. $n_{\text{imposs}}$ is the number of impossible differentials with one active bit in the input difference. $\deg_{\text{exp}}$ is the minimal algebraic degree in any of the output bits. $\deg_{\text{theor}}$ is the upper bound for the algebraic degree as determined from equation 5. $p_{\text{stat}}$ is the probability that a differential or linear characteristic of probability at least $2^{-12}$ exists (see eq. 4).

5.6 Fixing the number of rounds

We base our recommendation for the number of rounds on the following:

$$r \geq \max(r_{\text{stat}}, r_{\text{bmrng}}, r_{\text{deg}}) + r_{\text{outer}}$$

where $r_{\text{stat}}$ is a bound for statistical attack vectors such as differentials and linear characteristics as discussed in Section 5.1, $r_{\text{bmrng}}$ is the bound for boomerang attacks as discussed in Section 5.3, and where $r_{\text{deg}}$ indicates the number of rounds needed for the cipher to have sufficient degree as discussed in Section 5.4. Values of these for the parameters of LowMC can be found in Table 4. For the number of rounds which can be peeled off at the beginning and end of the cipher by key guessing and other strategies, we use the ad-hoc formula $r_{\text{outer}} = r_{\text{stat}}$.

6 Comparison of Implementations

In the following we report on experiments when evaluating LowMC with MPC protocols in Section 6.1 and with FHE in Section 6.2. The performance of both implementations is independent of the specific choice of the random matrices and
vectors used in LowMC (cf. Section 3.3) as we do not use any optimizations that are based on their specific structure.

In both the FHE and MPC settings, for more efficient matrix multiplication, we use a method that is generically better than a naive approach: the “method of the four Russians” \cite{4russians}. This method reduces the complexity of the matrix-vector product from \( O(n^2) \) to \( O(n^2/\log(n)) \), i.e. it’s an asymptotically faster algorithm and is also fast in practice for the dimensions we face in LowMC. Asymptotically faster methods like the Strassen-Winograd method method make no sense however, for the dimensions we are considering.

It turns out that considering design-optimizations of the linear layer by introducing structure and thereby lowering the density of the matricies and in turn reducing the number of XOR computations will not improve performance of all these implementations. On the contrary, as the application of the security analysis suggests, the number of rounds would need to be increased in such a case.

6.1 MPC Setting

As an example for both classes of MPC protocols described in Section 2.1 we use the GMW protocol \cite{GMW} in the semi-honest setting. As described in \cite{18}, this protocol can be partitioned into 1) a setup phase with a constant number of rounds and communication linear in the MC of the circuit (\( 2\kappa \) bits per AND gate for \( \kappa \)-bit security), and 2) an online phase whose round complexity is linear in the ANDdepth of the circuit. Hence, we expect that the setup time grows linearly in the MC while the online time grows mostly with increasing ANDdepth when network latency is high.

Benchmark Settings.

For our MPC experiments we compare LowMC against other ciphers with a comparable level of security. We compare LowMC with the two standardized ciphers Present and AES and also with the NSA cipher Simon which previously had the lowest number of ANDs per encrypted bit (cf. Table 2). More specifically, for lightweight security with at least \( \kappa = 80 \) bit security we compare LowMC with 80 bit keys against Present with 80 bit key (using the Sbox of \cite{19}) and Simon with 96 bit keys (the Simon specification does not include a variant with 80 bit keys); for long-term security with \( \kappa = 128 \) bit security we compare LowMC with 128 bit keys against AES-128 (using the Sbox of \cite{12}) and Simon with 128 bit key; we set the security parameters for the underlying MPC protocol to \( \kappa = 80 \) bit for lightweight security and to \( \kappa = 128 \) bit for long-term security. We exclude the key schedule and directly input the pre-computed round keys. We use the GMW implementation that is available in the ABY-framework \cite{aby}, which uses the efficient oblivious transfer extensions of \cite{3}. We run our MPC experiments on two desktop PCs, each equipped with...
Comparison of Implementations

### Lightweight Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cipher</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Simon</th>
<th>LowMC</th>
</tr>
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<td>26</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Runtime</td>
<td>LAN</td>
<td>WAN</td>
<td>LAN</td>
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<tr>
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### Long-Term Security

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<td>WAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total [s]</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 6: GMW benchmarking results for single block. Best in class marked in bold.

with an Intel Haswell i7-4770K CPU with 3.5 GHz and 16GB of RAM, that are connected by Gigabit LAN. To see the impact of the reduced AND depth in the online phase, we measured the times in a LAN scenario (0.2 ms latency) and also a trans-atlantic WAN scenario (50 ms latency) which we simulated using the Linux command `tc`.

In our first experiment depicted in Table 6 we encrypt a single block, whereas in our second experiment depicted in Table 7 we encrypt multiple blocks in parallel to encrypt 12.8 Mbit of data.

**Single-Block Results.**

From our single-block experiments in Table 6 we see that the communication of LowMC is higher by factor 2 compared to the lightweight security ciphers but lower by factor 2 compared to the long-term security ciphers. In terms of total runtime, for lightweight security LowMC performs similar to Present and Simon in the LAN setting and outperforms both by factor 3 to 9 in the WAN setting. For long-term security AES is slightly faster than LowMC in the LAN setting, but slower than LowMC in the WAN setting by factor 2. These results can be explained by the high number of XOR gates of LowMC compared to AES, which impact the run-time higher than the communication for the AND gates. In the WAN setting, the higher AND depth of AES outweighs the local overhead of the XOR gates for LowMC, yielding a faster run-time for LowMC.

**Multi-Block Results.**

From our multi-block experiments in Table 7 we see that LowMC needs less communication than all other ciphers: at least factor 2 for lightweight security and factor 4 for long-term security. Also the total runtime of LowMC is the lowest among all ciphers, ranging from factor 6 when compared to Simon for lightweight security to factor 9 when compared to AES for long-term security.
Table 7: GMW benchmarking results for multiple blocks to encrypt 12.8 Mbit of data. Best in class marked in bold.

Summary of the Results.

To summarize our MPC experiments, the benefits of LowMC w.r.t. the online time depend on the network latency: over the low-latency LAN network existing ciphers achieve comparable or even slightly faster online runtimes than LowMC, whereas in the higher latency WAN network LowMC achieves the fastest online runtime. W.r.t. the total runtime, LowMC’s benefit in the single-block application again depends on the latency (comparable or slightly less efficient over LAN, but more efficient over WAN), whereas in the multi-block application LowMC significantly improves over existing ciphers by factor 6 to 9. For secure computation protocols with security against malicious adversaries, the benefit of using LowMC would be even more significant, since there the costs per AND gate are at least an order of magnitude higher than in the semi-honest GMW protocol, cf. [48], [58].

6.2 FHE Setting

We implemented LowMC using the homomorphic encryption library HELib [37], [38], which implements the BGV homomorphic encryption scheme [14] and which was also used to evaluate AES-128 [31], [32]. Our implementation represents each plaintext, ciphertext and key bits as individual HE ciphertexts on which XOR and AND operations are performed. Due to the nature of the BGV system this means that we can evaluate many such instances in parallel, typically a few hundred. We found this representation to be more efficient than our other “compact” implementation which packs these bits into the slots of HE ciphertexts.

In the homomorphic encryption setting the number of AND gates is not the main determinant of complexity. Instead, the ANDdepth of the circuit largely determines the cost of XOR and AND, where AND is more expensive than XOR. However, due to the high number of XORs in LowMC, the cost of the linear layer is not negligible. In our implementation we use the “method of the four Russians” [1] to reduce the number of HE ciphertext additions from $O(n^2)$ to $O(n^2 / \log(n))$. 

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7 Conclusions, lessons learned, and open problems

Table 8: LowMC (commit f6a086e) in HElib [38] (commit e9d3785e) on Intel i7-4850HQ CPU @ 2.30GHz; \(d\) is the allowed data complexity, \(m\) is the number of Sboxes, \(n\) is the blocksize, \(r\) is the number of rounds, \# blocks is the number of blocks computed in parallel, \(t_{\text{setup}}\) is the total setup time, \(t_{\text{eval}}\) is the total running time of the encryption in seconds, \(t_{\text{sbox}}\) the total time spent in the S-Box layer in seconds, \(t_{\text{key}}\) the total time spent in the key schedule in seconds, \(t_{\text{block}} = t_{\text{eval}}/\#\text{blocks}\) and \(t_{\text{bit}} = t_{\text{block}}/n\). The rows marked as “main” contain the main parameter proposals. The rows marked as “perf”, “cons” or “smll” contain alternative parameter sets being conservative, performance oriented or relatively small respectively.

In our experiments we chose the depth for the homomorphic encryption scheme such that the “base level” of fresh ciphertexts is at least the number of rounds, i.e. we consume one level per round. Our implementation also does not precompute round keys in advance, but deriving round keys is considered part of the evaluation (cost).

We consider LowMC instances for Present-80 and AES-128 like security. We always choose a homomorphic encryption security level of 80 for compatibility with [31]. Our results are given in Table 8. Our implementation is available at https://bitbucket.org/malb/lowmc-helib.

For comparison with previous results in the literature we reproduce those results in Table 9 which demonstrates the benefit of a dedicated block cipher for homomorphic evaluation.

7 Conclusions, lessons learned, and open problems

We proposed block ciphers with an extremely small number of AND gates and an extremely shallow AND depth, demonstrated the soundness of our design through experimental evidence and provided a security analysis of these constructions. Of course, as with any other block cipher, more security analysis is needed to firmly establish the security provided by this new design. Furthermore, with the proposal of the LowMC family, we bring together the areas of symmetric cryptographic design and analysis research with new developments around MPC and FHE. Finally, in contrast to current folklore belief, in some implementation scenarios, we identified practical cases where “free XORs” can no longer be considered free and where local computations in an MPC protocol represent a considerable bottleneck.
Ciphers for MPC and FHE

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</table>

Table 9: Comparison of various block cipher evaluations in the literature and this work; Notation as in Table 8. Memory requirements are not listed as they are usually not provided in the literature. The first row is based on experimental data obtained on the same machine and the same instance of HELib as in Table 8.

To finish, we highlight a number of open problems related to the LowMC family of ciphers. Is it possible to reduce the number of rounds in LowMC further, which in turn would further reduce MC and ANDdepth? Analyzing such an extreme corner of the design space for a symmetric cipher is an interesting endeavor in itself. Can we add more structure into the linear layers in order to reduce the necessary computational effort in those cases where the number of AND gates is no longer the bottleneck? Do such approaches beat applying asymptotically faster linear algebra techniques for applying linear layers as done in Section 6? As we argue in the paper, simply lowering the density of the matrices by several factors of two will not be enough.

Currently, the MC and ANDdepth of various cipher constructions is poorly understood. For example, it would be interesting to find efficient algorithms along the lines of [11] for the various ciphers including the recent lightweight cipher proposals in the literature. While our choice for GF(2) is well motivated, there are scenarios where larger fields might be beneficial. What designs minimize MC and ANDdepth under such constraints?

Acknowledgements.

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References


Ciphers for MPC and FHE


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Observations on the SIMON block cipher family

Publication Information


Contribution

• All authors contributed equally.
• Main contributions are subsection 2.4, Theorems 3, 4, and 6 in section 3 and 4 as well as Appendix A and B.

Remarks

This publication has been slightly edited to fit the format.
Observations on the SIMON block cipher family

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Abstract. In this paper we analyse the general class of functions underlying the SIMON block cipher. In particular, we derive efficiently computable and easily implementable expressions for the exact differential and linear behaviour of SIMON-like round functions.

Following up on this, we use those expressions for a computer aided approach based on SAT/SMT solvers to find both optimal differential and linear characteristics for SIMON. Furthermore, we are able to find all characteristics contributing to the probability of a differential for SIMON32 and give better estimates for the probability for other variants.

Finally, we investigate a large set of SIMON variants using different rotation constants with respect to their resistance against differential and linear cryptanalysis. Interestingly, the default parameters seem to be not always optimal.

Keywords: SIMON, differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, block cipher, Boolean functions

1 Introduction

Lightweight cryptography studies the deployment of cryptographic primitives in resource-constrained environments. This research direction is driven by a demand for cost-effective, small-scale communicating devices such as RFID tags that are a cornerstone in the Internet of Things. Most often the constrained resource is taken to be the chip-area but other performance metrics such as latency [7], code-size [2] and ease of side-channel protection [12] have been considered as well. Some of these criteria were already treated in NOEKEON [9].

The increased importance of lightweight cryptography and its applications has lately been reflected in the NSA publishing two dedicated lightweight cipher families: SIMON and SPECK [5]. Considering that this is only the third time within four decades that the NSA has published a block cipher, this is quite remarkable. Especially as NIST has started shortly after this publication to investigate the possibilities to standardise lightweight primitives, SIMON and SPECK certainly deserve a thorough investigation. This is emphasised by the fact that, in contrast to common practice,
neither a security analysis nor a justification of the design choices were published by the NSA. This lack of openness necessarily gives rise to curiosity and caution.

In this paper we focus on the Simon family of block ciphers; an elegant, innovative and very efficient set of block ciphers. There exists already a large variety of papers, mainly focussed on evaluating Simon’s security with regard to linear and differential cryptanalysis. Most of the methods used therein are rather ad-hoc, often only using approximative values for the differential round probability and in particular for the linear square correlation of one round.

**Our Contribution**

With this study, we complement the existing work threefold. Firstly we develop an exact closed form expression for the differential probability and a \( \log(n) \) algorithm for determining the square correlation over one round. Their accuracy is proven rigorously. Secondly we use these expressions to implement a model of differential and linear characteristics for SAT/SMT solvers which allows us to find the provably best characteristics for different instantiations of Simon. Furthermore we are able to shed light on how differentials in Simon profit from the collapse of many differential characteristics. Thirdly by generalising the probability expressions and the SAT/SMT model, we are able to compare the quality of different parameter sets with respect to differential and linear cryptanalysis.

As a basis for our goal to understand both the security of Simon as well as the choice of its parameter set, we rigorously derive formulas for the differential probabilities and the linear square correlations of the Simon-like round function that can be evaluated in constant time and time linear in the word size respectively. More precisely, we study differential probabilities and linear correlations of functions of the form

\[
S^a(x) \odot S^b(x) + S^c(x)
\]

where \( S^i(x) \) corresponds to a cyclic left shift of \( x \) and \( \odot \) denotes the bitwise AND operation.

We achieve this goal by first simplifying this question by considering equivalent descriptions both of the round function as well as the whole cipher (cf. Section 2.4). These simplifications, together with the theory of quadratic boolean functions, result in a clearer analysis of linear and differential properties (cf. Sections 3 and 4). Importantly, the derived simple equations for computing the probabilities of the Simon round function can be evaluated efficiently and, more importantly maybe, are conceptually very easy. This allows them to be easily used in computer-aided investigations of differential and linear properties over more rounds. It should be noted here that the expression for linear approximations is more complex than the expression for the differential case. However, with respect to the running time of the computer-aided investigations this difference is negligible.

We used this to implement a framework based on SAT/SMT solvers to find the provably best differential and linear characteristics for various instantiations of Simon
1 Introduction

Furthermore we are able to shed light on how differentials in Simon profit from the collapse of many differential characteristics by giving exact distributions of the probabilities of these characteristics for chosen differents. The framework is open source and publicly available to encourage further research [13].

In Section 6 we apply the developed theory and tools to investigate the design space of Simon-like functions. In particular, using the computer-aided approach, we find that the standard Simon parameters are not optimal with regard to the best differential and linear characteristics.

As a side result, we improve the probabilities for the best known differentials for several variants and rounds of Simon. While this might well lead to (slightly) improved attacks, those improved attacks are out of the scope of our work.

Interestingly, at least for Simon32 our findings indicate that the choices made by the NSA are good but not optimal under our metrics, leaving room for further investigations and questions. To encourage further research, we propose several alternative parameter choices for Simon32. Here, we are using the parameters that are optimal when restricting the criteria to linear, differential and dependency properties. We encourage further research on those alternative choices to shed more light on the undisclosed design criteria.

We also like to point out that the Simon key-scheduling was not part of our investigations. Its influence on the security of Simon is left as an important open question for further investigations. In line with this, whenever we investigate multi-round properties of Simon in our work, we implicitly assume independent round keys in the computation of probabilities.

Finally, we note that most of our results can be applied to more general constructions, where the involved operations are restricted to AND, XOR, and rotations.

Related Work

There are various papers published on the cryptanalysis of Simon [1, 3, 6, 16, 18, 19]. The most promising attacks so far are based on differential and linear cryptanalysis, however a clear methodology of how to derive the differential probabilities and square correlations seems to miss in most cases. Biryukov, Roy and Velichkov [6] derive a correct, but rather involved method to find the differential probabilities. Abed, List, Lucks and Wenzel [1] state an algorithm for the calculation of the differential probabilities but without further explanation. For the calculation of the square correlations an algorithm seems to be missing all together.

Previous work also identifies various properties like the strong differential effect and give estimate of the probability of differentials.

The concept behind our framework was previously also applied on the ARX cipher Salsa20 [14] and the CAESAR candidate NORX [4]. In addition to the applications proposed in previous work we extend it for linear cryptanalysis, examine the influence of rotation constants and use it to compute the distribution of characteristics corresponding to a differential.
2 Preliminaries

In this section, we start by defining our notation and giving a short description of the round function. We recall suitable notions of equivalence of Boolean functions that allow us to simplify our investigations of Simon-like round functions. Most of this section is generally applicable to AND-RX constructions, i.e. constructions that only make use of the bitwise operations AND, XOR, and rotations.

2.1 Notation

We denote by $\mathbb{F}_2$ the field with two elements and by $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ the $n$-dimensional vector space over $\mathbb{F}_2$. By $0$ and $1$ we denote the vectors of $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ with all 0s and all 1s respectively. The Hamming weight of a vector $a \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ is denoted as $\text{wt}(a)$. By $\mathbb{Z}_n$ we denote the integers modulo $n$.

The addition in $\mathbb{F}_2^n$, i.e. bit-wise XOR, is denoted by $\oplus$. By $\odot$ we denote the AND operation in $\mathbb{F}_2^n$, i.e. multiplication over $\mathbb{F}_2$ in each coordinate:

$$x \odot y = (x_i y_i)_i.$$  

By $\lor$ we denote the bitwise OR operation. By $\overline{x}$ we denote the bitwise negation of $x$, i.e. $\overline{x} := (x + 1)$. We denote by $S^i : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$ the left circular shift by $i$ positions. We also note that any arithmetic of bit indices is always done modulo the word size $n$.

In this paper we are mainly concerned with functions of the form

$$f_{a, b, c}(x) = S^a(x) \odot S^b(x) + S^c(x)$$

and we identify such functions with its triple $(a, b, c)$ of parameters.

For a vectorial Boolean function on $n$ bits, $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$, we denote by

$$\hat{f}(\alpha, \beta) = \sum_x \mu((\beta, f(x)) + (\alpha, x))$$

the Walsh (or Fourier) coefficient with input mask $\alpha$ and output mask $\beta$. Here we use $\mu(x) = (-1)^x$ to simplify the notation.

The corresponding squared correlation of $f$ is given by

$$C^2(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) = \left( \frac{\hat{f}(\alpha, \beta)}{2^n} \right)^2.$$  

For differentials we similarly denote by $\Pr(\alpha \rightarrow \beta)$ the probability that a given input difference $\alpha$ results in a given output difference $\beta$, i.e.

$$\Pr(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) = \frac{|\{x \mid f(x) + f(x + \alpha) = \beta\}|}{2^n}.$$  

Furthermore, $\text{Dom}(f)$ is the domain of a function $f$, $\text{Img}(f)$ is its image.
2 Preliminaries

2.2 Description of SIMON

SIMON is a family of lightweight block ciphers with block sizes 32, 48, 64, 96, and 128 bits. The constructions are Feistel ciphers using a word size \( n \) of 16, 24, 32, 48 or 64 bits, respectively. We will denote the variants as SIMON2\( n \). The key size varies between of 2, 3, and 4 \( n \)-bit words. The round function of SIMON is composed of AND, rotation, and XOR operations on the complete word (see figure 1). More precisely, the round function in SIMON corresponds to

\[
S^8(x) \odot S^1(x) + S^2(x),
\]

that is to the parameters \((8, 1, 2)\) for \( f \) as given in Equation (1). As we are not only interested in the original SIMON parameters, but in investigating the entire design space of SIMON-like functions, we denote by

\[\text{SIMON}[a, b, c]\]

the variant of SIMON where the original round function is replaced by \( f_{a,b,c} \) (cf. Equation (1)).

As it is out of scope for our purpose, we refer to [5] for the description of the key-scheduling.

2.3 Affine equivalence of Boolean Functions

Given two (vectorial) Boolean functions \( f_1 \) and \( f_2 \) on \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \) related by

\[
f_1(x) = (A \circ f_2 \circ B)(x) + C(x)
\]

where \( A \) and \( B \) are affine permutations and \( C \) is an arbitrary affine mapping on \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \) we say that \( f_1 \) and \( f_2 \) are extended affine equivalent (cf. [8] for a comprehensive survey).
With respect to differential cryptanalysis, if $f_1$ and $f_2$ are extended affine equivalent then the differential $\alpha \xrightarrow{f_1} \beta$ over $f_1$ has probability $p$ if and only if the differential
$$B(\alpha) \xrightarrow{f_2} A^{-1}(\beta + C(\alpha))$$
over $f_2$ has probability $p$ as well.

For linear cryptanalysis, a similar relation holds for the linear correlation. If $f_1$ and $f_2$ are related as defined above, it holds that
$$\hat{f}_1(\alpha, \beta) = \hat{f}_2 \left( (C \circ B^{-1})^T \beta + (B^{-1})^T \alpha, A^T \beta \right).$$

Thus up to linear changes we can study $f_2$ instead of $f_1$ directly. Note that, for an actual attack, these changes are usually critical and can certainly not be ignored. However, tracing the changes is, again, simple linear algebra.

For differential and linear properties of SIMON-like functions of the form
$$f_{a,b,c}(x) = S^a(x) \odot S^b(x) + S^c(x)$$
this implies that it is sufficient to find the differential and linear properties of the simplified variant
$$f(x) = x \odot S^d(x)$$
and then transfer the results back by simply using linear algebra.\(^3\)

### 2.4 Structural Equivalence Classes in AND-RX Constructions

AND-RX constructions, i.e. constructions that make only use of the operations AND ($\odot$), XOR ($+$), and rotations ($S^r$), exhibit a high degree of symmetry. Not only are they invariant under rotation of all input words, output words and constants, they are furthermore structurally invariant under any affine transformation of the bit-indices. As a consequence of this, several equivalent representations of the SIMON variants exist.

Let $T$ be a permutation of the bits of an $n$-bit word that corresponds to an affine transformation of the bit-indices. Thus there are $s \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ and $t \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ such that bit $i$ is renamed to $s \cdot i + t$. As the AND and XOR operations are bitwise, $T$ clearly commutes with these:

$$Tv \odot Tw = T(v \odot w)$$
$$Tv + Tw = T(v + w)$$

where $v$ and $w$ are $n$-bit words. A rotation to the left by $r$ can be written bitwise as $S^r(v)_i = v_{i-r}$. For a rotation, we thus get the following bitwise relation after transformation with $T$
$$S^r(v)_{s \cdot i + t} = v_{s \cdot (i-r) + t} = v_{s \cdot i + t - s \cdot r}.$$

\(^3\)Note that we can transform the equation $f(x) = S^a(x) \odot S_b(x) + S^c(x)$ to the equation $S^{-a}(f(x)) + S^{c-a}(x) = x \odot S^{b-a}(x)$. 

3 Differential Probabilities of SIMON-like round functions

Substituting $s \cdot i + t$ with $j$ this is the same as

$$S^r(v)_j = v_{j-s \cdot r}.$$  

Thus the rotation by $r$ has been changed to a rotation by $s \cdot r$. Thus we can write

$$TS^r v = S^{s \cdot r}Tv.$$  

Commuting the linear transformation of the bit-indices with a rotation thus only
changes the rotation constant by a factor. In the special case where all input words,
output words and constants are rotated, which corresponds to the case $s = 1$, the
rotation constant are left untouched.

To summarise the above, when applying such a transformation $T$ to all input
words, output words and constants in an AND-RX construction, the structure of
the constructions remains untouched apart from a multiplication of the rotation
constants by the factor $s$.

This means for example for Simon32 that changing the rotation constants from
$(8, 1, 2)$ to $(3 \cdot 8, 3 \cdot 1, 3 \cdot 2) = (8, 3, 6)$ and adapting the key schedule accordingly gives
us the same cipher apart from a bit permutation. As $s$ has to be coprime to $n$, all $s$
with $\gcd(s, n) = 1$ are allowed, giving $\varphi(n)$ equivalent tuples of rotation constants in
each equivalence class where $\varphi$ is Euler’s phi function.

Together with the result from section 2.3 this implies the following lemma.

**Lemma 1.** Any function $f_{a,b,c}$ as defined in Equation (1) is extended affine equivalent
to a function

$$f(x) = x \odot S^d(x)$$

where $d|n$ or $d = 0$.

When looking at differential and square correlations of Simon-like round functions
this means that it is sufficient to investigate this restricted set of functions. The
results for these functions can then simply be transferred to the general case.

3 Differential Probabilities of SIMON-like round
functions

In this section, we derive a closed expression for the differential probability for all
Simon-like round functions, i.e. all functions as described in Equation (1). The
main ingredients here are the derived equivalences and the observation that any such
function is quadratic. Being quadratic immediately implies that its derivative is linear
and thus the computation of differential probabilities basically boils down to linear
algebra (cf. Theorem 2). However, to be able to efficiently study multiple-round
properties and in particular differential characteristics, it is important to have a
simple expression for the differential probabilities. Those expressions are given for
$f(x) = x \odot S^1(x)$ in Theorem 3 and for the general case in Theorem 4.
3.1 A closed expression for the differential probability

The following statement summarises the differential properties of the $f$ function.

**Theorem 2.** Given an input difference $\alpha$ and an output difference $\beta$ the probability $p$ of the corresponding differential (characteristic) for the function $f(x) = x \odot S^a(x)$ is given by

$$p_{\alpha, \beta} = \begin{cases} 2^{-(n-d)} & \text{if } \beta + \alpha \odot S^a(\alpha) \in \text{img}(L_\alpha) \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

where

$$d = \dim \ker(L_\alpha)$$

and

$$L_\alpha(x) = x \odot S^a(\alpha) + \alpha \odot S^a(x)$$

*Proof.* We have to count the number of solutions to the equation

$$f(x) + f(x + \alpha) = \beta.$$ 

This simplifies to

$$L_\alpha(x) = x \odot S^a(\alpha) + \alpha \odot S^a(x) = \beta + \alpha \odot S^a(\alpha)$$

As this is an affine equation, it either has zero solutions or the number of solutions equals the kernel size, i.e. the number of elements in the subspace

$$\{x \mid x \odot S^a(\alpha) + \alpha \odot S^a(x) = 0\}.$$ 

Clearly, the equation has solutions if and only if $\beta + \alpha \odot S^a(\alpha)$ is in the image of $L_\alpha$. \qed

Next we present a closed formula to calculate the differential probability in the case where $a = 1$. Furthermore we restrict ourselves to the case where $n$ is even.

**Theorem 3.** Let

$$\text{varibits} = S^1(\alpha) \lor \alpha$$

and

$$\text{doublebits} = \alpha \odot S^1(\alpha) \odot S^2(\alpha).$$

Then the probability that difference $\alpha$ goes to difference $\beta$ is

$$P(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) = \begin{cases} 2^{-n+1} & \text{if } \alpha = 1 \text{ and } \text{wt}(\beta) \equiv 0 \mod 2 \\ 2^{-\text{wt(varibits+doublebits)}} & \text{if } \alpha \neq 1 \text{ and } \beta \odot \text{varibits} = 0 \\ 0 & \text{and } (\beta + S^1(\beta)) \odot \text{doublebits} = 0 \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$
3 Differential Probabilities of SIMON-like round functions

Proof. According to theorem 2 we need to prove two things. Firstly we need to prove that the rank of $L_{\alpha}$ (i.e. $n - \dim \ker L_{\alpha}$) is $n - 1$ when $\alpha = 1$, and $\text{wt}((\text{varibits} + \text{doublebits}))$ otherwise. Secondly we need to prove that $\beta + \alpha \odot S^1(\alpha) \in \text{Im}g(L_{\alpha})$ iff $\text{wt}(\beta) \equiv 0 \mod 2$ when $\alpha = 1$, and that $\beta + \alpha \odot S^1(\alpha) \in \text{Im}g(L_{\alpha})$ iff $\beta \odot \text{varibits} = 0$ and $(\beta + S^1(\beta)) \odot \text{doublebits} = 0$ when $\alpha \neq 1$.

We first consider the first part. Let us write $L_{\alpha}(x)$ in matrix form and let us take $x$ to be a column vector.

\[
M_{S^1(\alpha) \odot} = \begin{pmatrix}
\alpha_{n-1} & \ldots & \ldots & 0 \\
\vdots & \alpha_0 & \vdots \\
\vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
0 & \ldots & \ldots & \alpha_{n-2}
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

Equivalently we can write $\alpha \odot x$ and $S^1(x)$ with matrices as $M_{\alpha \odot}x$ and $M_{S^1}x$ respectively where

\[
M_{\alpha \odot} = \begin{pmatrix}
\alpha_0 & \ldots & \ldots & 0 \\
\vdots & \alpha_1 & \vdots \\
\vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
0 & \ldots & \ldots & \alpha_{n-1}
\end{pmatrix} \text{ and } M_{S^1} = \begin{pmatrix}
0_{1,n-1} & I_{1,1} \\
I_{n-1,n-1} & 0_{n-1,1}
\end{pmatrix},
\]

i.e. $M_{S^1}$ consists of two identity and two zero submatrices. The result of $M_{S^1(\alpha) \odot} + M_{\alpha \odot}M_{S^1}$ can now be written as

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\alpha_{n-1} & 0 & \ldots & \alpha_0 \\
\alpha_1 & \alpha_0 & \ldots & 0 \\
0 & \alpha_2 & \alpha_1 & \vdots \\
\vdots & \ddots & \ddots & 0 \\
0 & \ldots & 0 & \alpha_{n-1} & \alpha_{n-2}
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

Clearly the rank of the matrix is $n - 1$ when all $\alpha_i$ are 1. Suppose now that not all $\alpha_i$ are 1. In that case, a set of non-zero rows is linearly dependent iff there exist two identical rows in the set. Thus to calculate the rank of the matrix, we need to calculate the number of unique non-zero rows.

By associating the rows in the above matrix with the bits in varibits, we can clearly see that the number of non-zero rows in the matrices corresponds to the number of 1s in varibits = $S^1(\alpha) \lor \alpha$.

To count the number of non-unique rows, first notice that a nonzero row can only be identical to the row exactly above or below. Suppose now that a non-zero row $i$ is identical to the row $(i - 1)$ above. Then $\alpha_{i-1}$ has to be 0 while $\alpha_i$ and $\alpha_{i-2}$ have to be 1. But then row $i$ cannot simultaneously be identical to row $(i + 1)$ below. Thus it is sufficient to calculate the number of non-zero rows minus the number of rows
Observations on the SIMON block cipher family

that are identical to the row above it to find the rank of the matrix. Noting that row
$i$ is non-zero iff $\alpha_i\alpha_{i-1}$ and that $\alpha_i\alpha_{i-1}\alpha_{i-2}$ is only equal 1 when row $i$ is non-zero
and equal to the row above it. Thus calculating the number of $i$ for which

$$\alpha_i\alpha_{i-1} + \alpha_i\alpha_{i-1}\alpha_{i-2}$$

is equal 1 gives us the rank of $L_\alpha$. This corresponds to calculating $\text{wt}(\text{varibits + doublebits})$.

For the second part of the proof, we need to prove the conditions that check
whether $\beta + \alpha \circ S^1(\alpha) \in \text{Img}(L_\alpha)$. First notice that $\alpha \circ S^1(\alpha)$ is in the image of $L_\alpha$ (consider for $x$ the vector with bits alternately set to 0 and 1). Thus it is sufficient
to test whether $\beta$ is in $\text{Img} L_\alpha$. Let $y = L_\alpha(x)$. Let us first look at the the case of
$\alpha = 1$. Then $L_\alpha(x) = x + S^1(x)$. We can thus deduce from bit $y_i$ whether $x_i = x_{i-1}$
or $x_i \neq x_{i-1}$. Thus the bits in $y$ create a chain of equalities/inequalities in the bits
of $x$ which can only be fulfilled if there the number of inequalities is even. Hence in
that case $\beta \in \text{Img} L_\alpha$ iff $\text{wt}(\beta) \equiv 0 \mod 2$.

For the case that $\alpha \neq 1$, we first note that $y_i$ has to be zero if the corresponding row
$i$ in the matrix of equation (3) is all zeroes. Furthermore following our discussion of
this matrix earlier, we see that $y_i$ is independent of the rest of $y$ if the corresponding
row is linearly independent of the other rows and that $y_i$ has to be the same as $y_i$ if the corresponding rows are identical. Thus we only need to check that the
zero-rows of the matrix correspond to zero bits in $\beta$ and that the bits in $\beta$ which
correspond to identical rows in the matrix are equal. Thus $\beta$ is in the image of $L_\alpha$
iff $\beta \circ \text{varibits} = 0$ and $(\beta + S^1(\beta)) \circ \text{doublebits} = 0$.

3.2 The full formula for differentials.

Above we treated only the case for the simplified function $f(x) = x \cdot S^1(x)$. As
mentioned earlier, the general case where $\gcd(a - b, n) = 1$ can be deduced from
this with linear algebra. When $\gcd(d, n) \neq 1$ though, the function $f(x) = x \circ S^d(x)$
partitions the output bits into independent classes. This not only raises differential
probabilities (worst case $d = 0$), it also makes the notation for the formulas more
complex and cumbersome, though not difficult. We thus restrict ourselves to the
most important case when $\gcd(a - b, n) = 1$. The general formulas are then

**Theorem 4.** Let $f(x) = S^a(x) \circ S^b(x) + S^c(x)$, where $\gcd(n, a - b) = 1$, $n$ even,
and $a > b$ and let $\alpha$ and $\beta$ be an input and an output difference. Then with

$$\text{varibits} = S^a(\alpha) \lor S^b(\alpha)$$

and

$$\text{doublebits} = S^b(\alpha) \lor \overline{S^a(\alpha)} \lor S^{2a-b}(\alpha)$$

and

$$\gamma = \beta + S^c(\alpha)$$
we have that the probability that difference $\alpha$ goes to difference $\beta$ is

$$P(\alpha \to \beta) = \begin{cases} 2^{-n+1} & \text{if } \alpha = 1 \text{ and } \text{wt}(\gamma) \equiv 0 \mod 2 \\ 2^{-\text{wt(varibits+doublebits)}} & \text{if } \alpha \neq 1 \text{ and } \gamma \odot \text{varibits} = 0 \\ 0 & \text{and } (\gamma + S^{a-b}(\gamma)) \odot \text{doublebits} = 0 \\ & \text{else} . \end{cases}$$

For a more intuitive approach and some elaboration on the differential probabilities, we refer to the ePrint version of this paper.

### 4 Linear Correlations of SIMON-like round functions

As in the differential case, for the study of linear approximations, we also build up on the results from subsections 2.3 and 2.4. We will thus start with studying linear approximations for the function $f(x) = x \odot S^a(x)$. Again, the key point here is that all those functions are quadratic and thus their Fourier coefficient, or equivalently their correlation, can be computed by linear algebra (cf. Theorem 5). Theorem 6 is then, in analogy to the differential case, the explicit expression for the linear correlations. It basically corresponds to an explicit formula for the dimension of the involved subspace.

The first result is the following:

**Theorem 5.**

$$\hat{f}(\alpha, \beta)^2 = \begin{cases} 2^{n+d} & \text{if } \alpha \in U^\perp_{\beta} \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

where $$d = \text{dim } U_{\beta}$$

and $$U_{\beta} = \{ y | \beta \odot S^a(y) + S^{-a}(\beta \odot y) = 0 \}$$

**Proof.** We compute

$$\hat{f}(\alpha, \beta)^2 = \sum_{x,y} \mu (\langle \beta, f(x) + f(y) \rangle + \langle \alpha, x + y \rangle)$$

$$= \sum_{x,y} \mu (\langle \beta, f(x) + f(x + y) \rangle + \langle \alpha, y \rangle)$$

$$= \sum_{x,y} \mu (\langle \beta, x \odot S^a(x) + (x + y) \odot S^a(x + y) \rangle + \langle \alpha, y \rangle)$$

$$= \sum_{y} \mu (\langle \beta, f(y) \rangle + \langle \alpha, y \rangle) \sum_{x} \mu (\langle \beta, x \odot S^a(y) + y \odot S^a(x) \rangle)$$

$$= \sum_{y} \mu (\langle \beta, f(y) \rangle + \langle \alpha, y \rangle) \sum_{x} \mu (\langle x, \beta \odot S^a(y) + S^{-a}(\beta \odot y) \rangle) .$$
Now for the sum over $x$ only two outcomes are possible, $2^n$ or zero. More precisely, it holds that
\[
\sum_x \mu(\langle x, \beta \odot S^a(y) + S^{-a}(\beta \odot y) \rangle) = \begin{cases} 2^n & \text{if } \beta \odot S^a(y) + S^{-a}(\beta \odot y) = 0 \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}.
\]

Thus, defining
\[
U_\beta = \{y \mid \beta \odot S^a(y) + S^{-a}(\beta \odot y) = 0\}
\]
we get
\[
\hat{f}(\alpha, \beta)^2 = 2^n \sum_{y \in U_\beta} \mu(\langle \beta, f(y) \rangle + \langle \alpha, y \rangle).
\]

Now as
\[
\langle \beta, f(y) \rangle = \langle \beta, y \odot S^a(y) \rangle \tag{1}
= \langle 1, y \odot \beta \odot S^a(y) \rangle \tag{2}
= \langle 1, y \odot S^{-a}(\beta \odot y) \rangle \tag{3}
\]
Now, the function $f_\beta := \langle \beta, f(y) \rangle$ is linear over $U_\beta$ as can be easily seen by the definition of $U_\beta$. Moreover, as $f_\beta$ is unbalanced for all $\beta$, it follows that actually $f_\beta$ is constant zero on $U_\beta$. We thus conclude that
\[
\hat{f}(\alpha, \beta)^2 = 2^n \sum_{y \in U_\beta} \mu(\langle \alpha, y \rangle).
\]

With a similar argument as above, it follows that $\hat{f}(\alpha, \beta)^2$ is non-zero if and only if $\alpha$ is contained in $U_\beta^\perp$. \hfill \square

Let us now restrict ourselves to the case where $f(x) = x \odot S^1(x)$. The general case can be deduced analogously to the differential probabilities. For simplicity we also restrict ourselves to the case where $n$ is even.

First we need to introduce some notation. Let $x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ with not all bits equal to 1. We now look at blocks of consecutive 1s in $x$, including potentially a block that “wraps around” the ends of $x$. Let the lengths of these blocks, measured in bits, be denoted as $c_0, \ldots, c_m$. For example, the bitstring 10101111011 has blocks of length 1, 3, and 4. With this notation define $\theta(x) := \sum_{i=0}^m \left\lceil \frac{c_i}{2} \right\rceil$.

Noting that the linear square correlation of $f$ is $\hat{f}(\alpha, \beta)^2$, we then have the following theorem:

**Theorem 6.** With the notation from above it holds that the linear square correlation of $\alpha \mapsto \beta$ can be calculated as
\[
C(\alpha \mapsto \beta) = \begin{cases} 2^{-n+2} & \text{if } \beta = 1 \text{ and } \alpha \in U_\beta^\perp \\ 2^{-\theta(\beta)} & \text{if } \beta \neq 1 \text{ and } \alpha \in U_\beta^\perp \\ 0 & \text{else.} \end{cases}
\]
Proof. Define $L_\beta(x) := \beta \circ S^1(x) + S^{-1}(\beta \circ x)$. Clearly $L_\beta$ is linear. Also $U_\beta = \ker L_\beta(x)$. Let us determine the rank of this mapping. Define the matrices $M_\beta$, $M_{S^1}$, and $M_{S^{-1}}$ as

$$M_\beta = \begin{pmatrix} \beta_0 & \cdots & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & \cdots & \cdots & \beta_{n-1} \end{pmatrix}, \quad M_{S^1} = \begin{pmatrix} 0_{1,n-1} & I_{1,1} \\ I_{n-1,n-1} & 0_{n-1,1} \end{pmatrix}, \quad M_{S^{-1}} = \begin{pmatrix} 0_{n-1,1} & I_{n-1,n-1} \\ I_{1,1} & 0_{1,n-1} \end{pmatrix} \quad (5)$$

We can then write $L_\beta$ in matrix form as

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 & \beta_1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \beta_0 \\ \beta_1 & 0 & \beta_2 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & \beta_2 & 0 & \beta_3 & \ddots & \vdots \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \beta_{n-1} \\ \beta_0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \beta_{n-1} & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad (6)$$

Clearly, if $\beta$ is all 1s, the rank of the matrix is $n - 2$ as $n$ is even. Let us therefore now assume that $\beta$ is not all 1s. When we look at a block of 1s in $\beta$ e.g., $\beta_{i-1} = 0$, $\beta_i, \beta_{i+1}, \ldots, \beta_{i+l-1} = 1$, and $\beta_1 = 0$. Then clearly the $l$ rows $i, i + 1, \ldots, i + l - 1$ are linearly independent when $l$ is even. When $l$ is odd though, the sum of rows $i, i + 2, i + 4$, up to row $i + l - 3$ will equal row $i + l - 1$. In that case there are thus only $l - 1$ linearly independent rows. As the blocks of 1s in $\beta$ generate independent blocks of rows, we can summarise that the rank of the matrix is exactly $\theta(\beta)$.

Analogously to the differential probabilities, the linear probabilities in the general case can be derived from this. It is likewise straightforward to derive how to determine whether $\alpha \in U_\beta \perp$. As an explicit formulation of this is rather tedious, we instead refer to the implementation in Python given in the Appendix where both is achieved in the case where $\gcd(a - b, n) = 1$ and $n$ is even.

For a more intuitive approach and some elaboration on the linear probabilities, we refer to the ePrint version of this paper.

## 5 Finding Optimal Differential and Linear Characteristics

While there are various methods for finding good characteristics, determining optimal differential or linear characteristics remains a hard problem in general. The formulas derived for both differential and linear probabilities enable us to apply an algebraic

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4The rank is $n - 1$ when $n$ is odd.
approach to finding the best characteristics. A similar technique has been applied to
the ARX cipher Salsa20 [14] and the CAESAR candidate NORX [4]. For finding the
optimal characteristics for Simon we implemented an open source tool [13] based on

In the next section we will show how Simon can be modeled to find both the best
differential and linear characteristics in this framework and how this can be used to
solve cryptanalytic problems.

5.1 Model for Differential Cryptanalysis of Simon

First we define the variables used in the model of Simon. We use two n-bit variables
\(x_i, y_i\) to represent the XOR-difference in the left and right halves of the state for
each round and an additional variable \(z_i\) to store the XOR-difference of the output
of the AND operation.

For representing the \(\log_2\) probability of the characteristic we introduce an additional
variable \(w_i\) for each round. The sum over all probabilities \(w_i\) then gives the probability
of the corresponding differential characteristic. The values \(w_i\) are computed according
to theorem 4 as

\[
w_i = \text{wt}(\text{varibits} + \text{doublebits})
\]

where \(\text{wt}(x)\) is the Hamming weight of \(x\) and

\[
\text{varibits} = S^a(x_i) \lor S^b(x_i)
\]

\[
\text{doublebits} = S^b(x_i) \odot S^a(x_i) \land S^{2a-b}(x_i)
\]

Therefore, for one round of Simon we get the following set of constraints:

\[
y_{i+1} = x_i
\]

\[
0 = (z_i \odot \text{varibits})
\]

\[
0 = (z_i + S^{a-b}(z_i)) \odot \text{doublebits}
\]

\[
x_{i+1} = y_i + z_i + S^c(x_i)
\]

\[
w_i = \text{wt}(\text{varibits} + \text{doublebits})
\]

A model for linear characteristics, though slightly more complex, can be imple-
mented in a similar way. A description of this model can be found in the imple-
mentation of our framework. Despite the increase in complexity, we could not observe
any significant impact on the solving time for the linear model.

5.2 Finding Optimal Characteristics

We can now use the previous model for Simon to search for optimal differential char-
acteristics. This is done by formulating the problem of finding a valid characteristic,
with respect to our constraints, for a given probability \(w\). This is important to limit
Finding Optimal Differential and Linear Characteristics

Table 1: Overview of the optimal differential (on top) and linear characteristics for different variants of Simon. The probabilities are given as $\log_2(p)$, for linear characteristic the squared correlation is used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rounds</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
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<td><strong>Differential</strong> Simon32</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-8</td>
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<td>-25</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>-36</td>
<td>-38</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon48</td>
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<td>-4</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-12</td>
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<td>-44</td>
<td>-46</td>
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<td>-8</td>
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<td>-20</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>-30</td>
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<td>-14</td>
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<td>-14</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-36</td>
<td>-38</td>
<td>-44</td>
<td>-46</td>
<td>-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon64</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-36</td>
<td>-38</td>
<td>-44</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>-54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The search space and makes sense as we are usually more interested in differential characteristics with a high probability as they are more promising to lead to attacks with a lower complexity. Therefore, we start with a high probability and check if such a characteristic exists. If not we lower the probability.

The procedure can be described in the following way:

- For each round of the cipher add the corresponding constraints as defined in [2]. This system of constraints then exactly describes the form of a valid characteristic for the given parameters.
- Add a condition which accumulates the probabilities of each round as defined in [1] and check if it is equal to our target probability $w$.
- Query if there exists an assignment of variables which is satisfiable under the constraints.
- Decrement the probability $w$ and repeat the procedure.

One of the main advantages compared to other approaches is that we can prove an upper bound on the probability of characteristics for a given cipher and number of rounds. If the solvers determines the set of conditions unsatisfiable, we know that no characteristic with the specified probability exists. We used this approach to determine the characteristics with optimal probability for different variants of Simon. The results are given in Table 1.

**Upper Bound for the Characteristics.**

During our experiments we observed that it seems to be an easy problem for the SMT/SAT solver to prove the absence of differential characteristics above $w_{\max}$. This can be used to get a lower bound on the probability of characteristics contributing to the differential. The procedure is similar to finding the optimal characteristics.
Start with a very low initial probability $w_i$.

Add the same system of constraints which were used for finding the characteristic.

Add a constraint fixing the variables $(x_0, y_0)$ to $\Delta_{in}$ and $(x_r, y_r)$ to $\Delta_{out}$.

Query if there is a solution for this weight.

Increase the probability $w_i$ and repeat the procedure until a solution is found.

5.3 Computing the Probability of a Differential

Given a differential characteristic it is of interest to determine the probability of the associated differential $\Pr(\Delta_{in} \xrightarrow{f_r} \Delta_{out})$ as it might potentially have a much higher probability than the single characteristic. It is often assumed that the probability of the best characteristic can be used to approximate the probability of the best differential. However, this assumption only gives an inaccurate estimate in the case of Simon.

Similarly to the previous approach for finding the characteristic, we can formalise the problem of finding the probability of a given differential in the following way:

• Add the same system of constraints which were used for finding the characteristic.

• Add a constraint fixing the variables $(x_0, y_0)$ to $\Delta_{in}$ and $(x_r, y_r)$ to $\Delta_{out}$.

• Use a SAT solver to find all solutions $s_i$ for the probability $w_i$.

• Decrement the probability $w_i$ and repeat the procedure.

The probability of the differential is then given by

$$\Pr(\Delta_{in} \xrightarrow{f_r} \Delta_{out}) = \sum_{i=w_{\min}}^{w_{\max}} s_i \cdot 2^{-i}$$

where $s_i$ is the number of characteristics with a probability of $2^{-i}$.

We used this approach to compute better estimates for the probability of various differentials (see Table 2). In the case of Simon32 we were able to find all characteristics contributing to the differentials for 13 and 14 rounds. The distribution of the characteristics and accumulated probability of the differential is given in Figure 1. It is interesting to see that the distribution of $w$ in the range $[55, 89]$ is close to uniform and therefore the probability of the corresponding differential improves only negligible and converges quickly towards the measured probability.\footnote{We encrypted all $2^{32}$ possible texts under 100 random keys to obtain the estimate of the probability for 13-round Simon32.}
Table 2: Overview of the differentials and the range \([w_{\text{min}}, w_{\text{max}}]\) of the \(\log_2\) probabilities of the characteristics contributing to the differential. For computing the lower bound \(\log_2(p)\) of the probability of the differentials, we used all characteristics with probabilities in the range from \(w_{\text{min}}\) up to the values in brackets in the \(w_{\text{max}}\) column.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cipher</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
<th>(\Delta_{\text{in}})</th>
<th>(\Delta_{\text{out}})</th>
<th>(w_{\min})</th>
<th>(w_{\max})</th>
<th>(\log_2(p))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simon32</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>(0, 40)</td>
<td>(4000, 0)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>91 (91)</td>
<td>−28.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>(0, 8)</td>
<td>(800, 0)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>120 (120)</td>
<td>−30.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon48</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>(20, 800088)</td>
<td>(800208, 2)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>219 (79)</td>
<td>−41.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon48</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(800000, 220082)</td>
<td>(800000, 220000)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>256 (68)</td>
<td>−44.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon48</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>(80, 222)</td>
<td>(222, 80)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>269 (85)</td>
<td>−46.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon64</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>(4000000, 11000000)</td>
<td>(11000000, 40000000)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>453 (89)</td>
<td>−57.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon64</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>(440, 1880)</td>
<td>(440, 100)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>502 (106)</td>
<td>−61.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The performance of the whole process is very competitive compared to dedicated approaches. Enumerating all characteristics up to probability \(2^{-46}\) for the 13-round Simon32 differential takes around 90 seconds on a single CPU core and already gives a better estimate compared to the results in [6]. A complete enumeration of all characteristics for 13-round Simon32 took close to one core month using CryptoMiniSat4 [15]. The computational effort for other variants of Simon is comparable given the same number of rounds. However, for these variants we can use differentials with a lower probability covering more rounds due to the increased block size. In this case the running time increases due to the larger interval \([w_{\text{min}}, w_{\text{max}}]\) and higher number of rounds.

For Simon48 and Simon64 we are able to improve the estimate given in [17]. Additionally we found differentials which can cover 17 rounds for Simon48 and 22 rounds for Simon64 which might have potential to improve previous attacks. Our results are also closer to the experimentally obtained estimates given in [10] but give a slightly lower probability. This can be due to the limited number of characteristics we use for the larger Simon variants or the different assumptions on the independence of rounds.

Our results are limited by the available computing power and in general it seems to be difficult to count all characteristics for weights in \([w_{\text{min}}, w_{\text{max}}]\), especially for the larger variants of Simon. However the whole process is embarrassingly parallel, as one can split up the computation for each probability \(w_i\). Furthermore, the improvement that one gets decreases quickly. For all differentials we observed that the distribution of differential characteristics becomes flat after a certain point.
Figure 1: Distribution of the number of characteristics for the differential $(0, 40) \rightarrow (4000, 0)$ for 13-round Simon32 and the accumulated probability. A total of $\approx 2^{25.21}$ characteristics contribute to the probability.

6 Analysis of the Parameter Choices

The designers of Simon so far gave no justification for their choice of the rotation constants. Here we evaluate the space of rotation parameters with regard to different metrics for the quality of the parameters. Our results are certainly not a definite answer but are rather intended as a starting point to evaluating the design space and reverse engineering the design choices. We consider all possible sets of rotation constants $(a, b, c)^6$ and checked them for diffusion properties and the optimal differential and linear characteristics.

6.1 Diffusion

As a very simple measure to estimate the quality of the rotation constants, we measure the number of rounds that are needed to reach full diffusion. Full diffusion is reached when every state bit principally depends on all input bits. Compared to computing linear and differential properties it is an easy task to determine the dependency.

In Table 3 we give a comparison to how well the standard Simon rotation parameters fare within the distribution of all possible parameter sets. The exact distributions for all Simon variants can be found in the appendix in Table 8.

Without lack of generality, we assume though that $a \geq b$. 
Table 3: The number of rounds after which full diffusion is reached for the standard SIMON parameters in comparison to the whole possible set of parameters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block size</th>
<th>32</th>
<th>48</th>
<th>64</th>
<th>96</th>
<th>128</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard parameters</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First quartile</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best possible</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2 Differential and Linear

As a second criteria for our parameters, we computed for all \(a > b\) and \(\gcd(a-b, n) = 1\) the optimal differential and linear characteristics for 10 rounds of SIMON32, SIMON48 and SIMON64. A list of the parameters which are optimal for all three variants of SIMON can be found in Appendix D.

It is important here to note that there are also many parameter sets, including the standard choice, for which the best 10-round characteristics of SIMON32 have a probability of \(2^{-25}\) compared to the optimum of \(2^{-26}\). However, this difference by a factor of 2 does not seem to occur for more than 10 rounds and also not any larger variants of SIMON.

6.3 Interesting Alternative Parameter Sets

As one result of our investigation we chose three exemplary sets of parameters that surpass the standard parameters with regard to some metrics. Those variants are SIMON[12, 5, 3], SIMON[7, 0, 2] and SIMON[1, 0, 2].

SIMON[12, 5, 3] has the best diffusion amongst the parameters which have optimal differential and linear characteristics for 10 rounds. The two other choices are both restricted by setting \(b = 0\) as this would allow a more efficient implementation in software. Among those SIMON[7, 0, 2] has the best diffusion and the characteristics behave similar to the standard parameters. Ignoring the diffusion SIMON[1, 0, 2] seems also an interesting choice as it is optimal for the differential and linear characteristics.

If we look though at the differential corresponding to the best differential characteristic of SIMON[7, 0, 2] and SIMON[1, 0, 2], then we can see the number of characteristics contributing to it is significantly higher than for the standard parameters (see Appendix Table 6). However, for SIMON[12, 5, 3] the differential shows a surprisingly different behaviour and the probability of the differential is much closer to the probability of the characteristic. On the other side, the characteristics seem to be worse for the larger variants as can be seen in Table 7. Furthermore it might be desirable to have at least one rotation parameter that corresponds to a byte length, something that the standard parameter set features.
7 Conclusion and Future Work

In this work we analysed the general class of functions underlying the SIMON block cipher. First we rigorously derived efficiently computable and easily implementable expressions for the exact differential and linear behaviour of SIMON-like round functions.

Building upon this, we used those expressions for a computer aided approach based on SAT/SMT solvers to find both optimal differential and linear characteristics for SIMON. Furthermore, we were able to find all characteristics contributing to the probability of a differential for SIMON32 and gave better estimates for the probability for other variants.

Finally, we investigated the space of SIMON variants using different rotation constants with respect to diffusion, and the optimal differential and linear characteristics. Interestingly, the default parameters seem to be not always optimal.

This work opens up for further investigations. In particular, the choice and justifications of the NSA parameters for SIMON remains unclear. Besides our first progress concerning the round function, the design of the key schedule remains largely unclear and further investigation is needed here.

Acknowledgments

First of all, we wish to thank Tomer Ashur. Both the method to check whether a linear input mask gives a correlated or uncorrelated linear 1-round characteristic for a given output mask as well as the first version of the SMT/SAT model for linear characteristics in SIMON were an outcome of our discussions. We furthermore wish to thank the reviewers for comments that helped to improve the paper.

References


A Short tutorial for calculating differential probabilities and square correlations in SIMON-like round functions

The idea of this section is to complement the rigorous proofs with a more intuitive approach to calculating the differential probabilities and square correlation of one
A Short tutorial on calculating probabilities in SIMON

round of SIMON. This should also allow us to better understand the Python code
given later for calculating these values. We restrict ourselves to a simplified version
of the SIMON round function:

\[ f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n \]  
\[ f(m) = S^1(m) \odot m . \]  

Writing this equation bitwise where \( m_i \) denotes the \( i \)th bit of \( m \) we obtain:

\[ f_i(m) = m_{i-1} \odot m_i . \]  

When using a bit subscript, we will always implicitly assume that the subscript is
calculated modulo \( n \), the number of bits. Thus \( m_{i-1} \) and \( m_{n-1} \) will for example refer
to the same bit.

A.1 Differential probabilities

Suppose now we are given a message \( m = (m_{n-1}, \ldots, m_1, m_0) \) and an input difference
\( d = (d_{n-1}, \ldots, d_1, d_0) \). Then the resulting difference \( D \) for the function \( f \) is calculated
as \( D(m, d) = f(m) \oplus f(m \oplus d) \). This can be written bitwise as:

\[ D_i(m, d) = (m_{i-1} \odot m_i) \oplus ((m_{i-1} \oplus d_{i-1}) \odot (m_i \oplus d_i)) . \]  

By differentiating between the four possible different cases for \( d_i \) and \( d_{i-1} \), we obtain
the following:

\[ D_i(m, d) = \begin{cases} 
0, & \text{if } d_i = 0 \text{ and } d_{i-1} = 0 \\
m_i, & \text{if } d_i = 0 \text{ and } d_{i-1} = 1 \\
m_{i-1}, & \text{if } d_i = 1 \text{ and } d_{i-1} = 0 \\
m_i \oplus m_{i-1}, & \text{if } d_i = 1 \text{ and } d_{i-1} = 1 
\end{cases} . \]  

In the last case, \( D_i \) is 1 exactly when \( m_i = m_{i-1} \) and is 0 when \( m_i \neq m_{i-1} \).

Let us now look at a first example. Let \( n = 6 \), and \( d = 001010 \). We then calculate
\( D(m, d) \) using the above bitwise definition of \( D \):

\[ i \quad 5 \\ d \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 1 \\ S^1(d) \quad 0 \quad 1 \quad 0 \quad 1 \\ D(m, d) \quad 0 \quad m_4 \quad m_2 \quad m_0 \quad 0 \]  

We can see that the resulting difference depends only on \( m_4 \), \( m_2 \) and \( m_0 \). Thus by
adapting these bits appropriately we can generate the following resulting differences:

\[ 000000, 000010, 001100, 001110, 010000, 010010, 011100, 011110. \]
All these differences then have the same probability of $\frac{8}{64} = \frac{1}{8}$. Note that the reuse of a message bit, $m_3$ in this case, is due to a subsequence $101$ in the difference.

Let us take a look at another example. Let again $n = 6$ and now $d = 011010$. Then we can again calculate $D(m,d)$ as

$$
\begin{array}{ccccccc}
 i & 5 & 4 & 3 & 2 & 1 & 0 \\
 d & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
 S^1(d) & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
 D(m,d) & m_5 & m_4 \oplus m_3 & m_3 \oplus m_2 & m_2 \oplus m_1 & m_1 \oplus m_0 & m_0 \oplus m_4 \\
\end{array}
$$

(7)

We can see here that consecutive 1s in the input difference will cause the respective output difference bit to depend on two message bits. Nevertheless are all five non-zero output difference bits independent of each other. Thus $2^5$ different output differences are possible, each one with probability $1/32$.

With the observations made above, we can now devise a rule that allows us to determine the probability of a given pair $(\alpha, \beta)$ of an input difference $\alpha$ and an output difference $\beta$. First we calculate the set of varibits which is the bits in which the output difference can be non-zero. So output bit $\beta_i$ is in varibits if and only if $\alpha_i$ or $\alpha_{i-1}$ is non-zero:

$$
\text{varibits} = \alpha \mid S^1(\alpha)
$$

(8)

where $\mid$ denotes the bitwise or.

Next we have to calculate which of these output difference bits have to be the same because of patterns $101$ in the input difference. We do this by calculating the set doublebits which is the output difference bits that always have to be the same as the difference bit one position to the right. Thus $\beta_i$ is in doublebits if and only if $\alpha_i$ is 1, $\alpha_{i-1}$ is 0, and $\alpha_{i-2}$ is 1.

$$
\text{doublebits} = \alpha \circ S^1(\alpha) \circ S^2(\alpha)
$$

(9)

To check whether input difference $\alpha$ can map to output difference $\beta$ with non-zero probability, we only need to check whether all non-zero bits of $\beta$ lie in varibits and that all bits of $\beta$ that are in doublebits are the same as the bits to their right. The probability of the transition is then determine by the number of output difference bits that can be chosen freely, i.e. the number of bits in varibits minus the number of bits in doublebits.

Before we write this procedure down, we have to take a look at one special case, namely when all input difference bits are set, e.g. $n = 6$ and $d = 111111$. Then we can again calculate $D(m,d)$ as

$$
\begin{array}{ccccccc}
 i & 5 & 4 & 3 & 2 & 1 & 0 \\
 d & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
 S^1(d) & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
 D(m,d) & m_5 \oplus m_4 & m_4 \oplus m_3 & m_3 \oplus m_2 & m_2 \oplus m_1 & m_1 \oplus m_0 & m_0 \oplus m_4 \\
\end{array}
$$

(10)
Although all bits of the output are influenced and all bits of the input take equal influence, there are not 64 possible output differences since by switching all bits of \( m \) the output difference does not change.

So which output differences are possible then? By fixing an output difference, we get a sequence of equations of the kind \( m_i = m_{i+1} \) or \( m_i \neq m_{i+1} \). This creates a closed chain of equations that have to be coherent to be satisfiable. As a 0 in the output difference creates an inequality and a 1 creates an equality, in the end it boils down to the condition that the number of 0s in the output difference has to be even when the input difference only consists of 1s.

Let us now summarise all of this in a method to calculate the probability that a given input difference \( \alpha \) is mapped to a given output difference \( \beta \):

1. Check if \( \alpha \) is the difference with all bits set to 1. If that is the case, calculate the number of 0s in \( \beta \). If this number is even, return probability \( 2^{-n+1} \), otherwise return probability 0. If \( \alpha \) is not all 1s, go to next step.

2. Calculate varibits as \( \text{varibits} = \alpha \mid S^1(\alpha) \). Check if \( \beta \) has any bits set to 1 which are not in varibits, i.e. check if \( \text{varibits} \odot \beta \neq 0 \). Should this be the case, return probability 0. Otherwise continue with next step.

3. Calculate doublebits as \( \text{doublebits} = \alpha \odot S^1(\alpha) \odot S^2(\alpha) \). Check whether there are any bits of \( \beta \) in doublebits that are not equal to their right neighbour, i.e. check \( (\beta + S^1(\beta)) \odot \text{doublebits} \neq 0 \). Should this be the case, return probability 0. Otherwise continue with next step.

4. Return probability \( 2^{-\text{wt(varibits+doublebits)}} \).

This method allows us to determine differential probabilities of the function \( f(x) = S^1(x) \odot x \). We only have to apply some affine transformation to convert this to a method for calculating the probability of the Simon round function. A Python implementation of the more general method can be found in Section B.

### A.2 Square correlations

Let us now look at how to calculate square correlations for \( f(x) = S^1(x) \odot x \).

First we look at the case where the input mask \( \alpha \) is all 0s. Let \( n = 6 \) and let the output mask \( \beta \) be 010110:

\[
\begin{array}{ccccccc}
\alpha & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\hline
m & m_5 & m_4 & m_3 & m_2 & m_1 & m_0 \\
S^1(m) & m_4 & m_3 & m_2 & m_1 & m_0 & m_5 \\
\beta & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0
\end{array}
\]  \tag{11}

The resulting expression is then

\[
m_4m_3 + m_2m_1 + m_1m_0. \tag{12}
\]
Observations on the SIMON block cipher family

Let us look at the first term. It is zero in 3 out of 4 cases. It thus has a correlation of $\frac{1}{2}$ and hence a square correlation of $\frac{1}{4}$.

Let us look at the next two terms $m_2m_1$ and $m_1m_0$. First we note that they are not independent as they share the variable $m_1$. So we cannot calculate the square correlation of the sum of these terms as the product of the square correlations of the single terms. But we can rewrite the sum of these terms as

$$m_2m_1 + m_1m_0 = m_1(m_2 + m_0). \quad (13)$$

Now $(m_2 + m_0)$ behaves like a single one bit variable. Therefore the square correlation of $m_1(m_2 + m_0)$ is $\frac{1}{4}$ as well. As $m_4m_3$ and $m_1(m_2 + m_0)$ do not share any variables, the square correlation of the whole expression $m_4m_3 + m_2m_1 + m_1m_0$ is then $\frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{4} = \frac{1}{16}$.

It is easy to see that different “blocks” of 1s in $\beta$ that are separated by at least one 0, will generate independent terms. We thus only need to look at the square correlations of the terms generated from these blocks and multiply these to get the final result.

Let us thus look at a longer block of 1s with $\beta = 011111$:

$$\begin{array}{cccccccc}
\alpha & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
 m & m_5 & m_4 & m_3 & m_2 & m_1 & m_0 & m_5 \\
 S^1(m) & m_4 & m_3 & m_2 & m_1 & m_0 & m_5 \\
 \beta & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
\end{array} \quad (14)$$

The resulting expression is

$$m_5m_4 + m_4m_3 + m_3m_2 + m_2m_1 + m_1m_0. \quad (15)$$

By combining the first and the second as well as the third and the fourth term, we get

$$m_4(m_5 + m_3) + m_2(m_3 + m_1) + m_0m_1. \quad (16)$$

As $(m_5 + m_3), (m_3 + m_1)$, and $m_1$ are independent of each other, the three terms $m_4(m_5 + m_3), m_2(m_3 + m_1),$ and $m_0m_1$ are independent and the square correlation of the whole expression is thus $(\frac{1}{4})^3 = 2^{-6}$.

At this point we already dare to formulate a rule. The square correlation of the term generated by $m$ consecutive blocks of 1s is $2^{-2\left\lfloor \frac{m}{2} \right\rfloor}$. As every pair of consecutive single terms can be combined to create one independent term of square correlation $2^{-2}$, the total square correlation just depends on the number of terms left after such pairing. And this number is $\left\lfloor \frac{m}{2} \right\rfloor$.

Let us now consider a non-zero input mask $\alpha$. Let $\alpha = 010010$ and let $\beta = 010100$:

$$\begin{array}{cccccccc}
\alpha & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
 m & m_5 & m_4 & m_3 & m_2 & m_1 & m_0 & m_5 \\
 S^1(m) & m_4 & m_3 & m_2 & m_1 & m_0 & m_5 \\
 \beta & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\end{array} \quad (17)$$

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The resulting expression is then
\[ m_4m_3 + m_4 + m_2m_1 + m_2 + m_1 + m_0. \] (18)

We see that we can combine the first two terms to get a term of square correlation \(2^{-2}\) again: \(m_4m_3 + m_4 = m_4(m_3 + 1)\). Note that if the second term had been \(m_3\) instead, it would have worked too. For the next three terms we can do the same: \(m_2m_1 + m_2 + m_1 = (m_2 + 1)(m_1 + 1) + 1\). Note that the bias of this term is now flipped; the square correlation is nonetheless also \(2^{-2}\). As the first two terms are independent of the next three terms, the square correlation of the combined first five terms is \(2^{-4}\). But when looking at the last term \(m_0\), we see that it is independent of all other terms and unbiased. Thus the square correlation of the complete expression is 0.

As a matter of fact, it is easy to see that when for any \(i\) the respective bit \(\alpha_i\) of the input mask is 1 but both \(\beta_i\) and \(\beta_{i+1}\) are 0, the resulting expression will always be unbiased. Thus we can say that every non-zero bit in the input mask belonging to some block of 1s in the output mask is a necessary condition for the whole expression to be unbiased. Note that every bit in the input mask can at most be associated with one block of 1s in the output mask.

Thus we can evaluate the square correlation of \(f\) for an input mask \(\alpha\) and an output mask \(\beta\) like this: First we check whether every non-zero bit in the input mask is associated to a block of 1s in the output mask. If this not the case, we already know that the square correlation is zero. Otherwise we continue to partition the output mask and the input mask into blocks of 1s and their associated input mask bits. For each of these blocks we determine the square correlation of the resulting expression and finally multiply these together to get the total square correlation.

But how do we evaluate a block of 1s with the associated input mask bits in general? In the last example, we saw that for a block of a single 1 in the output mask, the two associated bits of the input mask can take any value; the square correlation remains \(2^{-2}\).

How about in the case of a block of two 1s? Let us look at the case of \(\alpha = 111001\) and let \(\beta = 110110\):

\[
\begin{array}{cccccccc}
\alpha & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
\hline
m & m_5 & m_4 & m_3 & m_2 & m_1 & m_0 \\
S^1(m) & m_4 & m_3 & m_2 & m_1 & m_0 & m_5 \\
\beta & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0
\end{array}
\] (19)

The resulting expression is
\[ m_5m_4 + m_4m_3 + m_5 + m_4 + m_3 + m_2m_1 + m_1m_0 + m_0. \] (20)

Let us first look at the first block of 1s in the output mask \(\beta\), i.e. at the expression \(m_5m_4 + m_4m_3 + m_5 + m_4 + m_3\). Combining the first two terms, we get
\[ m_4(m_5 + m_3) + m_5 + m_4 + m_3. \] (21)
We can now combine the first term with \( m_4 \) to get
\[
m_4(m_5 + m_3 + 1) + m_5 + m_3.
\]  
(22)

Finally we can also incorporate \( m_5 \) and \( m_3 \) to get
\[
(m_4 + 1)(m_5 + m_3 + 1) + 1.
\]  
(23)

The expression thus has a square correlation of \( 2^{-2} \).

Let us look at the expression generated by the second block of 1s in the output mask:
\[
m_2m_1 + m_1m_0 + m_0.
\]  
(24)

Combining the first two terms, we get
\[
m_1(m_2 + m_0) + m_0.
\]  
(25)

But now we see that the term \( m_0 \) is independent of the first term. Thus we are left with a square correlation of 0. Note that the square correlation would also be 0 if the last term were \( m_2 \) but not if the last term were \( m_1 \) in which case the square correlation would be \( 2^{-2} \).

As a matter of fact, the rule to determine the square correlation of an expression generated by a block of two 1s in the output mask and the associated bits in the input mask is straightforward. There are three associated input mask bits. If and only if both or none of the two outer bits (\( m_2 \) and \( m_0 \) in the last example) are set to 1, is the expression biased and the square correlation is \( 2^{-2} \).

In fact, for a block of an even number of 1s in the output mask, any combination of associated input bits, will lead to a biased expression with the same square correlation. For a block of an odd number of 1s in the output mask, we need to check the input mask though. There is an odd number of associated bits to this block in the input mask. Let us refer to the first bit and then every second bit as the odd bits, and to the second bit and then every second bit as the even bits (from which direction we count does not matter). The even bits do not have an influence on the square correlation. But the parity of the odd bits determines whether the expression for this block will be unbiased or not. If and only if the parity is even, is the expression biased.

We can summarise a method to calculate the square correlation for a given input mask \( \alpha \) and a given output mask \( \beta \) that is not all 1s as follows:

1. Partition the 1s in the output mask into consecutive blocks of 1s. The total square correlation is now the product of the square correlations for each block.

2. For each block calculate the square correlation:
   a) If the block length is odd, this block is always biased and the square correlation is solely determined by its length.
b) If the block length is even, we need to check the input mask. There is
an odd number of bits in the input mask that are associated with this
output block. Calculate the XOR of every second bit of these associated
bits starting with the first one (such that both outer bits are considered).
If this XOR sum is 1, the block is unbiased and thus the whole expression
is unbiased. If the XOR sum is 0, the square correlation for this block is
determined by its length.

For an implementation of the method to calculate the square correlation in Python,
see Section 6.

B Python code to calculate differential probabilities and
square correlations in SIMON-like round functions

In the following, code for calculating the differential probabilities and square corre-
lations of SIMON-like round functions \( f_{a,b,c}(x) = S^a(x) \odot S^b(x) + S^c(x) \) are given
in Python. Restrictions are that the constants need to fulfil \( \gcd(a - b, n) = 1 \). We
assume that the functions \( S^d(x) \) and \( \text{wt}(x) \) have been implemented as well as a
function \( \text{parity} \) that calculates the parity \( \text{wt}(x) \mod 2 \) of a bit vector \( x \). \( a, b, \) and
c have to be defined in the program as well.

The differential probability of \( \alpha \xrightarrow{f} \beta \) can then be calculated with the following
function:

```python
def pdiff (alpha, beta):
    # Use gamma instead of beta to get rid of the
    # linear part
    gamma = beta ^ S(alpha, c)
    # Take care of the case where alpha is all 1s
    if alpha == 2**n-1:
        if hw(~gamma)%2 == 0:
            return 2**(n-1)
        else :
            return 0
    # Determine bits that can take a nonzero difference
    varibits = S(alpha, a) | S(alpha, b)
    # Check whether gamma conforms with varibits
    if gamma & ~varibits != 0:
        return 0
    # Determine the bits that are duplicates
    doublebits = S(alpha, 2 * a - b) & ~S(alpha, a) &
                S(alpha, b)
    # Check whether the duplicate bits are the same as
    # there counterpart
```

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Observations on the SIMON block cipher family

```python
if (gamma ^ S(gamma, a - b)) & doublebits != 0:
    return 0
return 2**(-hw(varibits ^ doublebits))
```

The squared correlation of $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ can be calculated with the following function. Here we assume $n$ to be even, which is relevant for the case where $\beta$ is all 1s.

```python
def plin(alpha, beta):
    # Get rid of linear part of round function
    alpha ^= S(beta, -c)
    # If the input masks uses bits that have corresponding bits in the output mask, the correlation is 0.
    if ((S(beta, -a) | S(beta, -b)) ^ alpha) & alpha != 0:
        return 0
    # Take care of the case where beta is all 1s
    if beta == 2**n - 1:
        t, v = alpha, 0
        while t != 0:
            v ^= t & 3
            t >>= 2
        if v != 0:
            return 0
        else:
            return 2**(-n + 2)
    # Set in the abits mask the first and then every second bit of each block of 1s in the output mask beta. Each corresponds to one independent multiplication term, and thus adds a factor of 2^(-2) to the square correlation.
    # Example:
    # beta = 011101110110 -> abits = 0101001010100
    tmp = beta
    abits = beta
    while tmp != 0:
        tmp = beta & S(tmp, -(a - b))
        abits ^= tmp
    # The sbits correspond to bits one to the right of each block of an even number of 1s in the output mask.
    # Example:
    # beta = 011101110110 -> sbits = 000010000001
```

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sbits = S(beta, -(a - b)) &  
       ~beta & -S(abits, -(a - b))  
# Adopt sbits to correspond to the respective bits  
# in the input mask  
sbits = S(sbits, -b)  
# The pbits are used to check whether the input  
# mask removes the bias from one of the output  
# mask blocks. It checks the parity of the sum of  
# every second inputmask bit for each block that  
# corresponds to a block of an even number of 1s  
# in the output mask.  
pbits = 0  
while sbits != 0:  
    pbits ^= sbits & alpha  
    sbits = S(sbits, (a - b)) & S(beta, -b)  
    sbits = S(sbits, (a - b))  
    pbits = S(pbits, 2 * (a - b))  
# If the parity is uneven for any one of the  
# blocks, there is no bias.  
if pbits != 0:  
    return 0  
return 2**(-2 * hw(abits))

C Additional Differential Bounds

In Table 4 resp. 5 we give the distributions for the characteristics contributing to a differential up to the bound we computed them.

D Optimal parameters for differential characteristics

The following sets of rotation constants (a, b, c) are optimal for 10 rounds regarding differential characteristics for SIMON32, SIMON48, and SIMON64

(1, 0, 2), (1, 0, 3), (2, 1, 3), (4, 3, 5), (5, 0, 10), (5, 0, 15), (5, 4, 3), (7, 0, 14), (7, 6, 5)  
(8, 1, 3), (8, 3, 14), (8, 7, 5), (10, 5, 15), (11, 6, 1), (12, 1, 7), (12, 5, 3), (12, 7, 1)  
(13, 0, 10), (13, 0, 7), (13, 8, 2)

Similar to the experiments for the default parameters, we used our framework to evaluate the quality of various rotation constants. In Table 7 we give an overview of the best differential characteristics for variants of SIMON using a different set of
rotation constants. Table 6 shows that a carefully chosen set of constants can have a very strong effect on the differentials.
Table 4: For the 17-round differential \((80, 222) \xrightarrow{f^{17}} (222, 80)\) in SIMON48, the number of differential characteristics are listed here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(\log_2(p))</th>
<th>#Characteristics</th>
<th>(\log_2(p))</th>
<th>#Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(-52)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(-69)</td>
<td>20890</td>
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<tr>
<td>(-53)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(-70)</td>
<td>38837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-54)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>(-71)</td>
<td>72822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-55)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>(-72)</td>
<td>133410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-56)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(-73)</td>
<td>240790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-57)</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>(-74)</td>
<td>353176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-58)</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>(-75)</td>
<td>279833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-59)</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>(-76)</td>
<td>235071</td>
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<tr>
<td>(-60)</td>
<td>1067</td>
<td>(-77)</td>
<td>259029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-61)</td>
<td>1607</td>
<td>(-78)</td>
<td>225836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-62)</td>
<td>2255</td>
<td>(-79)</td>
<td>256135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-63)</td>
<td>2839</td>
<td>(-80)</td>
<td>252193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-64)</td>
<td>3476</td>
<td>(-81)</td>
<td>252654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-65)</td>
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<td>198784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-66)</td>
<td>5032</td>
<td>(-83)</td>
<td>229843</td>
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<tr>
<td>(-67)</td>
<td>7063</td>
<td>(-84)</td>
<td>208757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-68)</td>
<td>11481</td>
<td>(-85)</td>
<td>253112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: For the 21-round differential \((4000000, 11000000) \xrightarrow{f^{21}} (11000000, 4000000)\) in SIMON64, the number of differential characteristics are listed here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(\log_2(p))</th>
<th>#Characteristics</th>
<th>(\log_2(p))</th>
<th>#Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>(-83)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(-69)</td>
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<td>(-85)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(-71)</td>
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<td>(-86)</td>
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<td>(-72)</td>
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<td>(-87)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-73)</td>
<td>2880</td>
<td>(-88)</td>
<td>164694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-74)</td>
<td>8101</td>
<td>(-89)</td>
<td>163141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-75)</td>
<td>21062</td>
<td>(-90)</td>
<td>161089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-76)</td>
<td>52255</td>
<td>(-91)</td>
<td>159354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-77)</td>
<td>123206</td>
<td>(-92)</td>
<td>155804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-78)</td>
<td>238297</td>
<td>(-93)</td>
<td>150954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-79)</td>
<td>239305</td>
<td>(-94)</td>
<td>145061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-80)</td>
<td>171895</td>
<td>(-95)</td>
<td>141914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-81)</td>
<td>170187</td>
<td>(-96)</td>
<td>138480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-82)</td>
<td>165671</td>
<td>(-97)</td>
<td>132931</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 6: Distribution of the characteristics for a 13-round differential for SIMON32 using different set of constants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\log_2(p)$</th>
<th>[8, 1, 2]</th>
<th>[12, 5, 3]</th>
<th>[7, 0, 2]</th>
<th>[1, 0, 2]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>−36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−37</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−38</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−39</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−40</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−41</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−42</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>2297</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>6006</td>
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<td>−49</td>
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<td>218832</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
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<td>−51</td>
<td>218516</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>362284</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 7: Overview of the optimal differential characteristics for SIMON variants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rounds</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Differential (12, 5, 3)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMON32</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>-36</td>
<td>-42</td>
<td>-44</td>
<td>-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMON48</td>
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<td>-6</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>-30</td>
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<td>-42</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIMON64</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-35</td>
<td>-37</td>
<td>-43</td>
<td>-47</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Differential (1, 0, 2)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMON32</td>
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<td>-6</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-12</td>
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<td>-36</td>
<td>-38</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-2</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-36</td>
<td>-38</td>
<td>-44</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>-54</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-2</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-36</td>
<td>-38</td>
<td>-44</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>-54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Differential (7, 0, 2)** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SIMON32 | -2 | -4 | -6 | -8 | -12 | -14 | -18 | -20 | -25 | -30 | -35 | -36 | -38 | -40 | -42 |
| SIMON48 | -2 | -4 | -6 | -8 | -12 | -14 | -18 | -20 | -26 | -30 | -35 | -38 | -44 | -48 | -53 |
| SIMON64 | -2 | -4 | -6 | -8 | -12 | -14 | -18 | -20 | -26 | -30 | -36 | -38 | -44 | -48 | /  |
Table 8: For each SIMON variant and each possible number of rounds, the number of possible combinations of rotation constants \((a, b, c)\) with \(a \geq b\) is given that reaches full diffusion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIMON32</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>(\infty)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#((a, b, c))</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>600</td>
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<td>88</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIMON48</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>(\infty)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#((a, b, c))</td>
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<td>1392</td>
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<td>64</td>
<td>2080</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIMON64</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
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<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
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<th>13</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>33</th>
<th>(\infty)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>#((a, b, c))</td>
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<td>2112</td>
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<td>512</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>128</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIMON96</th>
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<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>(\infty)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>13920</td>
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Polytopic Cryptanalysis

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Polytopic Cryptanalysis

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Abstract. Standard differential cryptanalysis uses statistical dependencies between the difference of two plaintexts and the difference of the respective two ciphertexts to attack a cipher. Here we introduce polytopic cryptanalysis which considers interdependencies between larger sets of texts as they traverse through the cipher. We prove that the methodology of standard differential cryptanalysis can unambiguously be extended and transferred to the polytopic case including impossible differentials. We show that impossible polytopic transitions have generic advantages over impossible differentials. To demonstrate the practical relevance of the generalization, we present new low-data attacks on round-reduced DES and AES using impossible polytopic transitions that are able to compete with existing attacks, partially outperforming these.

1 Introduction

Without doubt is differential cryptanalysis one of the most important tools that the cryptanalyst has at hand when trying to evaluate the security of a block cipher. Since its conception by Biham and Shamir [2] in their effort to break the Data Encryption Standard [26], it has been successfully applied to many block ciphers such that any modern block cipher is expected to have strong security arguments against this attack.

The methodology of differential cryptanalysis has been extended several times with a number of attack vectors, most importantly truncated differentials [20], impossible differentials [1], [19], and higher-order differentials [20], [22]. Further attacks include the boomerang attack [29], which bears some resemblance of second-order differential attacks, and differential-linear attacks [24].

Nonetheless many open problems remain in the field of differential cryptanalysis. Although the concept of higher-order differentials is almost 20 years old, it has not seen many good use cases. One reason has been the difficulty of determining the probability of higher-order differentials accurately without evaluating Boolean functions with prohibitively many terms. Thus the common use case remains

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probability 1 higher-order differentials where we know that a derivative of a certain order has to evaluate to zero because of a limit in the degree of the function.

Another open problem is the exact determination of the success probability of boomerang attacks and their extensions. It has correctly been observed that the correlation between differentials must be taken into account to accurately determine the success probability [25]. The true probability can otherwise deviate arbitrarily from the estimated one.

Starting with Chabaud and Vaudenay [12], considerable effort has gone into shedding light on the relation and interdependencies of various cryptographic attacks (see for example [5], [6], [30]). With this paper, we offer a generalized view on the various types of differential attacks that might help to understand both the interrelation between the attacks as well as the probabilities of the attacks better.

Our contribution

In this paper we introduce polytopic cryptanalysis. It can be viewed as a generalization of standard differential cryptanalysis which it embeds as a special case. We prove that the definitions and methodology of differential cryptanalysis can unambiguously be extended to polytopic cryptanalysis, including the concept of impossible differentials. Polytopic cryptanalysis is general enough to even encompass attacks such as higher-order differentials and might thus be valuable as a reference framework.

For impossible polytopic transitions, we show that they exhibit properties that allow them to be very effective in scenarios where ordinary impossible differentials fail. This is mostly due to a generic limit in the diffusion of any block cipher that guarantees that only a negligible number of all polytopic transitions is possible for a sufficiently high choice of dimension. This also makes impossible polytopic transitions ideal for low-data attacks where standard impossible differentials usually have a high data complexity.

Finally we prove that polytopic cryptanalysis is not only theoretically intriguing but indeed relevant for practical cryptanalysis by demonstrating competitive impossible polytopic attacks on round-reduced DES and AES that partly outperform existing low-data attacks and offer different trade-offs between time and data complexity.

In the appendix, we further prove that higher-order differentials can be expressed as truncated polytopic transitions and are hence a special case of these. Thus higher-order differentials can be expressed in terms of a collection of polytopic trails just as differentials can be expressed as a collection of differential trails. A consequence of this is that it is principally possible to determine lower bounds for the probability of a higher-order differential by summing over the probabilities of a subset of the polytopic trails which it contains.

Related work

To our knowledge, the concept of polytopic transitions is new and has not been used in cryptanalysis before. Nonetheless there is other work that shares some similarities
with polytopic cryptanalysis.

Higher-order differentials [22] can in some sense be seen as a higher-dimensional version of a differential. However, most concepts of ordinary differentials do not seem to extend to higher-order differentials, such as characteristics or iterated differentials.

The idea of using several differentials simultaneously in an attack is not new (see for example [4]). However as opposed to assuming independence of the differentials, which does not hold in general (see [25]), we explicitly take their correlation into account and use it in our framework.

Another type of cryptanalysis that uses a larger set of texts instead of a single pair is integral cryptanalysis (see for example [3], [14]), in which structural properties of the cipher are used to elegantly determine a higher-order derivative to be zero without relying on bounds in the degree. These attacks can be considered a particular form of higher-order differentials.

Finally decorrelation theory [28] also considers relations between multiple pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts but takes a different direction by considering security proofs based on a lack of correlation between the texts.

**Organization of the paper**

In Section 2 notation and concepts necessary for polytopic cryptanalysis are introduced. It is demonstrated how the concepts of differential cryptanalysis naturally extend to polytopic cryptanalysis. We also take a closer look at the probability of polytopic transitions and applicability of simple polytopic cryptanalysis.

In Section 3 we introduce impossible polytopic transitions. We show that impossible polytopic transitions offer some inherent advantages over impossible differentials and are particularly interesting for low-data attacks. We show that, given an efficient method to determine the possibility of a polytopic transition, generic impossible polytopic attack always exist.

In Section 4 we demonstrate the practicability of impossible polytopic transition attacks. We present some attacks on DES and AES that are able to compete with existing attacks with low-data complexity, partially outperforming these.

Furthermore, in Section 3 truncated polytopic transitions are introduced. We then give a proof that higher-order differentials are a special case of these. The cryptanalytic ramifications of the fact that higher-order differentials consist of polytopic trails are then discussed.

**Notation**

We use $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ to denote the $n$-dimensional binary vector space. To identify numbers in hexadecimal notation we use a typewriter font as in 3af179. Random variables are denoted with bold capital letters (X). We will denote $d$-difference (introduced later) by bold Greek letters ($\alpha$) and standard differences by Roman (i.e., non-bold) Greek letters ($\alpha$).
Polytopes and polytopic transitions

Classical differential cryptanalysis utilizes the statistical interdependency of two texts as they traverse through the cipher. When we are not interested in the absolute position of the two texts in the state space, the difference between the two texts completely determines their relative positioning.

But there is no inherent reason that forces us to be restricted to only using a pair of texts. Let us instead consider an ordered set of texts as they traverse through the cipher.

**Definition 1** \((s\text{-polytope})\). An \(s\)-polytope in \(\mathbb{F}_2^n\) is an \(s\)-tuple of values in \(\mathbb{F}_2^n\).

Similar to differential cryptanalysis, we are not so much interested in the absolute position of these texts but the relations between the texts. If we choose one of the texts as the point of reference, the relations between all texts are already uniquely determined by only considering their differences with respect to the reference text. If we thus have \(d + 1\) texts, we can describe their relative positioning by a tuple of \(d\) differences (see also Fig. 1).

**Definition 2** \((d\text{-difference})\). A \(d\)-difference over \(\mathbb{F}_2^n\) is a \(d\)-tuple of values in \(\mathbb{F}_2^n\) describing the relative position of the texts of a \((d + 1)\)-polytope from one point of reference.

When we reduce a \((d + 1)\)-polytope to a corresponding \(d\)-difference, we loose the information of the absolute position of the polytope. A \(d\)-difference thus corresponds to an equivalence class of \((d + 1)\)-polytopes where polytopes are equivalent if and only if they can be transformed into each other by simple shifting in state space. We will mostly be dealing with these equivalence classes.

In principal there are many \(d\)-differences that correspond to one \((d + 1)\)-polytope depending on the choice of reference text and the order of the differences. As a convention we will construct a \(d\)-difference from a \((d + 1)\)-polytope as follows:

**Convention.** For a \((d + 1)\)-polytope \((m_0, \ldots, m_d)\), the corresponding \(d\)-difference is created as \((m_0 \oplus m_1, m_0 \oplus m_2, \ldots, m_0 \oplus m_d)\).
This means, we use the first text of the polytope as the reference text and write the differences in the same order as the remaining texts of the polytope. We will call the reference text the anchor of the $d$-difference. Hence if we are given a $d$-difference and the value of the anchor, we can reconstruct the corresponding $(d+1)$-polytope uniquely.

Example. Let $(m_0, m_1, m_2, m_3)$ be a 4-polytope in $\mathbb{F}_2^4$. Then $(m_0 \oplus m_1, m_0 \oplus m_2, m_0 \oplus m_3)$ is the corresponding 3-difference with $m_0$ as the anchor.

In the following, we will now show that we can build a theory of polytopic cryptanalysis in which the same methodology as in standard differential cryptanalysis applies. Standard differential cryptanalysis is contained in this framework as a special case.

A short note regarding possible definitions of difference: in this paper we restrict ourselves to XOR-differences as the most common choice. Most, if not all, statements in this paper naturally extend to other definitions of difference, e.g., in modular arithmetic.

The equivalent of a differential in polytopic cryptanalysis is the polytopic transition. We use $d$-differences for the definition.

**Definition 3** (Polytopic transition with fixed anchor). Let $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q^n$. Let $\alpha$ be a $d$-difference $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_d)$ over $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ and let $\beta$ be the $d$-difference $(\beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots, \beta_d)$ over $\mathbb{F}_q^n$. By the $(d+1)$-polytopic transition $\alpha \xrightarrow{x} f \beta$ we denote that $f$ maps the polytope corresponding to $\alpha$ with anchor $x$ to a polytope corresponding to $\beta$. More precisely, we have $\alpha \xrightarrow{x} f \beta$ if and only if

$$f(x \oplus \alpha_1) \oplus f(x) = \beta_1$$

and

$$f(x \oplus \alpha_2) \oplus f(x) = \beta_2$$

... and

$$f(x \oplus \alpha_d) \oplus f(x) = \beta_d.$$

Building up on this definition, we can now define the probability of a polytopic transition under a random anchor.

**Definition 4** (Polytopic transition). Let $f$, $\alpha$, and $\beta$ again be as in Definition 3. The probability of the $(d+1)$-polytopic transition $\alpha \xrightarrow{x} f \beta$ is then defined as:

$$\Pr\left(\alpha \xrightarrow{x} f \beta\right) := \Pr_{X}\left(\alpha \xrightarrow{X} f \beta\right)$$

(1)

where $X$ is a random variable, uniformly distributed on $\mathbb{F}_2^n$. We will at times also write $\alpha \rightarrow f \beta$ if the function is clear from the context or not important.

Note that this definition coincides with the definition of the differential probability when differences between only two texts (2-polytopes) are considered.
Polytopic Cryptanalysis

Let \( f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n \) now be a function that is the repeated composition of round functions \( f_i : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n \):

\[
f := f_r \circ \cdots \circ f_2 \circ f_1.
\] (2)

Similarly to differential cryptanalysis, we can now define trails of polytopes:

**Definition 5 (Polytopic trail).** Let \( f \) be as in Eq. (2). A polytopic trail on \( f \) is an \((r + 1)\)-tuple of \(d\)-differences \((\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_r)\) written as

\[
\alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f_1} \alpha_1 \xrightarrow{f_2} \cdots \xrightarrow{f_r} \alpha_r.
\] (3)

The probability of such a polytopic trail is defined as

\[
\Pr_X \left( \alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f_1} \alpha_1 \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha_1 \xrightarrow{f_2} \alpha_2 \quad \text{and} \quad \ldots \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha_{r-1} \xrightarrow{f_r} \alpha_r \mid X \right)
\] (4)

where \( X \) is a random variable, distributed uniformly on \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \).

Similarly to differentials, it is possible to partition a polytopic transition over a composed function into all polytopic trails that feature the same input and output differences as the polytopic transition.

**Proposition 6.** The probability of a polytopic transition \( \alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f} \alpha_r \) over a function \( f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n \), \( f = f_r \circ \cdots \circ f_2 \circ f_1 \) is the sum of the probabilities of all polytopic trails \((\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_r)\) which it contains:

\[
\Pr \left( \alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f} \alpha_r \right) = \sum_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{r-1}} \Pr \left( \alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f_1} \alpha_1 \xrightarrow{f_2} \cdots \xrightarrow{f_{r-1}} \alpha_{r-1} \xrightarrow{f_r} \alpha_r \mid X \right)
\] (5)

where \( \alpha_0, \ldots, \alpha_r \) are \(d\)-differences and as such lie in \( \mathbb{F}_2^{dn} \).

**Proof.** If we fix the initial value of the anchor, we also fix the trail that the polytope has to take. The set of polytopic trails gives us thus a partition of the possible anchor values and in particular a partition of the anchors for which the output polytope is
of type $\alpha_r$. Using the above definitions we thus get:

$$\Pr \left( \alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f} \alpha_r \right) = \Pr_X \left( \alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f_X} \alpha_r \right)$$

$$= 2^{-n} \cdot \left| \left\{ x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \mid \alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f_X} \alpha_r \right\} \right|$$

$$= 2^{-n} \cdot \sum_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{r-1}} \left| \left\{ x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \mid \alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f_1} \alpha_1, \alpha_1 \xrightarrow{f_2} \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_{r-1} \xrightarrow{f_r} \alpha_r \right\} \right|$$

$$= \sum_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{r-1}} \Pr_X \left( \alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f_1} \alpha_1 \text{ and } \alpha_1 \xrightarrow{f_2} \alpha_2 \text{ and } \ldots \right.$$

$$\left. \ldots \text{ and } \alpha_{r-1} \xrightarrow{f_r} \alpha_r \right)$$

$$= \sum_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{r-1}} \Pr \left( \alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f_1} \alpha_1 \xrightarrow{f_2} \ldots \xrightarrow{f_{r-1}} \alpha_{r-1} \xrightarrow{f_r} \alpha_r \right)$$

which proves the proposition.

To be able to calculate the probability of a differential trail, it is common in differential cryptanalysis to make an assumption on the independence of the round transitions. This is usually justified by showing that the cipher is a Markov cipher and by assuming the stochastic equivalence hypothesis (see [23]). As we will mostly be working with impossible trails where these assumptions are not needed, we will assume for now that this independence holds and refer the interested reader to Section A where the Markov model is adapted to polytopic cryptanalysis.

Under the assumption that the single round transitions are independent, we can work with polytopic transitions just as with differentials:

1. The probability of a polytopic transition is the sum of the probabilities of all polytopic trails with the same input and output $d$-difference.

2. The probability of a polytopic trail is the product of the probabilities of the 1-round polytopic transitions that constitute the trail.

We are thus principally able to calculate the probability of a polytopic transition over many rounds by knowing how to calculate the polytopic transition over single rounds.

Now to calculate the probability of a 1-round polytopic transition, we can use the following observations:

3. A linear function maps a $d$-difference with probability 1 to the $d$-difference that is the result of applying the linear function to each single difference in the $d$-difference.
4. Addition of a constant to the anchor leaves the $d$-difference unchanged.

5. The probability of a polytopic transition over an S-box layer is the product of the polytopic transitions for each S-box.

We are thus able to determine probabilities of polytopic transitions and polytopic trails just as we are used to from standard differential cryptanalysis.

**A note on correlation, diffusion and the difference distribution table**

When estimating the probability of a polytopic transition a first guess might be that it is just the product of the individual 1-dimensional differentials. For a 3-polytopic transition we might for example expect:

$$\Pr((\alpha_0, \alpha_1) \rightarrow (\beta_0, \beta_1)) \neq \Pr(\alpha_0 \rightarrow \beta_0) \cdot \Pr(\alpha_1 \rightarrow \beta_1).$$

That this is generally not the case is a consequence of the following lemma.

**Lemma 7.** Let $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$. For a given input $d$-difference $\alpha$ the number of output $d$-differences to which $\alpha$ is mapped with non-zero probability is upper bounded by $2^n$.

**Proof.** This is just a result of the fact that the number of anchors for the transition is limited to $2^n$:

$$\left| \left\{ \beta \in \mathbb{F}_2^{dn} \mid \Pr(\alpha \xrightarrow{f} \beta) > 0 \right\} \right| = \left| \left\{ \beta \in \mathbb{F}_2^{dn} \mid \exists x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n : \alpha \xrightarrow{x} \beta \right\} \right| \leq 2^n \tag*{$\Box$}$$

One implication of this limitation of possible output $d$-differences is a correlation between differentials: the closer the distribution of differences of a function is to a uniform distribution, the stronger is the correlation of differentials over that function.

**Example.** Let us take the AES 8-bit S-box (denoted by $S$ here) which is differentially 4-uniform. Consider the three differentials, $7 \xrightarrow{S} 166$, $25 \xrightarrow{S} 183$, and $25 \xrightarrow{S} 1$ which have probabilities $2^{-6}$, $2^{-6}$, and $2^{-7}$ respectively. The probabilities of the polytopic transitions of the combined differentials deviate strongly from the product of the single probabilities:

$$\Pr((7, 25) \xrightarrow{S} (166, 183)) = 2^{-6} > \Pr(7 \xrightarrow{S} 166) \cdot \Pr(25 \xrightarrow{S} 183) = 2^{-12}$$

$$\Pr((7, 25) \xrightarrow{S} (166, 1)) = 0 < \Pr(7 \xrightarrow{S} 166) \cdot \Pr(25 \xrightarrow{S} 1) = 2^{-13}.$$
can only increase by a factor of $2^n$ over each round. Thus when starting from one $d$-difference, after one round at most $2^n d$-differences are possible, after two rounds at most $2^{2n}$ differences are possible, after three rounds at most $2^{3n}$ are possible and generally after round $r$ at most $2^{rn}$ $d$-differences are possible.

In standard differential cryptanalysis, the number of possible output differences for a given input difference is limited by the state size of the function. This is no longer true for $d$-differences: if the state space is $\mathbb{F}_2^n$, the space of $d$-differences is $\mathbb{F}_2^{dn}$. The number of possible $d$-differences thus increases exponentially with the dimension $d$. This has a consequence for the size of the difference distribution table (DDT). For an 8-bit S-box, a classical DDT has a size of $2^{16}$ entries, i.e., 64 kilobytes. But already the DDT for 3-differences has a size of $2^{48}$, i.e., 256 terabytes. Fortunately though, a third consequence of Lemma 7 is that the DDT table is sparse for $d > 1$. As a matter of fact, we can calculate any row of the DDT with a time complexity of $2^n$ by trying out all possible values for the anchor.

Relation to decorrelation theory.

Decorrelation theory \cite{28} is a framework that can be used to design ciphers which are provably secure against a range of attacks including differential and linear cryptanalysis. A cipher is called perfectly decorrelated of order $d$ when the image of any $d$-tuple of distinct plaintexts is uniformly distributed on all $d$-tuples of ciphertexts with distinct values under a uniformly distributed random key. It can for example be proved that a cipher which is perfectly decorrelated of order 2 is secure against standard differential and linear cryptanalysis.

When we consider $(d + 1)$-polytopes in polytopic cryptanalysis, we can naturally circumvent security proofs for order-$d$ perfectly decorrelated ciphers. The boomerang attack \cite{29} for example – invented to break an order-2 perfectly decorrelated cipher – can be described as a $4$-polytopic attack.

Limitations of simple polytopic cryptanalysis

Can simple polytopic cryptanalysis, i.e., using a single polytopic transition, outperform standard differential cryptanalysis? Unfortunately this is generally not the case as is shown in the following.

**Definition 8.** Let $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ be a $(d + 1)$-polytopic transition with $d$-differences $\alpha$ and $\beta$. Let $\alpha' \rightarrow \beta'$ be a $d'$-difference with $d' \leq d$. We then write $(\alpha', \beta') \subseteq (\alpha, \beta)$ if and only if for each $i \in [1, d']$ there exists $j \in [1, d]$ such that the $i$th differences in $\alpha'$ and $\beta'$ correspond to the $j$th differences in $\alpha$ and $\beta$.

Using this notation, we have the following lemma:

**Lemma 9.** Let $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ be a $(d + 1)$-polytopic transition and let $\alpha' \rightarrow \beta'$ be a $(d' + 1)$-polytopic transition with $d' \leq d$ and $(\alpha', \beta') \subseteq (\alpha, \beta)$. Then

$$
\Pr(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \leq \Pr(\alpha' \rightarrow \beta').
$$

(6)
Proof. This follows directly from the fact that $\alpha \xrightarrow{f \times x} \beta$ implies $\alpha' \xrightarrow{f \times x} \beta'$.

In words, the probability of a polytopic transition is always at most as high as the probability of any lower dimensional polytopic transition that it contains. In particular, it can never have a higher probability than any standard differential that it contains.

It can in some instances still be profitable to use a single polytopic transition instead of a standard differential that it contains. This is the case when the probability of the polytopic transition is the same as (or close to) the probability of the best standard differential it contains. Due to the fact that the space of $d$-differences is much larger than that of standard differentials ($2^{dn}$ vs. $2^n$), one set of texts that follows the polytopic transition is usually enough to distinguish the biased distribution from a uniform distribution as opposed to standard differentials where at least two are needed. Nonetheless the cryptanalytic advantages of polytopic cryptanalysis lie elsewhere as we will see in the next sections.

3 Impossible polytopic cryptanalysis

Impossible differential cryptanalysis makes use of differentials with probability zero to distinguish a cipher from an ideal cipher. In this section, we extend the definition to encompass polytopic transitions.

Impossible polytopic cryptanalysis offers distinct advantages over standard impossible differential cryptanalysis that are a result of the exponential increase in the size of the space of $d$-differences with increasing dimension $d$. This not only allows impossible $(d + 1)$-polytopic attacks using just a single set of $d + 1$ chosen plaintexts, it also allows generic distinguishing attacks on $(d - 1)$-round block ciphers whenever it is computationally easy to determine whether a $(d + 1)$-polytopic transition is possible or not. We elaborate this in more detail later in this section.

Definition 10. An impossible $(d + 1)$-polytopic transition is a $(d + 1)$-polytopic transition that occurs with probability zero.

In impossible differential attacks, we use knowledge of an impossible differential over $r - 1$ rounds to filter out wrong round key guesses for the last round: any round key that decrypts a text pair such that their difference adheres to the impossible differential has to be wrong. The large disadvantage of this attack is that it always requires a large number of text pairs to sufficiently reduce the number of possible keys. This is due to the fact that the filtering probability corresponds to the fraction of the impossible differentials among all differentials. Unfortunately for the attacker, most ciphers are designed to provide good diffusion, such that this ratio is usually low after a few rounds.

This is exactly where the advantage of impossible polytopic transitions lies. Due to the exponential increase in the size of the space of $d$-differences (from $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ to $\mathbb{F}_2^{dn}$) and the limitation of the diffusion to maximally a factor of $2^n$ (see Lemma 7), the ratio
of possible \((d+1)\)-polytopic transitions to impossible \((d+1)\)-polytopic transitions will be low for many more rounds than possible for standard differentials. In fact, by increasing the dimension \(d\) of the polytopic transition, it can be assured that the ratio of possible to impossible polytopic transitions is close to zero for an almost arbitrary number of rounds.

An impossible \((d+1)\)-polytopic attack could then proceed as follows. Let \(n\) be the block size of the cipher and let \(l\) be the number of bits in the last round key.

1. Choose a \(d\) and a \(d\)-difference such that the ratio of possible to impossible \((d+1)\)-polytopic transitions is lower than \(2^{l-1}\).

2. Get the \(r\)-round encryption of \(d+1\) plaintexts chosen such that they adhere to the input \(d\)-difference.

3. For each guess of the round key \(k_r\) decrypt the last round. If the obtained \(d\)-difference after the \((r-1)\)th round is possible, keep the key as a candidate. Otherwise discard it.

Clearly this should leave us on average with one round key candidate which is bound to be the correct one. In practice, an attack would likely be more complex, e.g., with only partially guessed round keys and tradeoffs in the filtering probability and the data/time complexities.

While the data complexity is limited to \(d+1\) chosen plaintexts (and thus very low), the time complexity is harder to determine and depends on the difficulty of determining whether an obtained \((r-1)\)-round \((d+1)\)-polytopic transition is possible or not. The straightforward approach is to precompute a list of possible \(d\)-differences after round \(r-1\). Both the exponentially increasing memory requirements and the time of the precomputation limit this approach though. In spite of this, attacks using this approach are competitive with existing low-data attacks as we show in Section 4.

One possibility to reduce the memory complexity is to use a meet-in-the-middle approach where one searches for a collision in the possible \(d\)-differences reachable from the input \(d\)-difference and the calculated \(d\)-difference after round \((r-1)\) at a round somewhere in the middle of the cipher. This however requires to repeat the computation for every newly calculated \(d\)-difference and thus limits its use in the scenario where we calculated a new \(d\)-difference after round \((r-1)\) for each key guess (not in a distinguishing attack though).

Clearly any method that could efficiently determine the impossibility of most impossible polytopic transitions would prove extremely useful in an attack. Intuitively it might seem that it is generally a hard problem to determine the possibility of a polytopic transition. As a matter of fact though, there already exists a cryptographic technique that provides a very efficient distinguisher for certain types of polytopic transitions, namely higher-order differentials which are shown in Section 13 to correspond to truncated polytopic transitions. This raises the hope that better distinguishing techniques could still be discovered.

There is one important further effect of the increase in the size of the difference space: it allows us to restrict ourselves to impossible \(d\)-differences on only a part of
the state. It is even possible to restrict the $d$-difference to a $d$-difference in one bit and still use it for efficient filtering.\footnote{In standard differential cryptanalysis, this would require a probability 1 truncated differential.} In Section 4 we will use these techniques in impossible polytopic attacks to demonstrate the validity of the attacks and provide a usage scenario.

**Wrong keys and random permutations**

Note that while impossible polytopic attacks – just like impossible differential attacks – do not require the stochastic equivalence hypothesis, practical attacks require another hypothesis: the wrong-key randomization hypothesis. This hypothesis states that when decrypting one or several rounds with a wrong key guess creates a function that behaves like a random function. For our setting, we formulate it as following:

**Wrong-key randomization hypothesis.** When decrypting one or multiple rounds of a block cipher with a wrong key guess, the resulting polytopic transition probability will be close to the transition probability over a random permutation for almost all key guesses.

Let us therefore take a look at the polytopic transition probabilities over random functions and random permutation. To simplify the treatment, we make the following definition:

**Definition 11 (Degenerate $d$-difference).** Let $\alpha$ be a $d$-difference over $\mathbb{F}_2^n$: $\alpha = (\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_d)$. We call $\alpha$ degenerate if there exists an $i$ with $1 \leq i \leq d$ with $\alpha_i = 0$ or if there exists a pair $i, j$ with $1 \leq i < j \leq d$ and $\alpha_i = \alpha_j$. Otherwise we call $\alpha$ non-degenerate.

Clearly if and only if a $d$-difference $\alpha$ is degenerate, there exist two texts in the underlying $(d + 1)$-polytope that are identical. To understand the transition probability of a degenerate $d$-difference it is thus sufficient to evaluate the transition probability of a non-degenerate $d'$-difference ($d' < d$) that contains the same set of texts. For the following two propositions, we will thus restrict ourselves to non-degenerate $d$-differences.

**Proposition 12 (Distribution over random function).** Let $\alpha$ be a non-degenerate $d$-difference over $\mathbb{F}_2^n$: Let $F$ be a uniformly distributed random function from $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ to $\mathbb{F}_2^m$. The image of $\alpha$ is then uniformly distributed over all $d$-difference over $\mathbb{F}_2^m$. In particular $\Pr(\alpha \xrightarrow{F} \beta) = 2^{-md}$ for any $d$-difference $\beta \in (\mathbb{F}_2^m)^d$.

**Proof.** Let $(m_0, m_1, \ldots, m_d)$ be a $(d + 1)$-polytope that adheres to $\alpha$. Then the polytope $(F(m_0), F(m_1), \ldots, F(m_d))$ is clearly uniformly randomly distributed on $(\mathbb{F}_2^m)^{d+1}$ and accordingly $\beta$ with $\alpha \xrightarrow{F} \beta$ is distributed uniformly randomly on $(\mathbb{F}_2^m)^d$. \qed
For the image of a $d$-difference over a random permutation, we have a similar result:

**Proposition 13 (Distribution over random permutation).** Let $\alpha$ be a non-degenerate $d$-difference over $\mathbb{F}_2^n$. Let $F$ be a uniformly distributed random permutation on $\mathbb{F}_2^n$. The image of $\alpha$ is then uniformly distributed over all non-degenerate $d$-differences over $\mathbb{F}_2^n$.

**Proof.** Let $(m_0, m_1, \ldots, m_d)$ be a $(d + 1)$-polytope that adheres to $\alpha$. As $\alpha$ is non-degenerate, all $m_i$ are distinct. Thus the polytope $(F(m_0), F(m_1), \ldots, F(m_d))$ is clearly uniformly randomly distributed on all $(d + 1)$-polytopes in $(\mathbb{F}_2^n)^{d+1}$ with distinct values. Accordingly $\beta$ with $\alpha \xrightarrow{F} \beta$ is distributed uniformly randomly on all non-degenerate $d$-differences over $\mathbb{F}_2^n$. \hfill \square

As long as $d \ll 2^n$, we can thus well approximate the probability $\Pr(\alpha \xrightarrow{F} \beta)$ by $2^{-dn}$ when $\beta$ is non-degenerate.

In the following, these proposition will be useful when we try to estimate the probability that a partial decryption with a wrong key guess will still give us a possible intermediate $d$-difference. We will then always assume that the wrong-key randomization hypothesis holds and that the probability of getting a particular $d$-difference on $m$ bits is the same as if we had used a random permutation, i.e., it is $2^{-dm}$ (as our $d$ is always small).

### 4 Impossible polytopic attacks on DES and AES

Without much doubt are the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [26] and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [15] the most studied and best cryptanalyzed block ciphers. Any cryptanalytic improvement on these ciphers should thus be a good indicator of the novelty and quality of a new cryptanalytic attack. We believe that these ciphers thus pose ideal candidates to demonstrate that the generalization of differential cryptanalysis to polytopic cryptanalysis is not a mere intellectual exercise but useful for practical cryptanalysis.

In the following, we demonstrate several impossible polytopic attacks on reduced-round versions of DES and AES that make only use of a very small set of chosen plaintexts. The natural reference frame for these attacks are hence low-data attacks. In Table 1 and in Table 2 we compare our attacks to other low-data attacks on round-reduced versions of DES and AES respectively. We should mention here that [11] only states attacks on 7 and 8 rounds of DES. It is not clear whether the techniques therein could also be used to improve complexities of meet-in-the-middle attacks for 5- and 6-round versions of that cipher.

We stress here that in contrast to at least some of the other low-data attacks, our attacks make no assumption on the key schedule and work equally well with independent round keys. In fact, all of our attacks are straight-forward applications...
Table 1: Comparison table of low-data attacks on round-reduced DES. Data complexity is measured in number of required known plaintexts (KP) or chosen plaintexts (CP). Time complexity is measured in round-reduced DES encryption equivalents. Memory complexity is measured in plaintexts (8 bytes). For the other attacks no memory requirements were explicitly specified in the publications. They should be low though. The attacks of this paper are in bold.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rounds</th>
<th>Attack Type</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Memory</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Differential</td>
<td>(2^{11.7})</td>
<td>64 CP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>As in 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linear</td>
<td>(2^{13.8})</td>
<td>72 CP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>As in 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MitM</td>
<td>(2^{45.5})</td>
<td>1 KP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>From 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MitM</td>
<td>(2^{37.9})</td>
<td>28 KP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>From 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MitM</td>
<td>(2^{30})</td>
<td>8 CP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>From 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imp. polytopic</td>
<td>(2^{13.2})</td>
<td>4 CP</td>
<td>(2^9)</td>
<td>This paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Differential</td>
<td>(2^{13.7})</td>
<td>256 CP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>As in 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linear</td>
<td>(2^{13.9})</td>
<td>(&gt;104) KP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>As in 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MitM</td>
<td>(2^{51.8})</td>
<td>1 KP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>From 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Truncated diff.</td>
<td>(2^{48})</td>
<td>7 CP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>From 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Truncated diff.</td>
<td>(2^{11.8})</td>
<td>46 CP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>From 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imp. polytopic</td>
<td>(2^{32.2})</td>
<td>4 CP</td>
<td>(2^{10})</td>
<td>This paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imp. polytopic</td>
<td>(2^{18.4})</td>
<td>48 CP</td>
<td>(2^9)</td>
<td>This paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>MitM Sieve</td>
<td>(2^{53})</td>
<td>1 KP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>From 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imp. polytopic</td>
<td>(2^{43})</td>
<td>16 CP</td>
<td>(2^{43})</td>
<td>This paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imp. polytopic</td>
<td>(2^{37.8})</td>
<td>48 CP</td>
<td>(2^{10})</td>
<td>This paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>MitM Sieve</td>
<td>(2^{53})</td>
<td>16 KP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>From 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of the ideas developed in this paper. There is likely still room for improvement of these attacks using details of the ciphers and more finely controlled trade-offs.

In all of the following attacks, we determine the possibility or impossibility of a polytopic transition by deterministically generating a list of all \(d\)-differences that are reachable from the starting \(d\)-difference, i.e., we generate and keep a list of all possible \(d\)-differences. The determination of these lists is straightforward using the rules described in Section 2. The sizes of these lists are the limiting factors of the attacks both for the time and the memory complexities.

### 4.1 Attacks on the DES

For a good reference for the DES, we refer to [21]. A summary of the results for DES can be found in Table 1.

\[136\]
4 Impossible polytopic attacks on DES and AES

A 5-round attack.

Let us start with an impossible 4-polytopic attack on 5-round DES. We split our input 3-difference into two parts, one for the left 32 state bits and one for the right 32 state bits. Let us denote the left 3-difference as \((\alpha, \beta, \gamma)\). For the right half we choose the 3-difference \((0, 0, 0)\). This allows us to pass the first round for free (as can be seen in Fig. 1).

The number of possible 3-differences after the second round depends now on our choice of \(\alpha\), \(\beta\), and \(\gamma\). To keep this number low, clearly it is good to choose the differences to activate as few S-boxes as possible. We experimentally tried out different natural choices and chose the values \((\alpha, \beta, \gamma) = (02000000, 04000000, 06000000)\).

All of these three differences only activate S-box 2 in round 2. With this choice we get 35 possible 3-differences after round 2. Note that the left 3-difference is still \((\alpha, \beta, \gamma)\) after round 2 while the 35 variations only appear in the right half.

As discussed earlier, the maximal number of output \(d\)-differences for a fixed input \(d\)-difference is inherently limited by the size of the domain of the function. A consequence of this is that for any of the 35 3-differences after round 2 the possible number of output 3-differences of any S-box in round 3 is limited to \(2^6\) as shown in Fig. 1. But by guessing the 6 bits of round key 5 that go into the corresponding S-box in round 5, we can determine the 3-difference in the same four output bits of

Figure 1: Outline of the 5-round attack on DES.
round 3 now coming from the ciphertexts. For the right guess of the 6 key bits, the determined 3-difference will be possible. For a wrong key guess though, we expect the 3-difference to take a random value in the set of all 3-differences on 4 bits.

But the size of the space of 3-differences in these four output bits is now $2^{4.3} = 2^{12}$. Thus when fixing one of the 35 possible 3-differences after round 2, we expect on average to get one suggestion for the 6 key bits in that S-box. Repeating this for every S-box, we get on average one suggestion for the last round key for each of the 35 possible 3-differences after round 2, leaving us with an average of 35 key candidates for the last round key.

What are the complexities of the attack? Clearly we only need 4 chosen plaintexts. For the time complexity we get the following: For each of the 35 possible 3-differences after round 2, we have to determine the $2^6$ possible output 3-differences and for each of these, we have to see in the list of possible 3-differences obtained from the key guesses whether there is a guess of the 6 key bits that gives us exactly that 3-difference. Thus we have a total of $35 \cdot 8 \cdot 2^6 = 2^{14.2}$ steps each of which should be easier than one round of DES encryption. This leaves us with a time complexity of $\approx 2^{12}$ 5-round DES encryptions equivalents. But to completely determine the DES key we need 8 additional bits that are not present in the last round key. As we expect on average maximally 35 round keys, we are left with trying out the $35 \cdot 2^8 = 2^{13.2}$ full key candidates, setting the time complexity of this attack to that value.

The only memory requirement in this attack is storing the list of possible 3-differences for each key guess in each S-box. This should roughly be no more than $2^{12}$ bytes.

A 6-round attack.

The 6-round attack proceeds exactly as the 5-round attack, with the only difference being that instead of determining the possible 3-difference output of each S-box in round 3, we do the same in round 4 and thus have to repeat the attack for every possible 3-difference after round 3.

Experimental testing revealed that it is beneficial for this attack to choose a different choice of $\alpha, \beta$, and $\gamma$, namely

$$(\alpha, \beta, \gamma) = (20000000, 40000000, 60000000),$$

which now activates S-box 1 instead of S-box 2 as it gives us the lowest number of 3-differences after round 3. For this choice, we get a number of 48 possible 3-differences after round 2 and $2^{24.12}$ possible 3-differences after round 3. Now substituting 35 with this number in the previous attack, gives us the time complexity for this 6-round attack.

A note regarding the memory requirement of this attack: As we loop over the $2^{24.12}$ possible 3-differences after round 3, we are not required to store all of them at any time. By doing the attack while creating these possible 3-differences we can keep the memory complexity nearly as low as before, namely to roughly $2^{13}$ bytes.
A 7-round attack.

Unfortunately extending from 6 to 7 rounds as done when going from 5 to 6 rounds is not possible, due to the prohibitively large number of possible 3-differences after round 4. Instead we use a different angle.

It is well known that when attacking \( r \)-round DES, guessing the appropriate 36 round key bits of the last round key and the appropriate 6 bits of the round key in round \( r-1 \) allows us to determine the output state bits of an S-box of our choice after round \( r-3 \). We will thus restrict ourselves to looking for impossible \( d \)-differences in only one S-box. We choose S-box 1 here.

In order to have a sufficiently high success rate, we need to increase the dimension of our polytopic transitions to increase the size of the \( d \)-difference space of the four output bits of the S-box of our choice. For this attack we choose \( d = 15 \) giving us a 15-difference space size of \( 2^{60} \) in four bits.

For our choice of input 15-difference, we again leave all differences in the right side to 0, while choosing for the 15-difference on the left side:

\[
(00000002, 00000004, 00000006, 02000000, 02000002, 02000004, \\
02000006, 04000000, 04000002, 04000004, 04000006, 06000000, \\
06000002, 06000004, 06000006)
\]

which only activates S-boxes 2 and 8. For this choice of input 15-difference we get 1470 possible 15-differences after round 2 and \( 2^{36.43} \) possible 15-differences after round 3.

For each of these \( 2^{36.43} \) possible 15-differences after round 3, we calculate the \( 2^6 \) possible output 15-differences of S-box 1 after round 4. Now having precomputed a list of possible 15-differences in the output bits of S-box 1 after round 4 for each of the \( 2^{42} \) guessed key bits of round 7 and 6, we can easily test whether we get a collision. What is the probability of this? The 15-difference space size in the four bits is \( 2^{60} \) and, we get maximally \( 2^{42} \) possible 15-differences from the key guesses. This leaves us with a chance of \( 2^{-18} \) that we find a 15-difference in that list. Thus for each of the \( 2^{36.43} \) possible 15-differences after round 3, we expect on average at most \( 2^{-12} \) suggestions for the guessed 42 key bits, a total of \( 2^{24.43} \) suggestions.

What are the complexities for this attack? Clearly again, the data complexity is 16 chosen plaintexts. For the time complexity, for each of the \( 2^{42.42} \) possible 4-bit 15-differences obtained after round 4, we have to see whether it is contained in the list of \( 2^{42} \) 3-differences which we obtained from the key guesses. To do this efficiently, we first have to sort the list which should take \( 2^{42} \cdot 42 = 2^{47.4} \) elementary steps. Assuming that a 7-round DES encryption takes at least 42 elementary steps, we can upperbound this complexity with \( 2^{42} \) DES encryption equivalents. As finding an entry in a list of \( 2^{42} \) entries also takes approximately 42 elementary steps, this leaves us with a total time complexity of at most \( 2^{43} \) 7-round DES encryption equivalents. As each suggestion gives us 42 DES key bits and as the list of suggestions has a size of \( 2^{24.23} \), we can find the correct full key with \( 2^{28.23} \) 7-round DES trial encryptions.
which is lower than then the previously mentioned time complexity and can thus be disregarded.

The data complexity is determined by the size of the list of 4-bit 15-differences generated from the key guesses. This gives us a memory requirement of $2^{42}(15 \cdot 4 + 42)$ bits $\approx 2^{16}$ bytes.

**Extension of the attacks using more plaintexts.**

The attacks for 5 and 6 rounds can be extended by one round at the cost of a higher data complexity. The extension can be made at the beginning of the cipher in the following way.

Let us suppose we start with a 3-difference $(\delta_1, \delta_2, \delta_3)$ in the left half and the 3-difference $(\alpha, \beta, \gamma)$ in the right half. If we knew the output 3-difference of the round function in the first round, we could choose $(\delta_1, \delta_2, \delta_3)$ accordingly to make sure that we end up at the starting position of the original attack. Thus by guessing this value and repeating the attack for each guessed value of this 3-difference we can make sure we still retrieve the key.

Fortunately the values of $(\alpha, \beta, \gamma)$ are already chosen to give a minimal number of possible 3-difference in the round function. Thus the time complexity only increases by this value, i.e., 35 and 48. The data complexity increases even less. As it turns out, 12 different values for the left half of the input text are enough to generate all of the 35 resp. 48 3-differences. Thus the data complexity only increases to 48 chosen plaintexts.

We should mention that the same technique can be used to extend the 7-round attack to an 8-round attack. But this leaves us with the same time complexity as the 8-round attack in [11], albeit at a much higher data cost.

**Experimental results.**

To verify the correctness of the above attacks and their complexities, we implemented the 5-round and 6-round attacks that use 4 chosen plaintexts. We ran the attacks on a single core of an Intel Core i5-4300U processor. We ran the 5-round attack 100000 times which took about 140 seconds. The average number of suggested round keys was 47 which is slightly higher than the expected number of 35. The suggested number of round keys was below 35 though in 84 percent of the cases and below 100 in 95 percent of the cases. In fact, the raised average is created by a few outliers in the distribution: taking the average on all but the 0.02 percent worst cases, we get 33.1 round key suggestions per case. While this shows that the estimated probability is generally good, it also demonstrates that the wrong-key randomization hypothesis has to be handled with care.

Running the six-round attack 10 times, an attack ran an average time of 10 min and produced an average of $2^{22.3}$ candidates for the last round key. As expected, the correct round key was always in the list of candidate round keys for both the 5-round and 6-round attacks.
Table 2: Comparison table of low-data attacks on round-reduced AES. Data complexity is measured in number of required chosen plaintexts (CP). Time complexity is measured in round-reduced AES encryption equivalents. Memory complexity is measured in plaintexts (16 bytes). The column ‘keyschedule’ denotes whether the attacks use the AES key schedule. All attacks that rely on the keyschedule are attacks on AES-128. The attacks of this paper are in bold.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rounds</th>
<th>Attack Type</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Memory</th>
<th>Keyschedule</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Guess &amp; Det.</td>
<td>$2^{120}$</td>
<td>1 KP</td>
<td>$2^{120}$</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>As in [10]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Diff. MitM</td>
<td>$2^{164}$</td>
<td>3 CP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>As in [8, 9]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Guess &amp; Det.</td>
<td>$2^{80}$</td>
<td>2 CP</td>
<td>$2^{80}$</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>As in [10]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Guess &amp; Det.</td>
<td>$2^{32}$</td>
<td>4 CP</td>
<td>$2^{24}$</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>As in [10]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Imp. polyt.</td>
<td>$2^{38}$</td>
<td>8 CP</td>
<td>$2^{15}$</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>This paper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 Attacks on the AES

For a good reference for the AES, we refer to [15]. A summary of the results for AES can be found in Table 2.

A 4-round attack.

We first present here an impossible 8-polytopic attack on 4-round AES. For the input 7-difference, we choose a 7-difference that activates only the first byte, i.e., that is all-zero in all other bytes. Such a 7-difference can be mapped after round 1 to at most $2^8$ different 7-differences. If we restrict ourselves to the 7-differences in the first column after round 2, we can then at most have $2^{16}$ different 7-differences in this column. In particular, we can have at most have $2^{16}$ different 7-differences in the first byte. For a depiction of this, see Fig. 2.

If we now request the encryptions of 8 plaintexts that adhere to our chosen start 7-difference, we can now determine the corresponding 7-difference after round 2 in the first byte by guessing 40 round key bits of round keys 3 and 4. If this 7-difference does not belong to the set of $2^{16}$ possible ones, we can discard the key guess as wrong.

How many guesses of the 40 key bits, do we expect to survive the filtering? There are $2^{56}$ possible 7-difference on a byte and only $2^{16}$ possible ones coming from our chosen input 7-difference. This leaves a chance of $2^{-40}$ for a wrong key guess to produce a correct 7-difference. We thus expect on average 2 suggestions for the 40 key bits, among them the right one. To determine the remaining round key bits, we can use the same texts, only restricting ourselves to different columns.

The data complexity of the attack is limited to 8 chosen plaintexts. The time complexity is dominated by determining the 7-difference in the first byte after round
Figure 2: Diffusion of the starting 7-difference for the 4-round attack on AES. The letter A shows a byte position in which a possible 7-difference is non-zero and known. A dot indicates a byte position where the 7-difference is known to be zero. A question mark indicates a byte position where arbitrary values for the 7-differences are allowed. In total there are $2^{16}$ different 7-differences possible in the first column after the second round.

2 for each guess of the 40 key bits and checking whether it is among the $2^{16}$ possible ones. This can be done in less than 16 table lookups on average for each key guess. Thus the time complexity corresponds to $2^{40} \cdot 2^{-2} = 2^{38}$ 4-round AES encryption equivalents, assuming one 4-round encryption corresponds to $4 \cdot 16$ table lookups. The memory complexity is limited to a table of the $2^{16}$ allowed 7-difference in one byte, corresponding to $2^{19}$ bytes or $2^{15}$ plaintext equivalents.

A 5-round attack.

In this attack, we are working with 15-polytopes and trace the possible 14-differences one round further than in the 4-round attack. Again we choose our starting 14-difference such that it only activates the first byte. After two rounds we then have maximally $2^{40}$ different 14-differences on the whole state. If we restrict ourselves to only the first column of the state after round 3, we then get an additional $2^{32}$ possible 14-differences in this column for each of the $2^{40}$ possible 14-differences after round 2, resulting in a total of $2^{72}$ possible 14-differences in the first column after round 3. This is depicted in Fig. 3. In particular again, we can have at most have $2^{72}$ different 14-differences in the first byte.

Let us suppose now we have the encrypted values of a 15-polytope that adheres to our starting 14-difference. We can then again find the respective 14-difference in the first byte after the third round by guessing 40 key bits in round keys 4 and 5. There are in total $2^{112}$ different 14-differences in one byte. The chance of a wrong key guess to produce one of the possible $2^{72}$ 14-differences is thus $2^{-40}$. We thus expect on average 2 suggestions for the 40 key bits, among them the right one. To determine the remaining round key bits, we can again use the same texts but restricting ourselves to a different column.

To lower the memory complexity of this attack it is advantageous to not store the $2^{72}$ possible 14-differences but store for each of the $2^{40}$ key guesses the obtained 14-difference. This gives a memory complexity of $2^{40} \cdot (14 + 5)$ bytes corresponding to $2^{41}$ plaintext equivalents. The time complexity is then dominated by constructing
5 Conclusion

In this paper, we developed and studied polytopic cryptanalysis. We were able to show that the methodology and notation of standard cryptanalysis can be unambiguously extended to polytopic cryptanalysis, including the concept of impossible differentials. Standard differential cryptanalysis remains as a special case of polytopic cryptanalysis.

For impossible polytopic transitions, we demonstrated that both the increase in the size of the space of $d$-differences and the inherent limit in the diffusion of $d$-differences in a cipher allow them to be very effective in settings where ordinary impossible differentials fail. This is the case when the number of rounds is so high that impossible differentials do no longer exist or when the allowed data complexity is too low.

Finally we showed the practical relevance of this framework by demonstrating novel low-data attacks on DES and AES that are able to compete with existing attacks.

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References


References


A Markov model in polytopic cryptanalysis

To develop the Markov model, we first need to introduce keys in the function over which the transitions take place. We will thus restrict our discussion to product ciphers i.e., block ciphers that are constructed through repeated composition of round functions. In contrast to Eq. (2), each round function $f^i$ is now keyed with its own round key $k_i$, which itself is derived from the key $k$ of the cipher via a key schedule.

\[2\] For a clearer notation, we moved the index from subscript to superscript.
We can then write the block cipher \( f_k \) as:

\[
f_k := f_{k_r}^r \circ \cdots \circ f_{k_2}^2 \circ f_{k_1}^1. \tag{1}
\]

The first assumption that we now need to make, is that the round keys are independent. The second assumption is that the product cipher is a Markov cipher. Here we adopt the notion of a Markov cipher from [23] to polytopic cryptanalysis:

**Definition 14.** A product cipher is a \((d+1)\)-polytopic Markov cipher if and only if for all round functions \( f^i \), for any \((d+1)\)-polytopic transition \( \alpha \rightarrow \beta \) for that round function and any fixed inputs \( x, y \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \), we have

\[
\Pr_{K} \left( \alpha \xrightarrow{f_{K}^i} x, \beta \right) = \Pr_{K} \left( \alpha \xrightarrow{f_{K}^i} y, \beta \right)
\]

where \( K \) is a random variable distributed uniformly over the spaces of round keys.

In words, a cipher is a \((d+1)\)-polytopic Markov cipher if and only if the probabilities of 1-round \((d+1)\)-polytopic transitions do not depend on the specific anchor as long as the round key is distributed uniformly at random. For \( d = 1 \), the definition coincides with the classical definition.

Just as with the standard definition of Markov ciphers, most block ciphers are \((d+1)\)-polytopic Markov ciphers for any \( d \) as the round keys are usually added to any part of the state that enters the non-linear part of the round function (for a counterexample, see [16]). Examples of \((d+1)\)-polytopic Markov ciphers are SPN ciphers such as AES [15] or PRESENT [7], and Feistel ciphers such as DES [26] or CLEFIA [27]. We are not aware of any cipher that is Markov in the classical definition but not \((d+1)\)-polytopic Markov.

In the following, we extend the central theorem from [23] (Theorem 2) to the case of \((d+1)\)-polytopes.

**Theorem 15.** Let \( f_k = f_{k_r}^r \circ \cdots \circ f_{k_1}^1 \) be a \((d+1)\)-polytopic Markov cipher with independent round keys, chosen uniformly at random and let \( \delta_0, \delta_1, \ldots, \delta_r \) be a series of \( d \)-differences such that \( \delta_0 \) is the input \( d \)-difference of round 1 and \( \delta_i \) is the output \( d \)-difference of round \( i \) of some fixed input \((d+1)\)-polytope. The series \( \delta_0, \delta_1, \ldots, \delta_r \) then forms a Markov chain.

The following proof follows the lines of the original proof from [23].

**Proof.** We limit ourselves here to showing that

\[
\Pr_{K_1, K_2} \left( \delta_1 \xrightarrow{f_{K_2}^r} \delta_2 \mid \delta_0 \xrightarrow{f_{K_1}^1} x, \delta_1 \right) = \Pr_{K_2} \left( \delta_1 \xrightarrow{f_{K_2}^r} z, \delta_2 \right)
\]

where \( x \) and \( z \) are any elements from \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \) and \( K_1 \) and \( K_2 \) are distributed uniformly at random over their respective round key spaces and the conditioned event has positive
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probability. The theorem then follows easily by induction and application of the same arguments to the other rounds.

For any \( x, z \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \), we now have

\[
\Pr_{K_1, K_2} \left( \delta_1 \xrightarrow{\frac{f_{K_2}}{f_{K_1}(x)}} \delta_2 \text{ and } \delta_0 \xrightarrow{\frac{f_{K_1}}{x}} \delta_1 \right)
\]

\[
= \sum_{y \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} \Pr_{K_1, K_2} \left( \delta_1 \xrightarrow{\frac{f_{K_2}}{y}} \delta_2 \text{ and } \delta_0 \xrightarrow{\frac{f_{K_1}}{x}} \delta_1 \right) \cdot \Pr_{K_1} \left( \delta_0 \xrightarrow{\frac{f_{K_1}}{x}} \delta_1 \text{ and } f_{K_1}(x) = y \right)
\]

\[
= \Pr_{K_2} \left( \delta_1 \xrightarrow{\frac{f_{K_2}}{z}} \delta_2 \right) \cdot \sum_{y \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} \Pr_{K_1} \left( \delta_0 \xrightarrow{\frac{f_{K_1}}{x}} \delta_1 \text{ and } f_{K_1}(x) = y \right)
\]

\[
= \Pr_{K_2} \left( \delta_1 \xrightarrow{\frac{f_{K_2}}{z}} \delta_2 \right) \cdot \Pr_{K_1} \left( \delta_0 \xrightarrow{\frac{f_{K_1}}{x}} \delta_1 \right)
\]

where the second equality comes from the independence of keys \( K_1 \) and \( K_2 \) and the third equality comes from the Markov property of the cipher. From this, Eq. (3) follows directly.

The important consequence of the fact that the sequence of \( d \)-differences forms a Markov chain is that, just as in standard differential cryptanalysis, the average probability of a particular polytopic trail with respect to independent random round keys is the product of the single polytopic 1-round transitions of which it consists. We then have the following result:

**Corollary 16.** Let \( f_k, f_{k_i}, 1 \leq i \leq r \) be as before. Let \( \alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f_1} \alpha_1 \xrightarrow{f_2} \cdots \xrightarrow{f_r} \alpha_r \) be an \( r \)-round \((d+1)\)-polytopic trail. Then

\[
\Pr \left( \alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f_{K_1}} \alpha_1 \xrightarrow{f_{K_2}} \cdots \xrightarrow{f_{K_r}} \alpha_r \right) = \prod_{i=1}^{r} \Pr \left( \alpha_{i-1} \xrightarrow{f_{K_i}} \alpha_i \right)
\]

(4)

where \( x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \) and the \( K_i \) are uniformly randomly distributed on their respective spaces.

**Proof.** This is a direct consequence of the fact that \( d \)-differences form a Markov chain.

In most attacks though, we are attacking one fixed key and can not average the attack over all keys. Thus the following assumption is necessary:

**Hypothesis of stochastic equivalence.** Let \( f \) be as above. The hypothesis of stochastic equivalence then refers to the assumption that the probability of any polytopic
trail $\alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f_1} \alpha_1 \xrightarrow{f_2} \ldots \xrightarrow{f_r} \alpha_r$ is roughly the same for the large majority of keys:

$$\Pr \left( \alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f_{k_1}} \alpha_1 \xrightarrow{f_{k_2}} \ldots \xrightarrow{f_{k_r}} \alpha_r \right) \approx \Pr \left( \alpha_0 \xrightarrow{f_1} \alpha_1 \xrightarrow{f_2} \ldots \xrightarrow{f_r} \alpha_r \right) \quad (5)$$

for almost all tuples of round keys $(k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_r)$.

\section*{B Truncated polytopic transitions and higher-order differentials}

In this section, we extend the definition of truncated differentials to polytopic transitions and prove that higher-order differentials are a special case of these. We then gauge the cryptographic ramifications of this.

In accordance with usual definitions for standard truncated differentials (see for example \cite{6}, we define:

\begin{definition}
A truncated $d$-difference is an affine subspace of the space of $d$-differences. A truncated $(d+1)$-polytopic transition is a pair $(A, B)$ of truncated $d$-differences, mostly denoted as $A \xrightarrow{} B$. The probability of a truncated $(d+1)$-polytopic transition $(A, B)$ is defined as the probability that an input $d$-difference chosen uniformly randomly from $A$ maps to a $d$-difference in $B$:

$$\Pr \left( A \xrightarrow{} B \right) := |A|^{-1} \sum_{\alpha \in A} \Pr \left( \alpha \xrightarrow{} \beta \right) \quad (1)$$

As the truncated input $d$-difference is usually just a single $d$-difference, the probability of a truncated differential is then just the probability that this input $d$-difference maps to any of the output $d$-differences in the output truncated $d$-difference. With a slight abuse of notation, we will denote the truncated polytopic transition then also as $\alpha \xrightarrow{} B$ where $\alpha$ is the single $d$-difference of the input truncated $d$-difference.

A particular case of a truncated $d$-difference is the case where the individual differences of the $d$-differences always add up to the same value. This is in fact just the kind of $d$-differences one is interested in when working with higher-order derivatives. We refer here to Lai’s original paper on higher-order derivatives \cite{22} and Knudsen’s paper on higher-order differentials \cite{20} for reference and notation.

\begin{theorem}
A differential of order $t$ is a special case of a truncated $2^t$-polytopic transition. In particular, its probability is the sum of the probabilities of all $2^t$-polytopic trails that adhere to the truncated $2^t$-polytopic transition.
\end{theorem}

\begin{proof}
Let $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$. Let $(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_t)$ be the set of linearly independent differences that are used as the base for our derivative. Let $L(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_t)$ denote the linear space spanned by these differences. Let furthermore $\beta$ be the output difference we are
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interested in. The probability of the \( t \)-th order differential \( \Delta_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_t} f(X) = \beta \) is then defined as the probability that

\[
\sum_{\gamma \in L(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_t)} f(X \oplus \gamma) = \beta
\]

holds with \( X \) being a random variable, uniformly distributed on \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \).

Let \( B \) now be the truncated \((2^t - 1)\)-difference defined as

\[
B := \left\{ (\delta_1, \ldots, \delta_{2^t - 1}) \left| \sum_{i=1}^{2^t - 1} \delta_i = \beta \right. \right\}.
\]

Let \( \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \ldots, \gamma_{2^t - 1} \) be an arbitrary ordering of the non-zero elements of the linear space \( L(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_t) \) and let \( \alpha = (\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_{2^t - 1}) \) be the \((2^t - 1)\)-difference consisting of these. We will then show that the probability of the \( t \)-th order differential \((\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_t, \beta)\) is equal to the the probability of the truncated \(2^t\)-polytopic transition \( \alpha \xrightarrow{f} B \). With \( X \) being a random variable, uniformly distributed on \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \), we have

\[
\Pr\left( \alpha \xrightarrow{f} B \right)
= \Pr\left( \sum_{i=1}^{2^t - 1} f(X \oplus \gamma_i) \oplus f(X) = \beta \right)
= \Pr\left( \sum_{i=1}^{2^t - 1} f(X \oplus \gamma_i) \oplus f(X) = \beta \right)
= \Pr\left( \sum_{\gamma \in L(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_t)} f(X \oplus \gamma) = \beta \right)
\]

which proves the theorem.

\[\square\]

**Example.** Let \( \alpha_1 \) and \( \alpha_2 \) be two differences with respect to which we want to take the second order derivative and let \( \beta \) be the output value we are interested in. The probability that \( \Delta_{\alpha_1, \alpha_2} f(X) = \beta \) for uniformly randomly chosen \( X \) is then nothing else than the probability that the 3-difference \((\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_1 \oplus \alpha_2)\) is mapped to a 3-difference \((\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3)\) with \( \beta_1 \oplus \beta_2 \oplus \beta_3 = \beta \).

This theoretical connection between truncated and higher-order differentials has an interesting consequence: a higher-order differentials can be regarded as the union of polytopic trails. This principally allows us to determine lower bounds for the probability of higher-order differentials by summing over the probabilities of a subset of all polytopic trails that it contains – just as we are used to from standard differentials.
As shown in Lemma 9, the probability of a \((d + 1)\)-polytopic trail is always at most as high as the probability of the worst standard differential trail that it contains. A situation in which the probability of a higher-order differential at the same time is dominated by a single polytopic trail and has a higher probability than any ordinary differential can thus never occur. To find a higher-order differential with a higher probability than any ordinary differential for a given cipher, we are thus always forced to sum over many polytopic trails. Whether this number can remain manageable for a large number of rounds will require further research and is beyond the scope of this paper.