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PRAGMATIC FAILURE CULTURE IN CONSTRUCTION PROCESSES

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Costs of failures in construction processes can be significant to project budgets. An ongoing empirical study, at a large Danish contractor, creates an in depth understanding of causes of failures. Underlying structures for AEC project management practices are studied from a sociological structuration perspective. Different failure cultures are studied as structures for the inter-organizational interactions in building processes. The project studied is successful in terms of time, costs and from the project's narrative although a fatal occupational injury is somewhat damaging this picture. The study shows a wide range of failures throughout the production phase. Most are minor problems leading only to limited reflection and narrow redressing actions. The ambiguity is that this "successful project" encompasses what could be seen as a failure culture. Conclusions are that project cultures entail an expectation of a certain level of failures throughout the project.

KEYWORDS: Failures, project culture, project management, structuration

INTRODUCTION

There is an absurdity attached to failure and success, since it is often failure or the unanticipated that leads to deeper reflections, change and improvement. The paper deals with an ambiguity that a building project that is regarded successful includes an expectation of a certain level of problems. The paper illuminates failures in construction processes from a different angle than rational understandings e.g. frameworks of causes and consequences of failures since it considers preconditions of actions rather than just the incidents. On basis of structuration theory and secondarily cultural theory the question is in connection to failures in operations; how actions and reflections on these occur in project based organisations? The empirical data stems from an ongoing Industrial-PhD-project hosted by NCC Construction Denmark, one of the largest Contractors in Denmark, in cooperation with University of Aarhus.

The starting point of the study is a frustration of what apparently seems to be an industry problem: a "failure culture". A review of existing knowledge on failures in the industry and within the company reveals a substantial amount of knowledge on the subject. Yet a range of problems are repeated across the portfolio of projects in the company and the industry. Internal company benchmarking data shows that quality issues, concerning both process and product, amount to large sums and strategies are imposed to reduce these. Earlier studies of stumbling stones in the building processes on a NCC project have estimated costs of the problems to 8 % of the total production value (Apelgren 2005) corresponding a summary from the Danish authorities (DEACA 2004) and Josephsons (1996) extensive studies in Sweden. Moreover the Danish building industry has been severely criticised on quality issues in the public debate, so it is a topic of current interest. The conception of failures in this paper is open-minded since it recognises the different dynamics of failure mechanisms (e.g. Jørgensen 2008; Apelgren 2005). Some can be latent, others emerging. The ambition is however not to reproduce arguments of large networks of causes and effects but to report the qualitative

insights that the specific cases produces, based on the theory and acquaintance of the field. The position of the investigation at a large contractor delivers a unique possibility to gasp a glimpse of what is underneath the surface of project cultures and company structures.

The paper opens with remarks on the methods used. Mirroring the abductive method it proceeds with the theoretical frame focusing primarily on structuration theory and secondarily culture. Central points from the empirical case material are followed by an analysis of structuration and cultural elements. Finally discussion and conclusion deals with failure cultures as a part of a successful project leading to implications for the company.

METHOD

The scientific approach is abductive, where theory and empirical knowledge is developed concurrently (e.g. Alvesson & Skjöldberg 1994). According to Hanson abduction in simple terms means the ability to see patterns; to reveal deep structures (in Alvesson & Skjöldberg 2000; 17). The theory is a starting point and eye-opener and through an open empirical case-study a discussion of divergence between theory and empirical findings is applied through continuous iterations. The theoretical framework combines processual elements with elements of stability (structures) via Giddens theory of structuration (e.g. Giddens 1984) as *ontology-in-general* (Stones 2005:75) and theory on cultural elements (e.g. Alvesson 2002) as *ontology-in-situ*. A study of preconditions of actions demands for an in-depth study, rather than a wide approach. Consequently a single-case-study is selected which is double-edged in the sense that “when compared with quantitative research or multiple case studies, [it] is ordinarily judged to be lacking in rigor, comparability, and replicability” (Barzelay 1993). However, it is an extremely valuable method of social science research when used for purposes of analysing how people frame and solve problems (Ibid.). It delivers a possibility to get a deeper insight in nexuses and ambiguity and examine what is underneath the surface of project cultures and company structures. The fact that the analytical phase is emergent entails some theoretical limitation, e.g. a limited cultural scope.

Empirical material: Observations and interview

The 3 year PhD-project has an aim to create an in depth understanding of causes of failures and to facilitate change activities within the company. The empirical data was collected from 80 days of ethnographic observations of primarily on-site processes from September 2007 until autumn 2008. The starting point was site management activities, where work tasks of the contractors’ project team were central. The primary focus was on the pre-cast concrete elements assembly phase as well as the installation phase. One-on-one observations (shadowing) were carried out on-site, in the site-office and at site-meetings. Participant observations and interviews also mapped interactions with designers, suppliers, subcontractors, craftsmen as well as functions at the headquarters. Numerous qualitative interviews were conducted with relevant actors as well as study visits at the suppliers’ facilities. The “output” consists of a structured record of 130 problems observed on-site and a parallel diary describing day-to-day problem-solving. This mirrors an attempt to systematically analyse the failures without ending at a quantitative argument. A limitation is that not all failures were registered since it is not possible to follow all parallel activities. Moreover the collection method can lead to “death by data suffocation” as a result of the substantial quantity of data. Also the economic involvement and integration with the contractor might bias the investigation. This condition is included in the analytical reflection carried out and the Industrial-PhD program setup and the involvement of a research institution should also limit this bias.

(STRONG) STRUCTURATION THEORY

Stones (2005) concept of *strong structuration* is moulding the “dried out” abstract theory of Giddens into an applicable implement for empirical researchers. The concepts of structuration theory can be seen as an *ontology-in-general*, “concepts about the very nature of social entities over and beyond any particular empirical manifestation of them in specific social circumstances” (Ibid; 7), while on an *ontic level* a cultural analysis can deliver insight of the practical level of the building projects. To Giddens, society consists of social practices that are produced and reproduced across time and space (Kaspersen 2001). On basis of structures the social practice constitutes individuals as conscious, knowledgeable agents and through “*activities agents reproduce the conditions that makes these activities possible*” (Giddens 1984; 2), i.e. structures are reproduced, or perhaps reinforced or transformed. Agents and structures are hereby two sides of the same thing: The social practice (Kaspersen 2001). Structures are both medium and outcome of processes and because the actors are knowledgeable structures are a condition for actions embedded within the agent and not deterministic.

Characteristic for structuration theory is that it goes beyond just looking at agents or structures or giving *a priori* primacy to one or another (Stones 2005; 4). Giddens embed values/norms as structural properties within the agent (Giddens 1984; 25). Structural properties consist of rules and resources. Rules can be understood broadly as “techniques and formulas that, anchored in our tacit practical consciousness, are employed in action or *simply*; “how to go on in social life” (Kaspersen 2000; 382). Rules relate on one hand to interpretation, *the constitution of meaning* (Giddens 1984; 18), and on the other hand to normative regulation (Ibid.). Sewell (1992; 9) put the notion of resources into “ordinary English” as *human* (authoritative) and *non-human* (allocative) resources. Both are media of power (Ibid). Structural properties are an unacknowledged condition of the activity but also unintended the structural properties are reproduced. Thus the structural properties are both constraining and enabling (Giddens 1984; 25) and the unintended consequences introduce the reproductive nature of actions which may as a result of the agents’ knowledgeability and reflexivity, or by incident, lead to change over time. As Bourdieu’s “habitus” that does nothing in itself, but is a disposition for agency, structure has no existence independent of the knowledge that agents have of their day-to-day activity (Ibid; 26). Quality-focus infrequently structures the building processes since other structures often becomes predominating. This way traditional cause/ consequence analysis’ often fail to deliver applicable knowledge to the actors and rational conceptions of failure mechanisms is in itself not sufficient. Thus the presumption is that elements in project cultures are essential in understanding dynamics in the problem solving which is why substantial catalogues of knowledge on failures often fail to structure the actions on projects.

Cultural scope

On an *ontic level* empirical implications on structures in the construction industry stress the importance of a cultural perspective. Kaspersen (2001; 233) criticise the structuration theory for the lack of a cultural scope: The theory can not grasp why actors act in different ways and why structural properties can be different to different people. Giddens notion of rules can be strengthened by including a cultural scope. There are a number of indications of differentiations in cultures in the construction industry. A study of organisational cultures focusing on the work processes (Koch 2002) as well as Thuesen (2006) describes a differentiation of cultures.

Organisational culture can be described as “patterns of meanings and ideas in the organisation” (Alvesson 2002; 96). The focus of study is symbols such as metaphors, myths and narratives (Ibid; 3) as well as meaning and interpretations regarding central aspects of project

culture. Theory of culture in organisations based on symbolic interactionism discusses these meanings and interpretations as integrated, differentiated and/or ambiguous. Alvesson (2002) discuss organisational cultures as a multiple cultural configuration that consists of both shared orientations as well as differentiated and unclear elements. In line with Koch's (2002) definition of safety cultures, failure cultures are viewed as a focussed aspect of organizational cultures. *Failure cultures* are then the shared and learned meanings, experiences and interpretations of quality and failure in construction processes, expressed partially symbolically, which guide peoples actions towards problem-solving in the day-to-day work and prevention of flaws, mistakes, failures and defects. Failure cultures are therefore seen as a conflicting set of symbols, metaphors and meanings and moreover the approach is a further step away from classical explanations of structures. The failure cultures are furthermore shaped by people in the structures and social relations within and outside the organization. Within cultural theory there is an understanding, that the founders of social orders play an important role as a culture creator and/or bearer (Alvesson 2002) which is another point of interest in the cultural investigation.

CASE: THE PERIMETER BLOCKS PROJECT

The case material stems from an ongoing building project that was organized as two separate projects on the same lot and in the same site accommodation. The primary object of the study was the construction of the first two of four six storey buildings (238 apartments) called *the perimeter blocks project* and the other project was six, six storey buildings (144 apartments) called *the square blocks project*. The total budget of the projects was 68 million Euros. In both projects NCC Construction is the general contractor and the executive manager is in charge of both, also in the design phase. He is however primarily connected to the daily execution of the square blocks. The executive manager is responsible of the total project and keeping to the budget and time. All three persons in the project team of the perimeter blocks were replaced during the project. All four subcontract managers, two at each project, are young with either no experience or experience from only a few projects.

The projects are successful in terms of measures as time and costs. Furthermore the social construction of the projects as a success is heard from the projects history narrative. But by the death of a construction worker this image is to some extent broken. Vital to the success has been that the project was very carefully worked out and had wide boundaries (in form of time, costs and work space). Other factors that were pointed out as important to the success where competencies and collaboration across the value chain, a consistent and competent executive manager throughout the design and execution phase, a focus on simple solutions and buildability, and sufficient time to make competent decisions and execute these on-site. At the beginning of the construction phase the construction of the penthouse storey was identified as the only critical element in the process. However, the empirical data shows that a wide range of problems is present throughout the on-site production phase. The data collection focussed on the quality in the processes, rather than a quantitative registration. In the following some particular examples are presented.

Assembly of the precast concrete carcass

The carcass structure is based on precast concrete elements. On basis of the design done by the architect, the structural engineers modelled the structural project in 3D-CAD. The 3D-model provided an opportunity for collision control between elements and installations. The project is evaluated by the on-site team as having an unusually high standard. There are three

precast concrete manufacturers responsible of different types of elements: light walls and horizontal divisions from one supplier, heavy brick façade walls from another and stairs from the third. Moreover bathroom cabins from a fourth supplier is delivered and mounted with the carcass. There are a number of failures in the process of erecting the panels. Failures occurs which are at some point initiated by all the different involved parties. Failures related to planning, the structural engineer project, the factories, on-site management, and execution is all present. Failures initiated by the manufactures are, however, the most represented. Production flaws in the form of misplaced recesses, joint locks, inserts etc. is a common problem, as well as slanting elements and problems of keeping within the tolerances, is often detected. The problems are reported to the manufacturer and it is decided who is responsible and who will redress the problem. As a result at some point there are three “finishing gangs” from the different manufacturers present at the site - in addition to the original concrete assembly gang. Yet the management group as well as NCC concrete department, which is a subcontractor on this project, refers to the project as very successful. This is in spite of a fatal injury:

A fatal occupational injury

In the ground floor gable two large brick sandwich elements was already mounted. The assembly gang started mounting the first façade elements adjacent to the gable. There was too much insulation so the element did not fit and the gang sent for the foreman to document the problem with a photo. At the same time a craftsman started casting under the gable elements for fixation. He was also on the photo that was taken. They decided to lift up the façade element to remove the excess insulation. Suddenly a sound was heard when the supporting steel structure broke. The foreman knew something was happening and shouted at the person at the end wall to get away. However, the closest gable element fell out taking the next gable element with it. The worker did not escape the 10 ton element... Soon the construction site and hut were crowded with police, ambulance men, people from the health and safety department of the contractor, as well as the working environment authority. The incident was thoroughly investigated by the health and safety department of the contractor as well as the police and the working environment authority. The investigation pointed at a number of different causes which were present at the same time and eventually caused the failure. Other than the excess insulation and the worker being in an unsafe area, the investigation pointed at incorrect handling of the element, that the bolts of the supporting steel structure can have been tightened with too much momentum, and that the inserts did not meet the dimensioned strength.

Immediately after the accident a number of emergency procedures were implemented in the company. Later it led to permanent changes in procedures e.g. restricted rules to cordon off areas close to the erection of large elements. On an industry level rules on the inserts' strength and procedures to tighten the bolts have been enhanced (DAPCP 2009). For a while there was a stressed atmosphere at the construction site but within a week everything was apparently back to normal. The executive manager addressed this directly by saying that they had to leave it behind and get going. After two more weeks the assembly gang was replaced; officially due to difficulties in cooperating with the foreman and not because of the accident. The accident was not mentioned for a long time at the site. However, it was mentioned by the NCC Concrete Department six months later as a part of the evaluation of the project.

ANALYSIS: STRUCTURATION AND CULTURE

When considering the enabling and constraining structural properties of the actions it is also required to look to previous actions of the value chain. A visible resource is the designers'

project materialised through a traditional paper plot drawing. The 3D-model is only represented on-site by a large 3D-plot on the paper drawing. This can be seen as a strong resource enabling the assembly gang to place the panels in the right direction, though. The project material prescribes some normative rules too e.g. assembly technique and sequence. Industry and national institutions also delivers rules, standards and regulations as well as the contractor have central internal procedures. The different rules and resources is interwoven and materialised in different ways through the processes. While the structures can descend from both far away as well as close to the actions or from the agents' interpretation, the structures are always "in-situ" since they 'do something' to the action and therefore are present. The project has observable presence of knowledgeable actors that influence actions and reproduce and transform day-to-day activities. The structural properties span a space to manoeuvre that can be both enabling and limiting. The most noticeable structuring elements in the on-site processes are the *non-human, allocative, resources* that refer to the project management. Not surprisingly this is mainly time and costs but also work space, tools, materials, equipment, workforce, information, and weather impact are important. The schedule is a continuous indicator and influence on the process and time equals money in this context. The different actors in the hierarchy do not have the same point of origin in this respect: In a long period in the beginning of the project there are major discussions on the piece rate between the NCC Concrete management group and the craftsmen. This incongruence has the unintended effect that it structures following activities, affecting other areas of cooperation between the groups. Later on, when the assembly gang is replaced, the management group focuses on settling the piece rate right away and similar problems are avoided. This shows that different structures can clash between different groups. The individual actors also navigate in a variety of rules and resources that also can be seen as conflicting; e.g. focus on progress (and costs) sometimes contrast other structures e.g. internal quality assurance (QA) and safety at work.

The structures can be more or less visible in the actions. The invisible structures are also enabling and constraining. The project material is an example of a structure that interwove practises and can be more or less invisible through the process. This can be a token of a good project material, but if a problem emerges the structure suddenly becomes visible. However, the visibility and symbolic meaning of the project material is closely related to the specific project; the practises of the agents and their interpretation.

Interpretive actors

The empirical data shows a wide range of problems throughout the on-site production phase. Most failures are minor problems leading only to limited reflection and narrow actions to redress the problems. The day-to-day handling is routinised; The NCC production manager doing his round on-site, detecting a problem (perhaps told by the craftsmen), photo documentation, typed into a spreadsheet, reported to the relevant supplier: "If you don't redress the problem, we will do it at you expense", response from the supplier and eventually redressing of the problem. At the project completion the parties make a final financial agreement to cover the expenses. This procedure secures progress of the project which is considered vital. However, unintended, it reproduces a notion of a certain level of problems as accepted in the pre-cast concrete project. This is symbolised by the fact that there are possibly four finishing gangs present at the same time at the construction site.

The knowledgeable actors are almost present to the extreme on the project. Solving problems on basis of their own knowledge at the construction site without consulting competences outside the near surroundings is almost a rule in itself. The executive manager is very

dominant and an autonomous leader. He is the first to demonstrate the competence of problem solving through his own practice, which is an influential element to the rest of the project team. There are numerous examples that the actors learn through reflection on their actions and thereby (unintended) structure the following actions. The structuration is mostly situated in the immediate environment of the project and tied to the individuals or perhaps the project group. The problem solving is often carried out in the closest project group. If this proves inadequate experiences are drawn across the projects in the site lot – especially from the square blocks project towards the perimeter blocks. On the former the actors are more experienced and the schedule is a bit ahead. The executive manager is very significant in this process and in relation to the subcontract manager it can be viewed as apprenticeship.

Reflections are triggered when something differs from the expected. Yet in the case of the routinised problem handling, symbolised by the pre-cast concrete panels, it is almost expected that the elements are flawed leading to only minor corrections of the problem. The reflections are often conveyed through the actions to report or redress the problem, interactions with the closest colleague and/or, in this case, a question from the observer. That reflection is triggered by something differing from the expected also introduces an element of coincidence since the actors are not omniscient and can not be expected to discover all problems.

Transformation or reproduction

Stones' (2005) analytical distinction between external and internal structures moreover shed a light on relations between projects and bureaucracies. The company delivers a setting (structural properties) to the actors that consist of both something intangible (interpretive rules/norms), some instructions or procedure (normative rules), and some resources which are utilised in the actions. These are a result of strategies or organizational reflectivity across projects. When failures have too large consequences, economic or in this case human, the incident can lead to a transformation of the system. The case shows that central procedures only to a small degree comes into effect, and often in a different guise than intended, since it is incorporated into an altered setting. Apparently this is accepted; As long as the fluctuations are not too big (e.g. time, costs and fatal incidents) the executive manager is left alone by headquarters. This way the whole system can be seen as accepting a certain level of failures on different levels. The presence of knowledgeable actors is again enabled and constrained by different interests that keep the house of cards from falling. An unintended consequence is a reproduction of a perhaps suboptimal system. However, the executive manager discursively presents his view upon his part as a role model. He is aware of his impact on the four young subcontract managers in particular and preaches the praxis of on-site problem solving with only little inclusion of central competencies. Time and time again central structures are dismissed and only when creating immense value central procedures are welcomed.

Only the one incident, the death injury, imposes actions that have an impact on future processes further than the project individuals. From the viewpoint of the system this incident leads to reflection that not only reproduces but also transforms structures. Interestingly, the focus was from the beginning put on the solution concerning the penthouse storey, which actually was problematic. But as seen other parts of the process was also flawed. In the process of erecting the carcass the reflection was mainly triggered when something differed, like new or special panels, or the consultants addressing an issue. But the process did cause problems although most of them were trivial and only one fatal! Yet the project is articulated and perceived as successful since the budget and the time frame is met. The perception is that when they choose to focus on the penthouse construction they become less vigilant about other parts of the processes.

Failure culture

The study elucidates how quality is handled and managed in the process. The different groupings show signs of integrative but also differentiated elements of “a failure culture”. The concrete management group reflects the overall management group in general with a pragmatic view of the relation between progress and quality issues, but stands a bit out symbolised through the foreman saying: “*If it goes – it goes*”. This contrasts the initial work gang that is eager to do things *right the first time* which often conflict an emphasis on progress. The subsequent gang’s view to a large degree resembles that of the concrete management group. Interestingly they are recognised by management for their speed and the general impression is that they matching or even surpass their predecessors’ work. A third party is represented through competencies and structures delivered by the headquarters of the contractor, which is a *culture of legitimisation* since structures are not only systems to secure quality in-house but also a recognition of a quality focus to customers and surroundings. The study shows that the latter actually becomes the most significant role of these central quality structures.

The emergent analysis indicate that the specific phenomenon of organisational cultures addressing handling of quality in the process, named failure culture, can be described as a multiple cultural configuration that consists of both shared orientations, as well as differentiated and unclear elements as suggested by Alvesson. Integration is much more distinct within the on-site groups; the management groups and the craftsmen, and this can overall be described as *pragmatic quality handling*. These characteristics are elements of project cultures that can be described as highly resistant to outside interference. The *culture of legitimisation* is representative of a viewpoint of the headquarters and a focus on quality structures. However there are also integrative elements across the two failure cultures.

DISCUSSION

There is a wide range of arguments on failures in the construction industry, founded in social practice and communicated through various different channels, which in reality says very little about the processes that produce the failures since they do not consider the dynamics and the preconditions of the actions. Indications are that a company like NCC Construction, with a large portfolio, has large, but unknown, costs of failures in operations. The failures disappear in the budgets as unrecognised rework. The successful project encompasses a failure culture with an expectation of a certain level of problems throughout the projects and the project cultures are highly resistant to outside interference. The interactions with functions at the headquarters illustrates that all levels of the company are included. An assertion is that this also encompasses many other actors in the Danish construction industry and therefore is a structure for the industry in general. The guiding principle of the accepted level will be relative to the competitive bidding and therefore how close the calculation hits the target.

Looking at how company structures are actually manifested through the actions, factors as time and costs becomes predominating. Among other structural properties also previous experiences can be structuring. These are highly dominated by individual or project network experiences and seldom based on organizational ditto. So structuration is primarily situated at projects, primarily directed at individuals or the project group, and knowledge is disconnected from the main organisation. Often the properties must create a direct sense of value to the individual or the project. This selection is also based on experiences of the actors or the project network and this social construction affects the selection and rejection of the options at hand. Additionally direct procedures, orders, or commands can become structures

for action. In contrast or collaboration with incentive structures it creates a tense space to manoeuvre. The project represents an industry structure rather than a company structure since most distinctive elements of the headquarters are dismissed, meaning the project has no more similarities with other NCC projects than with projects from other contractors.

Vital to structuration theory is a dualism of structure and agency. The cases reveal that structures can be contradictory - and often turns "visible" by this clash. This is a departure from pure structuralism and brings back agency to the actors. In a NCC context, where central procedures, regulations and reporting are increasing, the necessity of the presence of a space for actors to exert their agency is highlighted, which point at co-presence of structure and agency as vital elements. Yet at the moment there seem to be a lack of both. Methodological structures that affect the actors are often invisible. By following planning and interactions prior to the execution, bits of the reasoning and the procedures that form the rationality are often revealed. Mostly as part of the discursive or perhaps practical consciousness (Giddens 1984; 7) that is made discursive through reflection. It is difficult to manage unconscious motives and cognition but through training, education and relevant procedures the company can stimulate the discursive and practical consciousness of the employees.

The emergent analysis points at a multiple cultural configuration at the production site. An integrating element is the pragmatic quality handling across the groups. Based on prior experiences and literature, an assumption is that the ability to walk this thin line can be important for the success of the projects. But at the same time it is a frustrating element that sustains a high degree of flaws in the construction process. On-site the culture of legitimisation is underexposed, which can be seen as an expression of not only a clash between strategic intentions of the company and on-site processes but also between structural properties of different social groups and different failure cultures. The pragmatic quality handling is an element in the success of the project, but the ambiguity is that this "successful project" also covers what could be described as a failure culture.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Conclusions are that within the project culture there is an expectation of a certain level of failures and problems throughout the project. Through the actions of the project management this failure culture is unintentionally reproduced time and time again. Moreover, the study shows that understanding the causes of failures in the building process demands a wider scope and can seldom be narrowed down to simple causalities. Quality is a structure for the actions of the individuals on the projects but it is rarely the strongest argument. In the day-to-day activities the actors are reflective towards problems, mostly carried out in the close project surrounding. In a broader perspective they reproduce an unintended structure that can be seen as an expected and accepted level of failures and flaws in the processes. A transformation of the structures and actions are only seen when the consequences are comprehensive or fatal. Central structures are only present to a small degree in the specific project and local judgement can be seen as pivotal in the processes. The co-presence of structures and agency as vital elements in strategically addressing failures and quality is an important argument for the future processes of the contractor. The structures must to a wider degree take account of this autonomous local judgement that is indisputably present. And with respect to this, focus on the project experiences must be enhanced in order to facilitate organisational learning so that the experiences to a wider degree becomes structuring not only to the individuals and the project group but also to future projects. There is no point in reinventing the wheel in each project. As banal as this points may seem, it is however highly relevant.

The objective is not to demonstrate a theory. But mobilising the structuration theory has brought something to the empiric material – and vice versa. However, an ambition is to strengthen the cultural perspective and “rebuild” the theoretical foundation to enhance the focus on the cultural elements.

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